



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**SMALL TOWN INSURGENCY: THE STRUGGLE FOR  
INFORMATION DOMINANCE TO REDUCE GANG  
VIOLENCE**

by

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DOMINANCE TO REDUCE GANG VIOLENCE**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Since 2006, the gang related homicide rate in Salinas, California has quadrupled. As of 2009 the homicide rate associated with gang activity far exceeds those of much larger cities such as San Francisco, San Jose, and even Los Angeles, California. This report examines this negative trend through the lens of counterinsurgency, since gangs exhibit many similarities in structure and tactics to insurgent groups. Accordingly, this thesis capitalizes on the diverse academic theories available to the study of counterinsurgencies. While the common narrative for an effective counterinsurgency campaign focuses on the importance of information dominance, there has been little research into component factors that might either promote, or inhibit, the flow of information that is also critical in combating the American street gang phenomenon. In reality, gangs exist because of an information advantage bestowed upon them by the population. Thus, we postulate that two factors, information volume and information processing, mutually contribute to information dominance with respect to a counter-gang strategy. Through comparative analysis, our research suggests that improving relationships between the population and the government encourages more communication about gang activities. Additionally, improving communication structures within the government enhances information processing. Combined, these two factors reduce the gang's information advantage.

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

BNE	Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement (Salinas)
CASP	Community Alliance for Safety and Peace
CI	Confidential Informant
COEF	Coefficient
COIN	Counterinsurgency
DV	Dependent Variable
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FM	Field Manual
FY	Fiscal Year <sup>3</sup>
GSS	General Social Survey
IO	Information Operations
IV	Independent Variable
MCJGTF	Monterey County Joint Gang Task Force
NF	Nuestra Familia
NGIC	National Gang Intelligence Center
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PD	Police Department
PIO	Public Information Officer
POP	Problem Oriented Policing
RAND	The Research and Development Corporation
SARA	Scanning Analysis Response and Assessment
SPD	Salinas Police Department
STD DEV	Standard Deviation
TCO	Transnational Criminal Organization
VIF	Variance Inflation Factor
VSU	Violence Suppression Unit

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

Is there a place in modern law enforcement practices for the adoption of unconventional warfare techniques to counter the proliferation of street gangs in American society? We think there is. However, prior to understanding how counterinsurgency (COIN) theory can play a significant role in developing an effective counter-gang strategy, one must first examine and understand the similarities and differences between urban street gangs and insurgent forces. Despite the differences, a detailed evaluation of the characteristics of both groups will make evident how an effective strategy grounded in counterinsurgency doctrine can be used to combat street gangs. While the delineation between gangs and insurgent groups may at first seem clear-cut, in our ever changing world, the lines of distinction between different groups of armed young men are not so clear.

### **A. COMPARING GANGS AND INSURGENTS**

#### **1. The American Street Gang**

One can get lost in the myriad of descriptive terms used to describe gangs. The term "gang" has no fixed legal meaning. Definitions of gangs have varied over time, according to the perceptions and interests of the definer, academic fashions, and the changing social reality of the gang. States have varying legal definitions of gangs. According to the California State Penal Code, a street gang is defined as an “ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more [violent] criminal acts; having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.”<sup>1</sup> The Texas Penal Code defines street gangs as three or more persons having a common identifying sign or symbol or an identifiable leadership who continuously or

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<sup>1</sup> *California State Penal Code*, Title 7, Chapter 11:186.22, <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/> (accessed 11/12/2010).



regularly associate in the commission of criminal activities.”<sup>2</sup> The Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines a gang as, “a group of persons working to unlawful or antisocial ends.”<sup>3</sup>

While Merriam-Webster may have found closure on a concise definition of “gang,” it is not so clear to the agencies and organizations that are tasked with combating illicit gang activity on a daily basis. According to Donald Lyddane, an intelligence analyst for the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), no clear national consensus of what constitutes a gang has ever been fully reached.<sup>4</sup> Because there is no national standard definition of a gang, definitions can change from one law enforcement jurisdiction to another. Lyddane does highlight one common denominator used in virtually every gang definition, one that is prevalent in most literature on the subject, and that is that gang members are involved in continuing criminal activity. These activities can range from the sale of drugs, running prostitution rings, to human smuggling.

Some definitions of gangs are classified strictly by the activities of their members, David Curry and Scott Decker, in their research on gangs note that most gangs define themselves along two distinct lines: (1) involvement in criminal activities, or (2) the affiliation of gang membership through cultural aspects such as familial ties.<sup>5</sup> While definitively determining the correct and all encompassing definition of a gang is a worthwhile objective, this lofty goal is beyond the scope of this research. Suffice it to say, these definitional questions reveal a lack of consensus on the significance of the gang problem, and in turn make it extremely difficult to determine what strategic policies might best address this growing threat. For the purposes of this research, it is adequate to say that a gang is a group of individuals who constitute criminal organizations for the purpose of financial gain.

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<sup>2</sup> *Texas Penal Code*, Title 11, Chapter 71:71.01.d, <http://law.justia.com/> (accessed 11/12/2010).

<sup>3</sup> Merriam Webster Online, “Gang,” <http://www.merriam-webster.com/> (accessed 11/12/2010).

<sup>4</sup> Donald Lyddane, “Understanding Gangs and Gang Mentality: Acquiring Evidence of the Gang Conspiracy,” *United States Attorneys’ Bulletin: Gangs* 54, no. 3 (May 2006).

<sup>5</sup> David G. Curry and Scott H. Decker, *Confronting Gangs: Crime and Community*, Second ed. (Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company, 2003), 14.

## **2. The Insurgent**

Compared to the broad definition of gangs, the definition of insurgents on the other hand, has been honed to a much finer point of understanding. The latest Army Counterinsurgency Manual, FM 3–24, defines an insurgency by its actions rather than any organizational doctrine. It defines insurgency as, “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”<sup>6</sup>

## **3. Commonalities and Differences**

### ***a. Strategic Objectives***

This definition of insurgencies brings to the forefront the primary difference between street gangs and insurgencies, and that is that both organizations pursue different strategic objectives. As history has shown, most notable insurgent movements—the Maoist Chinese, the Hukbalahap movement in the Philippines, or the Iraq insurgency for example—desire to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country, or to break away from state control and form an autonomous area. Conversely, most traditional street gangs have focused their efforts on maximizing financial profit. Pursuant to this, gangs typically engage in illegal activity outside of the normal markets established by the state. Gangs, like insurgencies, strive for freedom of movement within a particular area of interest in order to push the expansion of their illegal markets further into society. Interviews with incarcerated gang members show that many gangs are organized strictly for the purpose of selling illegal drugs.<sup>7</sup> The research of Jerome Skolnick found that “the involvement of gangs in drug

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<sup>6</sup> United States Army and Marine Corps, *FM 3–24, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 1–1.

<sup>7</sup> Curry and Decker, *Confronting Gangs: Crime and Community*, 95.

distribution is well organized and provided the primary motivation for membership, and that many gangs in California effectively controlled the drug markets in their territories.”<sup>8</sup>

***b. Operational Objectives***

Insurgent groups are not void of using criminal activity for achieving financial gain. Insurgent groups in Iraq as well as those in Columbia, most notably the FARC, have engaged in kidnapping and other illegal activity to fund their organizations. The difference is financial gain is not the insurgent’s strategic objective. By most accounts, insurgencies are inherently political in nature. Financial gain is but one operational objective for the insurgency to continue to grow and achieve its ultimate goal of replacing the state apparatus.

***c. Coercive Influence***

Both gangs and insurgents tend to expand their influence in an area by co-opting individuals and organizations through bribery, coercion and intimidation to sustain their activities. In some cases the line between gangs and insurgents has become increasingly blurry. According to Max Manwaring, gangs are beginning to emerge as a serious impediment to democratic governance and free market economies. In his monograph, *A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil*, Manwaring states:

Rather than trying to depose a government with a major stroke (*golpe* or coup) or in a prolonged revolutionary war, as some insurgents have done, gangs and their allies (the gang phenomenon) more subtly take control of territory and people one street or neighborhood at a time (*coup d’ street*) or one individual, business, or government office at a time. Thus, whether a gang is specifically a criminal or insurgent type organization is irrelevant. Its putative objective is to neutralize, control, or depose

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<sup>8</sup> Curry and Decker, *Confronting Gangs: Crime and Community*, 95.

governments to ensure self-determined (nondemocratic) ends. This objective defines insurgency, a serious political agenda, and a clash regarding the authoritative allocation of values in a society.<sup>9</sup>

#### *d. Origins*

There are many theories that attempt to explain why insurgencies exist. Yet, not all agree upon the factors that motivate their creation and rise. The insurgencies that have plagued the twentieth century were predominately revolutionary in nature, following communist or socialist tenants; however, the twenty-first century has demonstrated something different, expanding our view, and defining the insurgency in different terms. Religious ideologies of all persuasions have become predominate insurgent motivators, suggesting that insurgencies can also be something different from nationalistic fervor. In reality, insurgencies are the result of something much more characteristic of human nature, and arise from persistent pressures placed upon society itself. For example, it is helpful to view the insurgency as an “evolutionary” phenomena rather than a “revolutionary” one, suggesting that they do not occur overnight. In his analysis of the current Afghan insurgency, Seth Jones states, “insurgency [is] caused by two...factors. First, the structural collapse of the state [providing] a permissive condition. [And] second, ideology [as] a direct motivation for insurgent leaders.”<sup>10</sup> Thus, an insurgency is more than a mere popular uprising, but rather a crisis that fills the vacuum resulting from instability and a lack of credibility of the state.

Traditional theories on the origins of gangs identified dysfunctional families, failed education systems, and a lack on social institutions as antecedent conditions that lead many young people into the gang lifestyle. However, in recent years these theories have begun to degrade in the face of new evidence that shows that the traditional stereotypes of gang members from impoverished neighborhoods and single

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<sup>9</sup> Max G. Manwaring, *A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute United States Army War College, [2008]).

<sup>10</sup> Seth G. Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad," *International Security* 32, no. 4 (2008), 15, <http://www.jstor.org/> (accessed 11/12/2010).

parent families with low education is too restrictive.<sup>11</sup> Many young people in inner city America grow up in environments where gangs are already established, for this reason it is a matter of whether that individual decides to join the gang or not. Those who choose to join gangs in many cases believe that it will increase their chances of securing monetary gains. While financial security is a highly motivating factor, it is not the sole motivation for joining gangs. In some cases it's an individual's search for identity, or the need for security and protection that drives them to join. It is important to emphasize that individuals join gangs for a myriad of reasons, some no doubt are caused by socioeconomic conditions, for others it's a sense of belonging. The tie that binds many of these reasons together is self interest.<sup>12</sup>

*e. The Population: The Source of Strength*

Of all the differences and similarities between gangs and insurgents, one similarity is of most importance: both organizations need the active or tacit support of the population to conduct their activities. Like insurgents, urban gangs use surreptitious methods to gain a relative advantage over an affected city's security apparatus, as well as its population, through corruption, coercion, and intimidation. In many cases this is done through taking advantage of economically depressed areas that do not have the social cohesion or social institutions in place to repel their advances. Because of the illicit nature of gangs and insurgencies, they are forced "underground" in order to survive because they typically do not have the size and strength to threaten or replace the state's security forces. For this reason these organizations seek out support from the population from which they gather recruits, weapons, and money to carry out operations.

The Army's Counterinsurgency Field Manual states that in every insurgency, regardless of its cause, there will exist an active minority population that supports the insurgent, a passive majority population, and an active minority population

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<sup>11</sup> Finn-Aage Esbensen, "Preventing Adolescent Gang Involvement," *Juvenile Justice Bulletin*, no. September (2000), <http://www.ncjrs.gov/> (accessed 11/12/2010).

<sup>12</sup> Martín Sánchez-Jankowski, *Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 382.

that opposes the insurgency.<sup>13</sup> The strategy for the insurgent then becomes swaying the passive majority to either support the insurgency, or at the least not interfere with his activities. Similarly, gangs require support from the population in order to survive.

While some may find it easy to dismiss the analogy between gangs and insurgents based on the differing ideologies, or strategic objectives of either group, there is validity in making the comparisons between them. Regardless of their differences, the actions of either group can have a significant destabilizing effect on society. Truly understanding these organization's ties to the population is the key to developing any real strategic solutions to either problem.

## **B THE SMALL TOWN INSURGENCY**

### **1. Gang Proliferation**

Gang migration from large cities to suburban and rural areas has increased over the last twenty years and is a continuous concern for law enforcement agencies. Gangs that were once formed in major cities are now becoming fully entrenched in many smaller communities across the nation. Gang members who migrate to smaller areas form new neighborhood street gangs who quickly take control of areas through violence and intimidation. "The percentage of law enforcement agencies in the United States reporting gang activity in their jurisdictions increased from 45% in 2004 to 58% in 2008."<sup>14</sup> In the wake of this infiltration of gangs into rural America comes criminal activities such as violence and drug trafficking.

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<sup>13</sup> United States Army and Marine Corps, *FM 3-24, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 1-16.

<sup>14</sup> The National Gang Intelligence Center, *2009 National Gang Threat Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: National Gang Intelligence Center, [2009]), <http://www.justice.gov/> (accessed 11/12/2010).

## **2. Gang Membership**

### ***a. National Gang Presence***

According to the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC)<sup>15</sup>, gang membership in the United States was estimated at 1 million members as of September 2008. Based on reporting from federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, this estimation has increased from 800,000 in 2005. Current estimates include approximately 900,000 active gang members in communities throughout the continental United States, and another 147,000 gang members incarcerated in correctional facilities.<sup>16</sup>

### ***b. Gang Presence in the Pacific Region***

States in the Pacific rank among the highest percentage of their populations as being identified as gang members. There are approximately 6,900 gangs operating in the pacific region of the United States (California and Nevada) with an estimated aggregated membership of 237,000. Data from the National Drug Threat Survey conducted in 2008 shows the percentage of law enforcement agencies reporting gang activity in their areas has grown from 66% in 2004 to 77% in 2008. The NGIC predictions of future gang activity are rather sobering. They predict Hispanic gangs will continue to fight for control of retail-level drug distribution in locations throughout the Pacific Region. Additionally, gang related crime levels are predicted to remain significant as gangs continue to fight for control of territories. Lastly gang-related extortion and fire arms violations will likely increase.<sup>17</sup>

### ***c. Salinas, California***

In 1999, it was estimated that there were 52 street gangs in Monterey County, with approximately 3,000 members. Of these, 16 gangs were estimated to reside

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<sup>15</sup> NGIC is a multiagency effort that integrates the gang intelligence assets of federal, state, and local law enforcement entities to serve as a centralized intelligence resource for gang information and analytical support.

<sup>16</sup> The National Gang Intelligence Center, *2009 National Gang Threat Assessment*, 6.

<sup>17</sup> The National Gang Intelligence Center, *2009 National Gang Threat Assessment*, 19.

in Salinas, CA with an estimated membership of 1,500 to 2,000.<sup>18</sup> As of 2009, this estimate has risen to 5,000 active gang members operating in Monterey County with more than 70% of them residing in Salinas, CA. The largest percentage of Hispanic gang members in the county are aligned with the Norteños (Northerners) or the Sureños (Southerners). Norteños is a commonly used generic name for a variety of gangs that are allied with the Nuestra Familia (NF), which has traditionally been responsible for orchestrating many of the violent crimes in Northern California. The NF, whose headquarters traditionally has been in Salinas, is also responsible for the majority of the narcotics trafficking in much of the region. Similarly, The Sureños is a generic name for gangs allied with the Mexican Mafia. Sureños, the traditional enemies of the Norteños, are expanding their power base through the Mexican Mafia's increasing influence in Southern California, and have begun to make their presence felt in Salinas.<sup>19</sup>

### **3. Gang Violence**

In 1998, 15% of all violent crimes in Salinas were classified as gang-related; 17% of all homicides committed in Salinas were classified as gang-related. While statistically overall crime in Salinas has seen a downward trend, the percentage of gang-related crime has increased. In 2009, 27% of all violent crimes were classified as gang-related, and the percentage of homicides that were classified as gang-related soared to 96%.<sup>20</sup> Since 2006, the homicide rate in Salinas has quadrupled. From 2006 to 2009, the homicide rate grew from 4.7 per 100,000 people to an all-time high of 20.4 per 100,000 in 2009, while the national rate held close to six per 100,000 for the same period.<sup>21</sup> In 2008, Salinas had

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<sup>18</sup> Estimation from Brian Contreras, Director of Second Chance, as cited in The Prevention Institute, *Cultivating Peace in Salinas: A Framework for Violence Prevention*, [1999], 6.

<sup>19</sup> Marie Glavin, *Monterey County's Comprehensive Violence Prevention, Intervention, Suppression and Reentry Framework* (Salinas, CA: Renaissance Resources West, [2009]), 7.

<sup>20</sup> Crime statistics are from the Salinas Police Department database. See Appendix A for more detail.

<sup>21</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigations, *FBI Uniform Crime Reports*, <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr> (accessed 05/05/2010).



a per capita murder rate and a per capita crime rate that far exceeded other cities of similar populations in California.<sup>22</sup> In 2009, the City of Salinas ranked 4th in the State of California for homicides per capita.<sup>23</sup>

#### **4. Perceptions of Gang Violence**

Police reports and interviews with gang task force personnel reveal that the intensity of gang crime and violence has escalated from 2008 to mid 2010. The increased lethality of shootings and the blatant daytime occurrences of gang violence have created an increased sense of fear among citizens and businesses. The high concern among local Salinas citizens about the seriousness of gang violence in their community is not overestimated, nor is it anecdotal. In 1996, an independent study of crime in Monterey County found that gang violence was considered the most prevalent form of violence in Salinas.<sup>24</sup> Thirteen years later, a 2009 survey of registered voters in Salinas revealed that 98% of voters considered gangs and youth violence to be an extremely serious problem in the city, and 96% regarded gang related crime to be an extremely serious problem.<sup>25</sup> The citizens are not alone. The Salinas Chief of Police, Louis Fetherolf, also understands the seriousness of gang proliferation, as evidenced by some recent public addresses where he stated:

There is no sector of our community unaffected by violent or major crime; gangs are at the heart of most crime in Salinas. We cannot overemphasize this point, we need your help. We need your eyes, your ears, and your assistance in reporting crime or suspicious activity.<sup>26</sup> Parents need to step up, relatives need to step up. Neighbors need to talk about what it is they

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<sup>22</sup> Glavin, *Monterey County's Comprehensive Violence Prevention, Intervention, Suppression and Reentry Framework*, 7.

<sup>23</sup> Louis Fetherolf, *Report to the Community July 2010* (Salinas, CA: Salinas Police Department, [2010]).

<sup>24</sup> Applied Survey Research, *The Tellus Project: Improving the Quality of Life in Monterey County*, August 1996. As cited by Glavin, *The Prevention Institute, Cultivating Peace in Salinas: A Framework for Violence Prevention*, 6.

<sup>25</sup> Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin & Associates (FMM&A), conducted a poll from May 2–4, 2009 of 400 City of Salinas registered voters likely to cast a ballot in an upcoming election.

<sup>26</sup> Fetherolf, *Report to the Community July 2010*, 1–4.

see and share that with us. . . .We need people to step forward and talk about whom they know are involved in this criminal activity.<sup>27</sup>

The words of Chief Fetherolf could have just as easily come from the mouths of frustrated military leaders who faced a mounting insurgency in Iraq in 2005. Unfortunately, this problem is much closer to home. Chief Fetherolf's pleas to the citizens of Salinas clearly indicate the need by local law enforcement for actionable intelligence on gang activity, and rightly so. For it is becoming increasingly clear that no community is immune to the growing presence and associated violence of street gangs.

## **5. Vulnerable Population**

According to the Salinas Police, "Monterey County can be described as the 'northern edge' of the border with Mexico. There is concern that Mexican cartels are exploiting local migrant populations to penetrate the region, potentially in conjunction with one or both of the prison-based gangs."<sup>28</sup> Recent immigrants and or undocumented foreigners come to work in Monterey County's abundant agricultural industry. These individuals usually face a myriad of cultural adjustments and language barriers that isolates them and makes them extremely vulnerable to gang coercion. This is the perfect environment for gangs to thrive; amid a group of foreigners that will not, or cannot talk to the police about their activities. This is very similar to the ways in which an insurgent group infiltrates and exploits sectors of an isolated population to further their influence in an area. Similarly, when a gang controls a particular territory, it will have freedom to maneuver as it sees fit. When describing the gangs in Salinas, Chief Fetherolf said, "[The gangs] operate with impunity, with no expectation of being caught" (personal communication, Chief Fetherolf, 2010).

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<sup>27</sup> Lucero Benitez, "Salinas Chief Says what are You Doing to Solve Crime," Central Coast News, <http://www.kionrightnow.com/> (accessed 11/12/2010).

<sup>28</sup> Glavin, *Monterey County's Comprehensive Violence Prevention, Intervention, Suppression and Reentry Framework*, 26.

## **6. Law Enforcement Challenges**

One of the major challenges in addressing the violence caused by gangs in Salinas has been the lack of sufficient information on exactly who is committing the crime. Chief Fetherolf stated, “The number of arrests [the Salinas Police Department] makes on homicides is abysmal because we have a problem with the community. The community does not trust us and will not communicate with us; by and large, especially the Latino community. There is a language barrier and a trust barrier” (personal communication, Chief Fetherolf, 2010).

A second major challenge facing the Salinas Police Department (SPD) is how to process crime information that comes to them in a manner that will optimize their efforts to reduce gang violence. The business of tracking, storing, recalling, and sharing information efficiently across multiple agencies and or departments is a monumental task for any organization, and SPD is no exception. Chief Fetherolf explained the problem in very clear in a recent interview; “[the SPD] is systems poor. Information is not dealt with in a systematic way, and so officers get information and hold it close to their chests so they can make their arrests. Information is not shared universally throughout the department. This is a critical deficiency we have to overcome” (personal communication, Chief Fetherolf, 2010).

## **7. Gangs: A "Wicked" Problem in Salinas**

For many given problems an exhaustive formulation can be constructed containing all the information a problem solver needs for understanding and solving the problem, these are considered “tame” problems. Unfortunately, this is not the case when trying to solve the gang problem, because the locus of the difficulty is so complex it is not possible to definitively solve for all the possible conditions that lead to such a social phenomenon.<sup>29</sup> For this reason, we see the gang problem as a “wicked problem”. Rittel and Webber eloquently describe the problem of determining the effectiveness of solutions for wicked problems:

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<sup>29</sup> Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," *Policy Sciences* 4 (1973), 161, <http://www.springerlink.com/> (accessed 11/14/2010).

For tame-problems one can determine on the spot how good a solution-attempt has been. More accurately, the test of a solution is entirely under the control of the few people who are involved and interested in the problem. With wicked problems, on the other hand, any solution, after being implemented, will generate waves of consequences over an extended—virtually an unbounded—period of time. The full consequences cannot be appraised until the waves of repercussions have completely run out, and we have no way of tracing all the waves through all the affected lives ahead of time or within a limited time span.<sup>30</sup>

In Salinas, as the levels of gang violence increase, there is an increasing degree of media coverage of the issue. This increased media coverage, in turn, results in a greater degree of general public fear. As the level of public fear rises, the police are put under increasing pressure to produce a greater number of gang-related arrests. This results in a short-term decrease in the levels of gang violence. However, over the long-term, it is apparent that increases in public fear produce a greater divide between the city government and the population that they are contractually obligated to protect. This loss of trust between the city and the population results in frustrated city workers who are struggling to meet their obligations as public servants. In Salinas, this frustration often results in heavy-handed approaches toward the population that, although well intentioned, only serve to improve the gangs' abilities to recruit new members. “Both the Norteños and the Sureños have been aggressively recruiting new members to fuel their efforts to control their territory.”<sup>31</sup> In other words, gang recruitment is made easier as the gang is better able to capitalize on its anti-establishment essence. Predictably, this increase in recruitment only serves to eventually reignite the flames of gang violence within the community as gangs grow and vie for precious real-estate in which to expand their drug markets. In order to break the cycle of gang violence we believe a more unconventional approach is needed. While the repercussions of any solution to the gang problem cannot be completely foreseen and evaluated, we believe an approach that has been proven effective in combating insurgencies has some merit in combating the proliferation of gang violence in our communities.

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<sup>30</sup> Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” 163.

<sup>31</sup> Glavin, *Monterey County's Comprehensive Violence Prevention, Intervention, Suppression and Reentry Framework*, 26.

### **C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE**

The purpose of this thesis is to understand what aspects of COIN doctrine, when applied to counter-gang operations, can have the most affect on reducing the levels of gang violence in Salinas, CA. The quintessential question is: how can Salinas overcome this “wicked problem” and reduce its level of gang violence? It is our belief that a narrow focus on short term suppression efforts comes at the expense of a broader, long-term prevention and intervention focus that is also necessary to break the recurring cycle of violence. We believe COIN doctrine can provide critical insight into improving counter-gang efforts.

The scope of this research will focus on the use of information to effectively target street gangs in Salinas. In order to “use information” two things must exist: first the city government must actually *have* information on gang activity, and secondly the city must be able to process this information to use it effectively. Potentially the collective population of Salinas has the information about gang activity and infrastructure needed by the city leadership to allow for an efficient and effective dismantling of gangs in their community. We want to explore what factors contribute to the population’s willingness to share information with the police, and what factors within the city government contribute to their ability to share information across agencies and departments. Using COIN doctrine as a guide, we analyze whether city government legitimacy, population security, the population’s trust of city government, and the embeddedness of the local government within the community influence the population’s willingness to share crime information with the police and city government. Furthermore, we analyze whether unity of effort within government, operational autonomy, and systems integration influence the city’s ability to process information.

### **D. ROADMAP**

To fully understand the specific context of the gang problem in Salinas, our analysis will focus on three main stakeholders within the city: (1) the general population of Salinas, (2) the Salinas Police Department, and (3) the civilian city employees. In the proceeding chapters we will analyze perceptions of these three demographics of the city

to obtain a deeper understanding of how different aspects of the population view the gang problem, as well as each other. From this analysis we hope to identify areas where major schisms are preventing a collaborative approach to the gang problem from occurring.

### **1. Methodology and Theory**

Chapter II outlines the methodology used in this study and addresses the difficulties and limitations of our research. Chapter III discusses in detail the latest fundamental theories in COIN and criminology literature. We use these theories as a departure point from which to develop a theory of how to reduce gang violence. Chapter III concludes with an outline of our basic hypotheses.

### **2. Statistical Analysis**

Chapters IV through VII contain the bulk of our analysis on the different aspects of the population. Using descriptive and analytical statistics we attempt to measure the perceptions of the different stakeholders and build regression models to better understand how the perceptions of the citizens interrelate with one another. Chapter IV focuses on the correlations between crime tips and the levels of gang crime in the city. Chapter V focuses on the perceptions of the population with respect to city government and law enforcement agencies using descriptive and analytical statistics. Chapter VI analyzes the perceptions of the SPD with respect to the population, gang violence, and city government. Chapter VII analyses the perceptions of city hall and civilian city employees with respect to gang crime and law enforcement agencies.

### **3. Social Network Analysis**

Chapter VIII focuses specifically on the SPD's level of information sharing using social network analysis. This analysis was designed to measure, visualize, and understand the contact network, the advice network, the intelligence network, and the assistance or trust network within the SPD. This analysis illustrates the strength of communication between the different units within the SPD and highlights areas where the SPD can improve its ability to collaborate among departments.

#### **4. Results and Conclusions**

Chapter IX summarizes our research and offers insight to the areas where schisms exist between the population and the city government, as well as within city government itself. This analysis adds understanding of those areas that might be friction points between the city government and the population that may retard a collaborative approach to fighting gang violence. This chapter concludes with some policy recommendations to the Salinas city government on areas where it can improve its ability to extract crime information from the population and improve its ability to process the information once it is obtained.

## II. THEORY

### A. INTRODUCTION

Is there a causal relationship or link between information dominance<sup>32</sup> and the levels of gang violence experienced by a city? More specifically, what conditions must exist, either naturally or by artificial means, for civic authorities and law enforcement personnel to extract the required information from the population to effectively target gangs in their cities? The argument put forth in this paper is that a whole-of-government focus on the collection and processing of information on gang activity can optimize the limited resources of city and law enforcement officials, and enable more effective targeting of gang activity. In essence, we argue that a more proactive information-centric strategy focused on building a complete picture of a gang network will be more effective at countering gang activity than a reactive prosecution-based strategy intended to disable these criminal networks in a more iterative, piecemeal fashion. To lend strength to this argument, this thesis offers a counter-gang theory that draws from existing military COIN theory. According to COIN theory, to win in counterinsurgency, the government must achieve an information advantage over the insurgent.<sup>33</sup> To achieve this advantage, counterinsurgent forces must proactively collect pertinent information on the insurgent, and then effectively analyze and process the information to convert it into actionable intelligence.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Endsley and Jones define information dominance as, “the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information while denying an adversary the ability to do the same.” Mica R. Endsley and William M. Jones, *Situational Awareness, Information Dominance, and Information Warfare*. Endsley Consulting, [1997]), <http://www.satechnologies.com/> (accessed 3/9/2010).

<sup>33</sup> Counterinsurgency theory suggests that both the state and the insurgent have opening advantages at the onset of a conflict. The state has a force advantage while the insurgent has an information advantage. However, both sides have disadvantages; the state’s opening disadvantage is its inability to “see” the insurgent, while the insurgent suffers an opening disadvantage in its inability to forcibly remove the state from power. (Dr. Gordon McCormick, lecture delivered at the Naval Postgraduate School as part of the Guerrilla Warfare Seminar, July 2009.)

<sup>34</sup> There is no one concise definition of “actionable intelligence”; however, several sources helped to shape the definition that this paper uses. They include: “Actionable Intelligence Definition from PC Magazine Encyclopedia,” <http://www.pcmag.com/> (accessed 5/21/2010); Stephen K. Iwicki, “Introducing the Concept of Actionable Intelligence,” <http://findarticles.com/> (accessed 5/21/2010); Andrew Borene, “Actionable Intelligence,” <http://www.andrewborene.com/> (accessed 5/21/2010).



Prior to the tragedies of September 11, 2001, criminology literature was relatively mute on the use of intelligence and its overall effectiveness in defeating rapidly evolving, and increasingly more technologically savvy, criminal networks. Since 2001, however, a body of literature has begun to emerge that addresses the need for closer law enforcement-community relationships designed to foster the improved collection of information, and the streamlined processing of information to produce actionable intelligence. However, because significant resources have thus far been deemed necessary to implement the concepts outlined in these emerging theories, their use seems to be relegated to the federal levels of law enforcement and a few larger cities such as New York and Chicago. Accordingly, it is rather easy to deduce that the majority of law enforcement intelligence collection at the local and state level remains based around a reactive model, designed to build court cases for successful prosecution in court.<sup>35</sup>

No longer is organized crime relegated to larger metropolises, and the last decade has witnessed the rise of powerful gangs in rural America. The increasing ability of these organizations to carry out illegal activities, some of which are transnational and pose an increased risk to local government, implies a need for these less-fiscally capable communities to collect intelligence on individuals or groups who are likely to engage in illegal activity or facilitate those who do.<sup>36</sup> For this reason, a more creative approach to today's counter-gang operations is needed; one that is grounded in COIN doctrine and practices yet seeks to achieve information supremacy within the reality of small town resource constraints to effectively dismantle a highly entrenched criminal opponent.

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<sup>35</sup> "Very little law enforcement activity is devoted to preventing crime (except by deterrence) as opposed to detecting it afterward and apprehending the perpetrators." As cited in Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, Third Edition ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, Inc., 2002), 155.

<sup>36</sup> Traditionally, this has been handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) who distinguishes between criminal intelligence investigations and ordinary criminal investigations. The FBI's target on criminal intelligence investigations is "an ongoing criminal organization, whose size, composition, past acts, intended criminal goals, and capacity to do harm must be determined." See Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, 155. Shulsky and Schmitt recognize that the line dividing law enforcement work and the work of intelligence organizations is not entirely clear; however they make the point that the distinction is usually made from the focus of the investigation. If the end state is one of punishment for a singular criminal act, it seems to fall into a law enforcement realm, but if the focus deals with an ongoing struggle with an organization such as a gang, engaged in criminal activity, it would seem that this should fall under the jurisdiction of an intelligence organization.

## **B. A THEORY ON GANGS**

There are clear similarities in the origin and development of both gangs and insurgencies within society. In his book *Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency*, Max Manwaring observes that street gangs operate most effectively in “non-state” battle spaces.<sup>37</sup> Conflicts in these areas are akin to “guerrilla warfare,” where the “insurgent” thrives amongst the host population of a vulnerable city. Like insurgents, urban gangs use surreptitious methods to gain relative advantage over an affected city’s security apparatus, as well as its population, through corruption, coercion, and intimidation. These disruptive tactics serve a larger gang strategy of destabilization in pursuit of oft-illegal political and economic objectives. However, while there are clear similarities, there are also distinct differences in the organizational objectives of gangs and insurgent groups. Most prominently, the difference lies in the insurgent’s violent quest for political power, while the gang member seeks power outside of the confines of the traditional political system. Regardless, their actions can have significant destabilizing effects on society.

## **C. INFORMATION DOMINANCE**

Information dominance requires a focus on three implicit tasks. First, an organization must have the capacity to collect information on an adversary. Second, the organization must possess the ability to control the information, process it, and exploit it for further gain. Third, an organization must be able to defend against an adversary’s attempts to gather information on its activities. While this last task is important, it is not within the scope of this study. This thesis will concentrate on the ability of an organization to gather information and process it for further exploitation.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Max G. Manwaring, *Street Gangs : The New Urban Insurgency* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), 4, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/> (accessed 1/23/2010).

<sup>38</sup> Endsley and Jones, *Situational Awareness, Information Dominance, and Information Warfare*.

#### **D. A THEORY ON INFORMATION DOMINANCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS**

While most gangs in the United States do not seek to overthrow the existing government, the asymmetric relationship between civil authorities and the gangs exhibits important similarities to COIN operations. For this reason, central concepts from COIN theory can be useful in identifying and explaining many of the problems city officials encounter when conducting counter-gang operations. In the following sections, a COIN-based theory of information dominance will be developed to empower communities to effectively collect and process information to uncover the infrastructure of illegal organizations such as gangs.

Just as dominating the high ground gives a force a decisive advantage over an opponent in a conventional war of maneuver; dominating information in an asymmetric conflict provides a similar advantage. According to Mao Tse-tung, in the early stages of a revolutionary movement, the insurgent attacks at a time and place of his choosing and then disappears by merging back into the population.<sup>39</sup> Mao Tse-tung observed that the insurgent moves amongst the population as fish would water, demonstrating the inherent connectedness that the insurgent has with a population.<sup>40</sup> The population provides money, food, guns, and recruits to the insurgent; therefore, it is imperative that these facilitation networks remain anonymous, lest they be discovered by the counterinsurgent.<sup>41</sup> This frames the counterinsurgent's principle problem: finding the insurgents, and their supporters, from among the population. This task stresses the need

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<sup>39</sup> Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations; Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1971), 95.

<sup>40</sup> Bard E. O'Neil, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, Inc., 1990), 23.

<sup>41</sup> The Insurgent movements of Mao Tse-tung, Vo Nguyen, and Che Guevara, to name a few, demonstrated that the population of any given area holds the key to success of the insurgent by providing security, supplies, and reinforcement when needed. See David G. Epstein, "The Police Role in Counterinsurgency Efforts," *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science* 59, no. 1 (Mar., 1968), 148–151, <http://www.jstor.org/> (accessed 11/12/2010). Mao Tse-tung writes, "Especially in guerrilla combat, we must rely on the force of the popular masses, for it is only thus that we can have guarantee of success. The support of the masses offers us great advantages as regards transport, assistance to wounded, intelligence, disruption of the enemy's position, etc...If, by misfortune, we are defeated, it will also be possible to escape or to find concealment." As cited in Tse-tung Mao and Stuart R. Schram, *Basic Tactics* (New York: Praeger, 1966), 57–58.

for good intelligence. In much of the counterinsurgency literature, intelligence is regarded as the sine qua non of success by the counterinsurgent, and the argument can be made that the same holds true for the insurgent as well. Therefore, it is important to understand the role of information as it relates to how both the insurgent and counterinsurgent attempt to dominate information to achieve their respective goals.

Information dominance allows the insurgent to shape and mold his operating environment. He is more likely to influence the people than the government is, since he can more easily move within the population. Once he has information dominance, he can establish his own “shadow government,” thus increasing his legitimacy by becoming the authority. Galula describes the effective use of this methodology, implying that “infiltration...agitation, and propaganda,” are the true subversive hallmarks of an insurgency.<sup>42</sup>

Conversely, information dominance can aid the counterinsurgent in “seeing” the insurgent’s infrastructure and effectively targeting it. By properly collecting and exploiting information, the counterinsurgent can raise the cost to the insurgent of acquiring resources such as new recruits, weapons, and finances. Accurate information from a supporting population can also illuminate facilitation networks by which the insurgent processes inputs into outputs. By changing the production coefficients, the counterinsurgent can force the insurgent to spend inputs on merely surviving rather than producing effective outputs.<sup>43</sup>

An underlying premise in COIN theory, which will be applied throughout the scope of this research, is that the population, as a collective entity, knows everything about an insurgent organization; therefore, the population holds the key to favorably shifting the balance of information in favor of the counterinsurgent.<sup>44</sup> Accordingly, this

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<sup>42</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 1964), 32.

<sup>43</sup> Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 32.

<sup>44</sup> A recent analysis of information requirements in COIN operations found that approximately 90 percent of all information needed could be found through the population. David C. Gompert and John Gordon, *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, [2008]) (accessed 1/28/2010).

study presumes that the same holds true in regards to the activities of gangs. In other words, the population amongst which a gang thrives knows everything the civil authorities need to effectively dismantle the gang. This assumption naturally leads to questions such as: why do communities tolerate gang activity, or refrain from sharing information that might eliminate their presence? Or alternatively, what factors prevent the local civic authorities from extracting this information from the population? Also puzzling: what practices implemented by the local authorities either retard, or improve their ability to gather information from the population? Using COIN theory as a point of departure, this paper hypothesizes that factors such as government legitimacy, the population's sense of security, and trust of public authorities weigh heavily in the population's calculated willingness to cooperate with authorities to eliminate gangs.

## **1. Information Volume**

### ***a. Legitimacy***

Often, governments fighting an insurgency face a problem of legitimacy.<sup>45</sup> A preponderance of literature addressing the topic of COIN places the pursuit of legitimacy ahead of all other objectives of the state. Legitimacy is defined as, “the extent that [the] citizens regard [the state] as proper and deserving of support.”<sup>46</sup> Experience has shown that in a counterinsurgency campaign, the state requires support from the

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<sup>45</sup> Weak actors, such as gangs, can destabilize a strong actor, making the strong actor's power irrelevant. This destabilization of legitimacy occurs through strategic interaction within an asymmetric conflict model. See Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (2001), 93–95. For more on legitimacy in counterinsurgency see: United States Army and Marine Corps, *FM 3–24, The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*; Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*; Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), <http://www.jstor.com/> (accessed 2/12/2010); Timothy J. Lomperis, *From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Seth G. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008); Tom R. Tyler, "Enhancing Police Legitimacy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 593, no. 1, "To Better Serve and Protect: Improving Police Practices" (May, 2004), 84–99, <http://www.jstor.org/> (accessed 2/11/2010). Also see Jason Sunshine and Tom R. Tyler, "The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing," *Law & Society Review* 37, no. 3 (Sep., 2003), 513–548, <http://www.jstor.org/> (accessed 2/11/2010)..

<sup>46</sup> Rodney Barker, *Political Legitimacy and the State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 185–186.

population to be effective. Support and cooperation from the population is directly linked to the population's judgments about the legitimacy of the state. A key antecedent condition bolstering the population's perceptions of the state is the population's assessment of the manner in which the state exercises its authority.<sup>47</sup> Although the state has many resources at its disposal, without the support of the population it cannot effectively target the insurgent's infrastructure.<sup>48</sup>

As with most theories, the ideas surrounding legitimacy are broad and varied. Timothy Lomperis opines, "Insurgencies are won—or lost—by the relative amounts of legitimacy the competing sides achieve;" legitimacy is a function of political and economic engagement with the affected population.<sup>49</sup> Additionally, Chalmers Johnson describes how a loss of authority, or the loss of confidence of the governed for the governing, creates a power deflation that prevents proper social interactions, making engagement and information diffusion difficult.<sup>50</sup> Similarly, Leites and Wolf describe legitimacy as a zero-sum game. If the population is not for the government it must be for the insurgent, criminal, or gang. Thus, leadership must provide solutions and opportunities endogenously in order to maintain sufficient legitimacy.<sup>51</sup> Alternatively, Seth Jones summarizes legitimacy as a function of capacity. Essentially, a governing entity will naturally create and maintain legitimacy if it has the physical and moral means to govern and enforce its laws.<sup>52</sup> Lastly, Tom Tyler approaches the issue of legitimacy as a function of law and order, suggesting that laws focus of procedural fairness to

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<sup>47</sup> David Galula concludes that, "The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embodied in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population." See Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 55.

<sup>48</sup> It is important to note that the population can support the insurgent both actively and passively. The counterinsurgent cannot win unless the population sees the government as legitimate and stops supporting the insurgent both in a passive and active capacity. Passive support is support nonetheless to the insurgent because the conscious decision to withhold information from the counterinsurgent still aids the insurgent.

<sup>49</sup> Lomperis, *From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam*, 6.

<sup>50</sup> Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, Second ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 94.

<sup>51</sup> Leites and Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*, 174.

<sup>52</sup> Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, 7.

maximize benefit to the government and minimize violence and other misconduct.<sup>53</sup> All agree that legitimacy is tantamount to reducing violence associated with insurgencies, or in this case, gangs, but the approaches differ.

***b. Population Security***

The interconnectedness between the insurgent and the population brings to the forefront another obstacle to the counterinsurgent's attempts to gain information about the insurgent: the security of the population. In counterinsurgency operations, security is the degree to which the population is separated from the coercive influence of the insurgent.<sup>54</sup> Thus, population security is perhaps one of the most fundamental considerations when attempting to uncover information from within a given population.

Providing a safe environment in which the population feels free to share what it knows is the key task. Kilcullen aptly describes security of the population as fundamental, "otherwise, the enemy re-infiltrates the area and intimidates or co-opts the population, and only once security is consistently established can the population be...induced to provide information about local...enemy."<sup>55</sup> Additionally, Galula argues that population and resource control measures provide a tremendous degree of population security. These control measures are designed to physically separate the population from the insurgent, creating a secure environment. Galula suggests that this can be accomplished through aggressive patrolling, curfews, censuses, and other related tools.<sup>56</sup> Eventually, the population will begin to provide any information it has, once it feels

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<sup>53</sup> Tom R. Tyler, "Legitimacy in Corrections: Policy Implications," *Criminology & Public Policy* 9, no. 1 (Feb, 2010), 132, ProQuest (accessed 2/11/2010). Additionally, Tyler points out those residents who viewed the police as more legitimate are more willing to cooperate with them both by reporting crimes or identifying criminals and by engaging in community activities to combat the problems of crime.

<sup>54</sup> United States Army and Marine Corps, *FM 3-24, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 1-7.

<sup>55</sup> David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 94.

<sup>56</sup> Security is a function of effective organization and is a deliberate process. The security apparatus must be fairly and intentionally applied as evenly as possible, otherwise popular support will shift away from the government. See O'Neil, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, 143-144.

sufficiently separated from the insurgent.<sup>57</sup> Finally, Bard O’Neil suggests that security is a function of effective organization and is a deliberate process. The security apparatus must be fairly and intentionally applied, otherwise popular support will shift away from the government.<sup>58</sup> Similarly, from a counter-gang perspective this axiom seems to hold true. A population that is exposed to gang coercion will be much less likely to provide information to local law enforcement officials about what they know about illegal gang activity.

*c. Trust and Embeddedness*

In order for counterinsurgent forces to begin the process of collecting information on an insurgent organization they must become embedded in the population by integrating and engaging the population at the community level. COIN theories add some depth to the understanding of conditions that contribute to a population’s willingness to provide information to local authorities. As Kilcullen points out, engagement at the local community level is necessary in order to generate “bottom up buy in” from the population.<sup>59</sup> In this endeavor, Kilcullen stresses the importance of removing or overcoming language and cultural barriers between the counterinsurgent and the population. Only after this is achieved will trust begin to form between the counterinsurgent force and the population.

While many cultural and ethnic barriers exist that preclude effective interaction between civic authorities and communities within the population, there are also social and environmental barriers as well. One of the first established environmental theories that shed some light on these barriers was social disorganization theory developed by Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay in 1942. Social disorganization theory states that constant residential turnover and migration cause rapid social change within a community. These influences either disrupt social networks or prevent them from being established at all. This ultimately contributes to the erosion of social institutions and

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<sup>57</sup> Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 81–85.

<sup>58</sup> O’Neil, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, 143–144.

<sup>59</sup> Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, 138.



prevents the community from generating social control agents to effectively retard the growth of gangs.<sup>60</sup> Building upon this theory, researchers such as Robert Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Robert Bursik have hypothesized that social cohesion and trust, among members of a neighborhood is linked to reduced violence levels.<sup>61</sup> Ruth Horowitz, in her study of community tolerance of gangs, theorizes that familial bonds and family honor play a significant role in whether an outside agency, such as police, would be called upon to control gang violence.

In counterinsurgency operations, the police are the first line of defense against an asymmetric foe.<sup>62</sup> Unlike the military, police are particularly suited to engage the population at the lowest levels because they tend to remain in local areas and live in the community that they patrol. This familiarity with their particular areas of responsibility, however defined, give police officials the unique opportunity to gain an intimate knowledge of who the “bad guys” actually are. The embeddedness of local law enforcement into a community can provide key capabilities necessary to defeat an insurgency.<sup>63</sup>

Public relations also become an extremely important role for law enforcement in developing and maintaining trust within the context of a counterinsurgency. “The police must be trained to look upon themselves as being of the people and for the people. The sometimes understandable feeling prevalent in policemen that ‘it’s them against us’ must be avoided at all costs.”<sup>64</sup> Insurgent forces will undoubtedly attempt to point out and exploit any misconceptions about police procedures when carrying out their functions of maintaining law and order. In weak states, with poorly functioning law enforcement agencies, insurgents may attempt to interact with the

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<sup>60</sup> Kimberly Tobin, *Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective* (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), 30 (accessed 2/15/2010).

<sup>61</sup> Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush and Felton Earls, "Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy," *Science* 277 (1997), 918–924 (accessed 2/15/2010).

<sup>62</sup> Gompert and Gordon, *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency*.

<sup>63</sup> Gompert and Gordon, *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency*.

<sup>64</sup> Epstein, *The Police Role in Counterinsurgency Efforts*, 151.

population in ways that exaggerate any sense of injustice or inadequacy commonly perceived in police structure or procedures.

## **2. Information Processing**

While the preceding paragraphs have noted the importance of improving the amount of information collected from the population, achieving information dominance involves more than merely collecting greater volumes of information than an opponent. To achieve information dominance the information that is received must be analyzed and processed into actionable intelligence in a timely manner for a number of varied forces that can be used to effectively target the enemy.<sup>65</sup> Leites and Wolf point out:

The ingredients of effective intelligence organization and operations are numerous and complex. An effective system requires not just collection of information from multiple sources (some degree of redundancy is essential) but also processing, classifying, evaluating, storing, and retrieving information. Indeed, modern technological progress in information processing and handling is probably more important for counterinsurgency than are changes in weapons technology.<sup>66</sup>

Thus, the effectiveness of information processing is a critical component, not just to the intelligence collection effort, but also to the entire counterinsurgency equation as a whole. Effective information processing can aid in early detection of insurgent movements, and allow seemingly unrelated intelligence to be combined to form a comprehensive picture of the insurgent movement itself, and can be used to identify and neutralize the insurgent infrastructure.<sup>67</sup>

Organizations differ broadly in their structure. What are the organizational characteristics that are most effective in fighting an insurgency? What characteristics maximize an organization's ability to process, classify, evaluate, share, and retrieve vast amounts of information for the purpose of defeating an insurgency? The following

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<sup>65</sup> Endsley and Jones, *Situational Awareness, Information Dominance, and Information Warfare*.

<sup>66</sup> Leites and Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*.

<sup>67</sup> Robert E. Hildner and Charles A. Russell, "Intelligence and Information Processing in Counterinsurgency," *Air University Review* (1973) (accessed 2/11/2010).

sections examine existing theories that address fundamental organizational concepts that lead to increased levels of information sharing and processing.

*a. Systems Integration*

Lessons learned over the last ten years both in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the sharing of information across a wide spectrum of agencies is critical for success. A recent RAND study on the United States' counterinsurgency capabilities found that, "this requirement for connectivity extends not only across services, agencies, and coalition nations, but also to local authorities, security services, and citizens." More pointedly, "the civil side of COIN needs information no less than the military side does, and the sharing of information between the two is crucial for coherence and success."<sup>68</sup> Zanini and Edwards, in their analysis of networks and netwar highlight the importance of organizational structure in combating networked counter-government adversaries such as gangs, noting that "governments wishing to counter netwar terrorism will need to adopt organizational designs and strategies like those of their adversaries...a willingness to innovate organizationally and doctrinally and by building new mechanisms for interagency and multi-jurisdictional cooperation."<sup>69</sup> This type of cooperation can only be achieved through the integration of the systems used by all agencies involved, to include, civic and law enforcement agencies, first responders, military organizations, and civilian entities.

A significant barrier to integration and sharing of information across agencies is the old axiom of "need to know" for the sake of security. This need to know attitude breeds a culture of stove piping or compartmentalization of intelligence with little cross talk. This type of environment lends itself to disjointed operations, impaired trust among departments or agencies, lack of a common operational picture, and certainly degrades the chances of agencies providing reciprocal information to one another.

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<sup>68</sup> Gompert and Gordon, *War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency*, 127–129.

<sup>69</sup> Michele Zanini and Sean J. A. Edwards, "The Networking of Terror in the Information Age," in *Networks and Netwars*, eds. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 54.

**b. Unity of Effort**

The well-known organizational theorist Richard Daft succinctly captures the importance of a shared common vision in the effectiveness of an organization when he wrote, “without a shared vision that provides harmony and unity of mind, employee actions will not add to the whole. Without a strong vision, employees may fragment and move in different directions.”<sup>70</sup> From Daft’s description above we derive unity of effort as the degree to which an agency or agencies share a common vision or purpose.

The United States Army Counterinsurgency Manual states, “unity of effort must pervade every echelon. Otherwise, well intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other out or provide a competent insurgent many vulnerabilities to exploit.”<sup>71</sup> Pointing to the necessity of tools to enhance individual and organizational interpretation of incoming information toward a common purpose, Endsley and Jones note that, “[groups] without shared mental models will most likely require a great deal of real-time coordination and communication to ensure that their activities are carried out properly and will be far more susceptible to lapses...”<sup>72</sup> The concept of vertical decentralization for managing information flows and decision making has been highlighted by Daft, who noted that an organization’s structure, “should fit the information requirements of the organization: if it does not, people will either have too little information or will spend time processing information not vital to their tasks, thus reducing effectiveness.”<sup>73</sup>

In military terms, this amounts to everyone operating from common guidelines disseminated from a commander, to subordinates, under the term “commander’s guidance.” While this should unite the efforts of everyone under a specific command toward a common purpose, it should not be so prescriptive as to

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<sup>70</sup> Richard L. Daft, *Essentials of Organization Theory & Design*, 2nd ed. (Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western College Pub, 2001), 565.

<sup>71</sup> United States Army and Marine Corps, *FM 3–24, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 1–18.

<sup>72</sup> Endsley and Jones, *Situational Awareness, Information Dominance, and Information Warfare*.

<sup>73</sup> Richard L. Daft and Ann Armstrong, “Fundamentals of Organizational Structure,” in *Organizational Theory and Design*, First Canadian ed. (Nelson Education, Ltd.: Toronto, Ontario, 2009), 125.

suppress individual initiative or hinder actions by subordinates. In an interagency setting, for example, between law enforcement, civic authorities, and civilian organizations, this unity of effort will be evident through the establishment of formal relationships. These relationships will be codified through the creation of missions statements, purposes, and goals; establishment of operating procedures; and possibly written memorandums of understanding detailing the responsibilities of all participants to ensure accountability. Regardless of how unity of effort is achieved, it is paramount that all agencies involved in counterinsurgency or counter-gang operations act in unison.

*c.       Autonomy*

The need to act quickly and decisively in counterinsurgency campaigns drives organizations to decentralize operations. Subordinate units are given the autonomy to conduct operations at the time and location deemed necessary for mission success.

In the scope of this research, autonomy has two components. The first is nested in the above concept of integration. Without access or inclusion in all information systems, users will not have timely information on which to act. Technology and situational awareness tools such as focal point software and web forums empower individual execution.

The second component of autonomy is that freedom users have to act on information in a timely manner. The degree of vertical decentralization in an organization facilitates individual execution at the tactical level. Zanini and Edwards have noted that through emerging low cost, high capacity communication capabilities “it is becoming increasingly possible to further disaggregate organizations through decentralization and autonomy.”<sup>74</sup> These two components combined support the concept that autonomy is an effective tool that can speed up an organization’s reaction to informational inputs by shortening the decision making cycle.

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<sup>74</sup> Zanini and Edwards, *The Networking of Terror in the Information Age*, 36.

## **E. CRIMINOLOGY THEORY**

There is a broad spectrum of criminology research that provides some theoretical insight to the origins of, and society's response to, gang violence. The following is a brief summary of the most convincing theories of just how and why street gangs continue to grow and thrive despite often well-intended efforts to stop the violence within the communities in which they exist.

### **1. Social Disorganization Theory**

Some of the earliest scientific theory on the growth and development of gangs can be traced to social scientists such as Frederic Thrasher, and Shaw and McKay. Their research pointed to the breakdown of social institutions, known as social disorganization theory, as the origins of social unrest. This social unrest, in turn, leads to the development of counter-society organizations that provide some sense of structure to social anarchy. As summarized by Wood and Alleyne, Thrasher found:

One reason why social institutions failed to satisfy the needs of the populace was because so many people living in disorganized areas were immigrants. Immigrant parents were unable to help their children adapt to their new culture due to a lack of familiarity with local customs. Furthermore, a lack of support from established social orders such as schools failed to compensate for this parental ignorance.<sup>75</sup>

Shaw and McKay also point to cultural transmission of criminal traditions in areas where social institutions have failed to meet resident needs.<sup>76</sup> In other words, the youth who are candidates for gang membership are a product of their environment—an environment polluted by criminal activity serves to improve the recruiting capacity of gangs, and thus continue the downward spiral of social decay.

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<sup>75</sup> Jane Wood and Emma Alleyne, "Street Gang Theory and Research: Where Do We Go From Here?" *Aggression and Violent Behavior* 15, no. 2 (March-April, 2010), 108.

<sup>76</sup> Wood and Alleyne, "Street Gang Theory and Research: Where Do We Go From Here?"

## **2. Differential Association Theory**

Later work by Sutherland and Cressey led to the development of the theory of differential association. Differential association points to social interaction with individuals who harbor counter-society norms as the root cause of phenomenon such as criminal gang growth. Sutherland noted that gangs offer a social structure through which to interact and learn criminal tradecraft.<sup>77</sup> Rather than the breakdown of social institutions leading to social unrest, differential association theory points to the breakdown of individual morality as the necessary and essential element leading to societal decay.

## **3. Community-Based Policing Theory**

The body of work focused on society's response to the presence of gang violence is largely dominated by the examination of the critical role required of society's designated enforcers of public law: the police. As Sung has noted, "the legitimacy of police work derives from the law and popular will."<sup>78</sup> Accordingly, the true measurement of effectiveness for a community's police is not measured solely "in terms of catching criminals and clearing crimes," but also by the degree to which the police repeatedly demonstrate themselves to be legitimate representatives of the government they protect and the population that they serve.<sup>79</sup>

The role of information within law enforcement theory has evolved over the years in response to the changing nature of both crime itself and the constraints of the environment in which police operate. In the 1990s, police departments recognized the need to foster a greater sense of trust with the communities they served. Community policing represents a move toward that end via a focus on "police-citizen interaction and cooperation, and problem-solving efforts to reduce crime-related community

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<sup>77</sup> Wood and Alleyne, "Street Gang Theory and Research: Where Do We Go From Here?" 108.

<sup>78</sup> Hung-En Sung, *Fragmentation of Policing in American Cities: Toward and Ecological Theory of Police-Citizen Relations* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), 19.

<sup>79</sup> Sung, *Fragmentation of Policing in American Cities: Towards and Ecological Theory of Police-Citizen Relations*.

problems."<sup>80</sup> This effort offers great promise of improving the relationship between police departments and their communities, but the issue of gang-violence, like counterinsurgency, demands a multi-lateral approach that draws the community closer to their elected government-the police are simply a piece of the larger puzzle.

#### **4. Intelligence-Led Policing**

The more recent push by criminology theorists toward intelligence led policing represents a belief in the need for a more proactive approach toward law enforcement. This shift in focus has occurred due to the perceived failure of reactionary policing to cope with a more rapidly evolving criminal element.<sup>81</sup> As noted by Ball, intelligence-based policing is a function of two components: (1) production of intelligence and (2) application of intelligence.<sup>82</sup> Both components require an inward focus by police departments on how their intelligence organizations are structured to more efficiently cope with incoming information and produce actionable, analytical outputs. By itself, however, this theory is insufficient in understanding what generates the intelligence inputs to the police and how the police should best respond with the information that they receive.

#### **5. Problem-Oriented Policing**

Problem-oriented policing (POP) was first introduced by Herman Goldstein in 1979 as a revolutionary approach to law enforcement that focused attention on collections of related incidents, and their underlying causes, rather than the isolated incidents themselves.<sup>83</sup> In essence it centers on intelligence and problem identification. Problem-oriented policing is preventive in nature and stresses the need to engage other public agencies and the private sector in reducing particular problems.

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<sup>80</sup> John E. Ball, *Rethinking Intelligence to Integrate Counterterrorism into the Local Law Enforcement Mission* (Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 21.

<sup>81</sup> Ball, *Rethinking Intelligence to Integrate Counterterrorism into the Local Law Enforcement Mission*.

<sup>82</sup> Ball, *Rethinking Intelligence to Integrate Counterterrorism into the Local Law Enforcement Mission*.

<sup>83</sup> Gary Cordner and Elizabeth Biebel, "Problem-Oriented Policing in Practice," *Criminology & Public Policy* 4, no. 2 (May, 2005), 155–180.



Instead of over relying on criminal law, POP utilizes the Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment (SARA) problem solving model, which is more of an analytical process of solving specific policing problems.<sup>84</sup> Scanning consists of identifying recurring problems in a community, identifying the consequences of the problem, and systematically determining a priority for each one. Analysis of the problem consists of determining the underlying causes of a problem, developing hypothesis about why the problem is occurring, identifying and evaluate resources that are already focused on the problem, and identifying additional resources that could aid in the solution. Response consists of determining various course of action about how to handle the problem, objectives of the response plan, and determining responsible parties to implement the response. Lastly, assessment involves determining if the correct plan was implemented through data collection, what additional resources should become involved if necessary, and continued assessment of the plan's effectiveness.<sup>85</sup>

POP, in many regards, includes elements of both community based policing and intelligence based policing, and comes closest to a model that can aid in counter-gang operations. However in counter-gang operations, this type of analysis and problem solving may be more effective if utilized at the municipal level, where government officials can provide unity of effort of all agencies involved.

## **F. INSURGENCY, GANGS, AND THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT**

Current military doctrine suggests that a spectrum of warfare, measured by intensity, exists. This spectrum, as constructed, is largely a graduated process, delineating the levels of violence associated with each progression. For instance, a stable peace, the first progression within this spectrum, is characterized by a low level of violence; followed by an unstable peace with moderate levels of violence; then an insurgency with intermittent levels of extreme violence and instability follows; and finally, to complete the spectrum, general war with unrestricted levels of violence (see Figure 1). This continuum attempts to give military commanders a concise methodology

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<sup>84</sup> Cordner and Biebel, "Problem-Oriented Policing in Practice."

<sup>85</sup> Cordner and Biebel, "Problem-Oriented Policing in Practice."

from which to frame the type of operations that they will conduct, linking observed environments with operational approaches and doctrine.<sup>86</sup>




Figure 1. FM 3-0, Military Spectrum of Conflict<sup>87</sup>

This line of thinking maintains that if an army is capable of fighting a general war, it will be equally as proficient in fighting an insurgency, because it is only a less violent form of general war. However, reality demonstrates that this paradigm misses its mark. Insurgencies, as a social and political problem, pose a different analytical set for military practitioners, and must be approached with a unique set of principles and resources.<sup>88</sup> Likewise, when general “policing” methodologies are applied to counter-gang operations, a similar conundrum exists. The approach required to fight criminal gangs is on a different spectrum from that needed for traditional unorganized street crime, and demands a re-shaping of the approach communities take toward counter-gang operations.

## G. RETHINKING THE COUNTER-GANG APPROACH

Intelligence led policing, community based policing, and problem oriented policing all have similar analytical approaches to solving crime problems. They all share a theme of proactive analysis to increase the ability to identify emerging threats to a community. While there has been significant evolutionary development in these types of policing both in theory and practice, there still remains a void as to the holistic approach

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<sup>86</sup> Department of the Army, *FM 3-0: Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008), 2-1.

<sup>87</sup> Department of the Army, *FM 3-0: Operations*.

<sup>88</sup> Dr. Gordon McCormick, Guerrilla Warfare Seminar, lecture given at the Naval Postgraduate School, July 14, 2009, referencing Martin Van Creveld. For additional explanation, see Martin L. Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Collier Macmillan International, 1991), 254.

to the specific problem set of gang activity. The answer to the unique problem of gang violence is not simply “policing” as these practices suggest by their singular focus. What this research suggests is a COIN-based model for countering gang violence. What makes counterinsurgency important to this research is that it focuses not simply on police capacity to gain and analyze information, but also other civic and civilian institutions, that interact with the population. When integrated as a whole, these institutions can effectively retard the levels of gang violence in an area by increasing the volume and analysis of information that is extracted from the population.

## **H. HYPOTHESES**

This thesis proposes that a government’s dominance of information is significantly responsible for decreases in the activity levels of gangs. In the absence of information, the government is left only with a force advantage, but cannot decisively use this advantage against the gangs. However, information dominance, as a variable, is difficult to conceptualize and measure. Therefore, information dominance must be understood with respect to two congruent factors: the first being the volume of information received by the city; and second, the ability of the city to process this data into actionable and useable intelligence. Figure 2 depicts the causal relationship between information dominance and gang violence levels. Based on this established causal link, this research will focus on specific factors within Salinas that: (1) increase or decrease the population’s willingness to share information with the police, and (2) those factors that increase or decrease the ability of the city to share and process information they receive from the population. Exploring these two factors of information dominance will provide useful insight into how Salinas city officials can obtain an information advantage in the fight against gang violence within their community.




Figure 2. Causal Sequence for the Effects of Information Dominance on Gang Violence

**Hypothesis 1:** Volume of information from the population increases when city government improves: (1) its legitimacy, (2) population security, and (3) its level of trust and embeddedness within the community.

**Hypothesis 2:** Information processing increases when the city government improves: (1) its systems integration, (2) unity of effort, and (3) operational autonomy.

## I. CONCLUSION

Observing the counter-gang problem through the lens of counterinsurgency provides a useful focus from which to approach the question of how to effectively combat the instability street gangs bring to an environment. Civic authorities must focus their efforts towards decisively using information against gang activity. The degree to which this is realized defines the level of information dominance the city has achieved. Information dominance is as essential to countering gangs as it is to countering insurgencies, as it allows the city, in this case, to combine their force advantage with

actionable intelligence to maximize effects. From a counterinsurgency and counter-gang theory perspective it would seem, at least anecdotally, that controlling information in an asymmetric conflict can have significant impacts on violence levels.

### III. METHODOLOGY

#### A. INTRODUCTION

In seeking to understand the causal relationship between information dominance and its effects on gang violence in Salinas, CA we attempted to measure three things. The first was information volume, which we defined as the sum total of all gang related crime tips that the SPD receives from the population writ large. To quantifiably measure volume of information, we collected and analyzed monthly crime tip data from the SPD database.<sup>89</sup> We categorized the tip data into three categories: information received through phone calls, internet tips, and information received through confidential informants (CI).<sup>90</sup> Secondly, we sought to understand the city of Salinas's ability to effectively process information related to gang violence. To get a sense of the topography of the SPD's informal communication networks, as well as their propensity to share intelligence across different divisions and units within the department, we utilized a social network survey. Lastly, we sought to quantify gang related crime, which we defined as the sum total of all gang crime in Salinas, CA. To measure gang crime levels, we collected and analyzed monthly gang crime data from the SPD database.<sup>91</sup>

To add depth to this study, we wanted to further understand if and how the population's perceptions, and resulting attitudes, impacted their willingness to divulge information to the city regarding gang activity. Furthermore, we wanted to understand

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<sup>89</sup> Crime tips from the general population are collected by the SPD in multiple ways. A concerned citizen can report crime information to the SPD using phone, text, or email. In the case of phone calls and texts, all personal information about the caller is blocked, making the originator of the information anonymous to the SPD. Emails can be sent to the SPD either anonymously or with their personal contact information included.

<sup>90</sup> Confidential informants fall into three categories; 1) citizen informants—provide info for the betterment of the community; 2) mercenary informant—provide info for monetary gain; and 3) criminal informant—reduced sentence in exchange for information. The preponderance of CI information collected by the Monterey County Joint Gang Task Force is from criminal informants (personal communication, Officer from the MCJGTF, 2010).

<sup>91</sup> Gang crime statistics were aggregate from several crime categories to include: homicide, robbery, aggravated assault. All figures were filtered so that only crimes associated with gang activity were included.

the perceptions of city hall employees and law enforcement personnel toward the gang problem to help identify schisms or similarities in the different groups when compared to the general population. A preponderance of the data collected for this part of the research was collected through interviews and surveys. The interviews were conducted over a three week period in September and October of 2010 with senior Salinas government and non-government officials with backgrounds in education, youth programs and social work, city governance, and law enforcement. Similarly, the surveys were conducted over a thirty day period in September and October of 2010, and included city hall employees and sworn law enforcement officers.

The qualitative research on the causal relationship between information dominance and the level of gang violence experienced by a city is summarized in Table 1. The sources of information for each variable within the research framework are divided among the major condition variables identified at the end of Chapter II. The research methodology includes a review of non-scholarly literature, such as information from the Monterey County voting office, city and state websites, views from prominent city government officials, census data, and city and national survey data.

	<b>Variables</b>							
	<b>Legitimacy</b>	<b>Security</b>	<b>Trust</b>	<b>Embeddedness</b>	<b>Crime Tips</b>	<b>Unity of Effort</b>	<b>Autonomy</b>	<b>Systems Integration</b>
<b>Scholarly Literature and Research</b>	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
<b>Government Reports and Documents</b>	X	X		X	X	X		
<b>Government Websites</b>					X			
<b>Surveys</b>	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
<b>Interviews</b>	X	X	X	X		X	X	X

Table 1. Sources of Information

## **B. INTERVIEWS**

For interviews, we sought out the most prominent city officials and community leaders that were most visibly involved in the fight against gang crime in Salinas. Interviewees fell into two broad categories: city government employees and non-governmental community leaders. Selection criteria for government employee subjects were limited to the executive leadership of Salinas, such as the Mayor, City Manager, Chief of Police, Gang Task Force Commanders, and the Monterey County School Superintendent. We felt these individuals would provide depth to our research, as it was assumed that they would be attuned to the creation and execution of strategic gang-related policies in Salinas.

The selection criteria used to determine the second group of interviewees was based on specific associations with gang prevention programs in Salinas such as the Community Alliance for Safety and Peace (CASP), Boys & Girls Clubs of Salinas and Second Chance.<sup>92</sup> These individuals were deemed highly relevant to our research because of their direct day to day contact with high risk youth, and their experience in implementing the intervention and prevention policies of the city. Collectively, both groups of interviewees aided this research by providing unique perspectives on the ongoing suppression, intervention, and prevention initiatives currently in use to combat gang violence in Salinas.

The interviews were conducted with questions based on our condition variables. The questions ranged from baseline assessments of the gang situation, to perceptions of city government. Topics identified for discussion included: legitimacy, city security, population's trust in government, levels of intelligence sharing, and media engagement. Not all questions developed for this research were applicable to every person interviewed. Thus, we developed tailored interview questions for each interviewee based on their role in countering the gang problem, whether they were involved in suppression, intervention, or prevention; or some combination of all of these. All interview questions

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<sup>92</sup> The 2nd Chance staff is a highly trained bilingual and bicultural group of professionals, specially trained in adolescent development and the latest anti-gang intervention techniques. For more on Second Chance see their website at <http://www.scyp.org/>.



were developed in advance, and were approved by the Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board. See Appendix F for a complete list of the interview questions used in our research.

To elicit thoughtful and candid responses from the interviewees, we attempted to be as transparent as possible by providing the questions identified for discussion prior to the interview. All interviews were conducted in person with at least two researchers present during the interview. At all times, interviewees were made aware that we were taking notes of the interview, and all respondents agreed to be quoted; however, some of the respondents did not want to be referred to by name in the final publication of this paper. Interviews ranged between 45 to 90 minutes in length. The feedback during the interviews reflected an array of substantive responses, from additional discussion topics beyond the scope of this research, to responses that directly addressed our key variables. Follow up emails and phone calls helped clarify responses as needed.

## **C. SURVEYS**

For our survey research, we considered three distinct sample groups: the general population of Salinas, law enforcement personnel, and city employees. These specific target populations were selected in order to capture the perceptions of the three main parties confronted with the presence of gangs in Salinas. We ultimately hoped to quantify the perceptions of those individuals tasked with suppressing gang violence, of those involved with intervention and prevention, as well as the perceptions and attitudes of the general population of Salinas. The surveys, we hoped, would add insight about how perceptions and attitudes might create a barrier to the effective flow of information.

### **1. Salinas Population Survey**

Given time and resource constraints, it was deemed infeasible to develop an independent survey to measure the perceptions of the local population of Salinas. Instead, we used survey research conducted by CASP to measure the population's

perceptions about local government.<sup>93</sup> CASP leaders agreed to provide us with the raw data of their survey. From this we were able to conduct our own independent analysis of the survey results. The survey, which was conducted in September 2010, consisted of 37 questions; 32 using a five-point Likert scale response format, two open ended comment questions, and three background/demographic questions.<sup>94</sup> CASP was able to collect 309 completed surveys distributed across the three main zip codes in Salinas (93901, 93905, and 93906). While the overall sample size of the survey constitutes only .2% of the overall population, the sample size did represent the populations in the main zip code areas by 94%.

For our analysis we grouped the survey questions into the following categories: legitimacy, security, trust, and embeddedness, unity of effort, and recommendations from the population. The responses from this survey provided the raw data for analysis in Chapter V. In order to compare responses from the general population with those of the city employees and law enforcement personnel, we used the CASP survey as a template from which to develop our surveys for the city employees and the SPD.

## **2. Law Enforcement Perceptions and Attitudes Survey Design and Distribution**

In order to get an adequate cross section of the perceptions of sworn officers within the SPD, we surveyed a random sampling of officers from all units within the department. To obtain our sample, we attended all shift change briefings held by the police department over a 48 hour period for a total of eight shift change briefs. A cross section of sworn officers from all units within the police department attended each briefing. At the beginning of each brief we explained our research and asked for volunteers to complete the survey. All surveys were completed within ten minutes and all participants signed a consent form.

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<sup>93</sup> Salinas Community Alliance for Safety and Peace, "Salinas Population Survey 2010," Community Alliance for Safety and Peace, Salinas, CA, 2010).

<sup>94</sup> Likert Scale used was 0–5; 1 though 5 ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree; 0 was used to equal a do not know answer. See Appendix B for the complete survey used in this analysis.

The survey was comprised of 34 questions; 33 using a five-point Likert scale response format, and one demographic question.<sup>95</sup> We obtained 88 completed surveys from the entire population of 153 sworn officers at the rank of Commander and below, achieving 56% overall participation from the SPD. Questions were grouped together to reflect our variables that impact processing of information: legitimacy, trust, unity of effort, and security. The responses to these questions provided the raw data for analysis in Chapter VI.

### **3. City Employee Survey Design and Distribution**

The wide variety of city employees presented a challenge in how best to obtain an adequate unbiased sampling of all city workers. With 17 departments spread across the city we determined that visiting a majority of them was not feasible. Instead we worked with the City Manager, who permitted us to attend two of his mandatory monthly city employee briefings. During each briefing we were allowed to explain our research and recruit volunteers to complete the survey. All surveys were completed within ten minutes, and all participants signed a consent form.

The survey administered to city employees was very similar in design to the law enforcement survey. The survey consisted of 33 questions; 32 using a five-point Likert scale response format, and one demographic question.<sup>96</sup> We obtained 66 completed surveys, which correlates to 10% of all full-time and part-time employees on the city payroll as of October 2010.<sup>97</sup> Questions were grouped according to their relevance to our variables: legitimacy, trust, unity of effort, and security. The responses to these questions provided the raw data for the analysis in Chapter VII.

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<sup>95</sup> Likert Scale used was 0–5; 1 though 5 ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree; 0 was used to equal a do not know answer. See Appendix C for the complete survey used in this analysis.

<sup>96</sup> Likert Scale used was 0–5; 1 though 5 ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree; 0 was used to equal a do not know answer. See Appendix D for the complete survey used in this analysis.

<sup>97</sup> As of October 2010, there were 535 fulltime city employees and 108 part time employees on the city payroll. Gutierrez, Miguel (Accounting Officer, City of Salinas Finance Department), Email correspondents with authors, 10/26/2010.

#### **4. Police Social Network Survey Design and Distribution**

There is no standard doctrine, or universally accepted operating procedures, that describe how civilian law-enforcement agencies should process intelligence. This presented our team a unique measurement problem for this particular variable. For this reason we decided to conduct a social network analysis of the SPD to quantifiably measure relationships within the organization and determine what effect those relationships had on individual propensity to share information intra-departmentally. To accomplish this we developed a social network survey template using the David Krackhardt informal network model, which was adapted by Dr. Bruce Hoppe of Boston University.<sup>98</sup> To analyze the topography of the SPD's informal network, four questions were posed to the entire population of sworn officers within the SPD, using a modified five point Likert Scale.<sup>99</sup> These survey questions were designed to measure, visualize, and understand the contact network, the advice network, the intelligence network, and the assistance or trust network within the SPD. Each officer was asked to rate their relationships with the other officers in the SPD when it came to general contact, seeking advice, sharing intelligence, and seeking assistance in work related matters. The precise questions of the survey can be found in Chapter VIII.

The entire population of sworn SPD officers was recruited to conduct the voluntary survey. The survey was sent to the Deputy Chief of Police via email, who electronically distributed the surveys to all potential participants through official SPD email distribution lists. The SPD leadership encouraged participation in the survey, but did not make participation mandatory. The survey was returned to us electronically, and individual responses were coded to ensure anonymity. Of the total population of 157 sworn officers, 59 completed the survey. This equates to 38% of all sworn officers in the

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<sup>98</sup> Bruce Hoppe, "Network Characteristics," <http://people.bu.edu/> (accessed 10/20/2010).

<sup>99</sup> Each officer rated his or her survey responses using a scale of 0 (Rarely or never), 1 (Every few months), 2 (Every few weeks), 3 (Every week), and 4 (Everyday) in relation to other officers and outside organizations and agencies that work with the SPD on gang-related issues. Additionally, see Appendix E. The survey used for this research was developed using the David Krackhardt informal network model, and was adapted by Bruce Hoppe, Ph.D. from Boston University. Used with permission, from Bruce Hoppe, "Organizational Network Survey Spreadsheet Utility," *Connective Associates* (2006–2009), <http://connectiveassociates.com> (accessed 10/20/2010)..

SPD. Survey results were compiled and analyzed using UCINET and NETDRAW social networking analysis programs.<sup>100</sup> In accordance with IRB guidelines, all names were removed from survey responses during the analysis of the results. The responses to these questions provided the raw data for analysis in Chapter VIII.

#### **D. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS**

Collecting accurate crime tip data was a particularly challenging problem for our research. While the SPD was able to provide crime statistics, which they submit regularly to the state and federal level, tip data proved very difficult to obtain. There is no single repository where all crime tip data is stored at the SPD. Anonymous phone and email tips are simply distributed to the unit(s) deemed most responsible for handling the type of information provided, and are not required to be tracked or logged at any point in the chain. As a result we had to correspond with numerous points of contact within the SPD to piece together the quantity of tips each individual unit had obtained. In many cases there was simply no documented data available for our analysis. This made our data set for gang crime tips very sporadic, and ultimately prevented us from being able to compare the number of gang-related crimes with the volume of tips received by the SPD, across an optimal period of time.

One of the limiting aspects of collecting data for this research was the lack of any significant historical survey data, specifically focused on Salinas, which could be analyzed longitudinally with respect to gang violence. While the surveys allow for specific analysis of one point in time, no comparisons with past surveys could be conducted. This limited our analysis to current perceptions, and prevented us from understanding how those perceptions have changed over time as the gang violence in Salinas has continued to increase. While limited in their ability to show variance temporally, the surveys provided a robust set of data with which to analyze the population's perceptions regarding their willingness to share information with the SPD.

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<sup>100</sup> See Stephen P. Brogatti, Martin G. Everett and Linton C. Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis* (Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies: 2002) and Stephen P. Brogatti, *Netdraw Network Visualization* (Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies: 2002)

One of the challenges we faced in survey design was comparability. Since our survey research sought to understand the perceptions of three distinct aspects of the population, it was necessary for them to vary slightly in order to best address our condition variables. While the majority of the questions were the same, some questions had to be modified for the particular audience. While all the same condition variables were covered in each survey, the number and type of question within each category had to include varied questions that could best illicit relevant data from each specific target audience.

Another challenge we faced was obtaining an adequate representative sample size for the surveys, specifically the SPD social network survey and the CASP population survey. Not every member of the SPD participated in the social network survey. Of all sworn officers, only 38% completed the survey. Ideally, this type of analysis becomes more effective and focused when the entire focal population participates. Despite the limitations of our resultant overall sample size, the data collected is deemed sufficient to draw meaningful conclusions since a representative population from each relevant SPD unit provided input. For example, important gang related special units of the SPD, such as the Violence Suppression Unit (VSU) (38% participation) and the Salinas police officers involved with the Monterey County Joint Gang Task Force (MCJGTF) (40% participation), participated on a level equal or near that of the survey's total participation. Other units, such as the Patrol unit (33% participation) and the Investigations unit (35% participation), which consistently deal with gang related issues, participated slightly less than the VSU and the MCJGTF. Their results are still consistent enough with the combined participation levels to merit consideration. Ultimately we are confident our sample size was sufficient and provided outcomes that illustrate important characteristics of the SPD's informal network.

Lastly, the majority of the completed CASP surveys came from zip code 93905, approximately 58.3%, followed by zip codes 93901 and 93906 both constituting 17.8% of the surveys completed. An analysis of the individual zip code percentages revealed that zip code 93901 was underrepresented by 8%, 93905 was over represented by 17%, and 93906 was underrepresented by 20%. These misrepresentations within the zip codes

cautioned us to examine the data closely for any sample bias that may have resulted from the disproportioned zip code representation. However, analyzing the racial demographics of the surveys reveals the survey distribution matched the city's demographics by 96%. This combined with the fact that 94% of the primary three zip codes were covered in the survey gives us confidence that the responses received contain sufficient data to support a robust analysis of the perceptions of the population in regards to gang violence.

In Chapters V through VII, we examine the survey data using descriptive statistics and regression analysis to determine what the survey results mean. Throughout this analysis, examination of the interviews conducted adds amplifying data and anecdotal evidence to the survey results. Through this analysis we begin to see a more complete picture of the perceptions of Salinas' citizens through multiple viewpoints. From these differing viewpoints comes a better understanding of those conditions that increase the population's willingness to share information with law enforcement, and what contributes to and hinders SPD's ability to process that information across its departments.

## **IV. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF GANG-RELATED CRIME STATISTICS AND TIP INFORMATION**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The complexity of the American urban gang problem is too far reaching and difficult to ascribe to any one single cause. Countering these problems is an equally difficult and complex task, with no obvious “silver bullet” solutions available to stem the violence. This lack of easy answers is what allows gangs to continue to breed and, in a perverse way, protects them from eradication. Outlining this dilemma, SPD Police Chief Louis Fetherolf describes the gang situation in Salinas, CA, for example, as “a multigenerational, decades long problem [where] the gangs are operating with impunity” (personal communication, Chief Louis Fetherolf, 2010). If this problem has prevailed as persistently as Chief Fetherolf suggests, the question remains - are the prevention, suppression, and prosecution methodologies currently implemented by government and law enforcement entities sufficient?

In large part, community leaders and police departments have always viewed campaigns to minimize criminal gang activity as a war for information. In theory, the more information about narcotics, violence, and other criminal activities typically associated with gangs the authorities possess, the more arrests and preventative actions the authorities can enact, thus making their communities safer. While this is not necessarily a false cognition, it is far more difficult to execute than it is to theorize. To demonstrate this assertion, this chapter will examine the correlation of information volume and processing, in the form of tips, with gang related criminal statistics. In the end, it will be shown that the complexity of this problem demands a full and detailed accounting of information and how it is used to be able to fully capitalize on its potential to stem criminal gang activity.



## B. BACKGROUND

For this analysis, we focused our efforts on understanding the impact of information, in terms of quality and quantity, on gang violence in Salinas, CA. Salinas is an interesting laboratory from which to understand this problem, given its notable tradition of gang violence over the last few decades. Salinas's strong agricultural setting has attracted Hispanic migrant workers for decades.<sup>101</sup> What initially took root as a form of worker protection has morphed into a much broader endemic problem within the community.<sup>102</sup> The SPD has a long tradition of working to counter this challenge. However, comparatively, the decentralized nature of gang organizations has permitted much greater flexibility for adaptation to a changing environment, taxing the SPD's ability to secure the city. Currently, enforcement and security approaches may not be keeping pace with the ever changing face of gang crime.<sup>103</sup> Brian K. Contreras, Sr., of Second Chance Family & Youth Services in Salinas, and a noted community leader, observes that compared to 10 years ago, the gang problem today is a "different kind of problem...[gangs are] less blatant about their violence...even less violent...[but] more organized" (personal communication, Brian Contreras, 2010). Echoing this observation, a SPD officer assigned to the Monterey County Joint Gang Task Force (MCJGTF) assesses gang violence as relatively level over the past decade, but also notes that gang tactics, and abilities, are evolving. He says that gangs are "hitting what they are shooting at [which] shocks the conscience of the community" (personal communication, Officer from the MCJGTF, 2010).

Thus, it is asserted that traditional or accepted law enforcement practices and information gathering and processing techniques may not be keeping pace with this changing foe, demonstrating little noticeable impact from information received on law enforcement's ability to keep the peace. To objectively measure this, two analytical

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<sup>101</sup> Monterey County Historical Society, "City of Salinas, California—Our History," <http://www.salinas.net/> (accessed 10/28/2010).

<sup>102</sup> Louis Fetherolf, *90 Day Report to the Community: An Overview of the Salinas Police Department* (Salinas, CA: Salinas Police Department, [2009]) 6–7.

<sup>103</sup> Fetherolf, *90 Day Report to the Community: An Overview of the Salinas Police Department*, 6–11.

methodologies were used to determine if the information received about crimes associated with gangs had any impact on the level of gang violence: descriptive comparison of temporal crime data and a regression analysis of these models. Essentially, these models compared three significant crime statistics from the period encompassing January 2006 to October 2010. These statistics included monthly gang crime numbers for the given period, monthly gang arrests, and monthly tip information received by the SPD.

Gang crime, as measured by this study, includes homicide, robbery, and aggravated assault, combined to provide a single number describing criminal gang incidents. Gang arrests represent all arrests made by the SPD that were gang related. This includes assault and narcotic type arrests. Tips, on the other hand, come from several sources, including information produced by confidential informants, as well as anonymous internet and phone tips.

Tips are an important aspect of this research, as they provide the primary measure of information volume about gang activity that the SPD uses in its enforcement efforts. Specifically, the SPD CI program categorizes CIs into three distinct groups: citizen informants, who provide information for the betterment of the community; mercenary informants, who provide information for monetary gain; and criminal informants, who seek reduced sentences in exchange for information. CIs are generally assigned to obtain very specific and detailed information but, depending on the person, the situation, and motivations, that informational quality can vary. The SPD will generally manage 20 to 25 CIs at any given time, using guidelines strictly regulated by the California Department of Justice (personal communication, Officer from the MCJGTF, 2010). According to a member of the MCJGTF, the value of the CI cannot be understated, claiming that "almost without exception, actionable information that comes into the [police department] is from CIs" (personal communication, Officer from the MCJGTF, 2010). Other tips are

generated from anonymous internet and phone sources, received through local Salinas and Monterey County phone lines and official websites, and the nationally organized “We-Tip” crime reporting system.<sup>104</sup>

### C. DESCRIPTIVE MODELING

The graph in Figure 3 depicts gang crime levels (represented as a red line) in relation to tips received about gang activities (represented as a green line). Gang arrests are also represented (in blue), showing how each of these statistics compare to the other. This figure shows these relationships over time, based on all available, and contiguous, historical data for these variables, which includes January 2006 to October 2010.<sup>105</sup>




Figure 3. Impacts of Gang Related Tips on Gang Related Arrests and Crime Levels—January 2006 to October 2010

<sup>104</sup> Fetherolf, *Report to the Community July 2010*, 1–2.

<sup>105</sup> Correlating data can be found in Appendix A of this study.

Figure 4 shows the impact of gang related tips on gang related arrests and crime levels in Salinas for 2006.<sup>106</sup> Some interesting correlations can be drawn from this first refined graph.

First, there is a nearly perfect inverse relationship between the number of tips received and the amount of violence recorded. In other words, as crime tips increased, violence decreased, and vice versa, suggesting that as the public shared information with the SPD, the police were better able to counter gang activities. The inverse is also true—crime levels increased when the public failed to share what it knew about the gangs.




Figure 4. Impacts of Gang Related Tips on Gang Related Arrests and Crime Levels—2006

Subsequently, this unexpected relationship continues in Figure 5, which outlines the related 2007 data. This graph shows a nearly identical correlation, where arrests and crimes follow the same general trends.

<sup>106</sup> Correlating data can be found in Appendix A of this study.




Figure 5. Impacts of Gang Related Tips on Gang Related Arrests and Crime Levels—2007

Figures 6, 7, and 8 outline the 2008, 2009, and 2010 data sets.




Figure 6. Impacts of Gang Related Tips on Gang Related Arrests and Crime Levels—2008




Figure 7. Impacts of Gang Related Tips on Gang Related Arrests and Crime Levels—2009




Figure 8. Impacts of Gang Related Tips on Gang Related Arrests and Crime Levels—2010

In the end, this analysis alone is not sufficient enough to make significant conclusions concerning the effects of information volume on the SPD's ability to affect gang crime. A further, more refined analysis is essential to draw clearer conclusion.

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

There are two important conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of this data. The first conclusion outlines the need for better data collection, warehousing, and compiling. This was a significant limitation on this portion of the analysis. Data was often incomplete, making it difficult to conduct a comprehensive analysis. Thus, there may be a connection or impact, as our theory suggests, between the quantities of information gathered and the levels of gang related crime and arrests. However, the current available data makes this difficult to assess. Regardless, the SPD recognizes holes in their data collecting system. Chief Fetherolf opines that there are no collaborative information tools or systematized operating procedures that allow information to be collected and eventually processed to any noticeable effect (personal communication, Chief Fetherolf, 2010). However, individual units within the SPD and other supporting entities have begun gathering and using information that may, in the short term, allow for localized volume management. For example, the MCJGTF has implemented a comprehensive gang activity and arrests log that, if implemented across the rest of the SPD, could potentially benefit future efforts to discern trends associated with information received from the population (personal communication, Officer from the MCJGTF, 2010).

The second critical conclusion concerns the quality of the information received. Future research must develop criteria and a methodology to determine if the tip information that is being analyzed has produced any noticeable effects. Again, this relies on the improvement of data collection and management, as previously noted. A careful analysis of information quality will improve future research endeavors to determine any potential correlations that were previously obscure.

## **V. RESEARCH RESULTS FOR SALINAS POPULATION SURVEY**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The most important variables bearing on Salinas citizens' willingness to share information with the SPD are personal responsibility and unity of effort. This finding is the result of our analysis of survey responses from 309 Salinas citizens. Our analysis sought to determine the nature of the relationship between a person's willingness to share information (i.e., information volume) and our independent variables: legitimacy, unity of effort, trust and embeddedness, and security. Unity of effort was not originally included in our hypothesis regarding information volume, but as our research progressed we chose to add unity of effort to our analysis in order to expand our model and add depth to our hypothesis.

As discussed in Chapter III, we utilized survey research conducted by the Community Alliance for Safety and Peace (CASP) to analyze typical perceptions about city government, law enforcement, and gang violence. The observations and findings resulting from this survey are presented in three sections: statistical analysis, regression analysis, and results summary.

We examined how each of our variables influences the propensity a person has for sharing information with the police via descriptive statistics and regression analysis. Both methods of analysis revealed interesting findings on how the city can improve its ability to elicit a greater volume of crime information from the population of Salinas. For the descriptive statistical analysis below, we analyzed the results according to each independent variable, incorporating an analysis of the frequency of response for each question.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Frequency of responses for all survey questions can be found in Appendix B, Table 61.



For regression analysis we combined multiple questions from the survey that were determined to best measure each independent variable. Not all questions were deemed to have the requisite expository power for a particular variable, therefore not all survey questions were included in the variables used in the final regression model. Regression analysis offers a glimpse of both the statistical and substantive significance of our results. In our analysis we focus on the interpretations of statistically significant factors ( $p < 0.10$ ) and try to understand why some variables were less robust ( $p > 0.10$ ). In those cases where our independent variables did not conform to our overall hypothesis, we offer possible explanations.

## B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

The questions used in the CASP survey used a closed ended, five level Likert scale that ranged from 1—Strongly Disagree to 5—Strongly Agree. With this particular scale there was a midpoint rating of neutral. Accordingly, a response value greater than three indicates agreement, while less than three indicates disagreement. From the survey questions, we developed the following categories of analysis based on our variables: (1) Legitimacy, (2) Unity of Effort, (3) Trust and Embeddedness, and (4) Security. We first discuss some demographic background characteristics of the survey responses, and then discuss each variable with its associated questions. Table 5 describes the means and standard deviations for the independent variables.

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation
Legitimacy	3.0	1.2
Unity of Effort	3.7	1.0
Trust and Embeddedness		
Personal Responsibility	4.4	.91
Embeddedness	2.4	.95
Cultural Alignment	3.5	1.0
Cultural Needs	2.9	1.4
Security	3.3	.99

Table 2. Variable Means and Standard Deviation

## 1. Demographic Background

Survey respondents proportionally reflected the racial demographics of the city of Salinas, CA to a large degree, see Table 6. When asked what ethnic group they most identified themselves with, 76.8% of respondents stated Hispanic and 15.2% stated Caucasian. These two racial demographics together comprise approximately 90% of the ethnic makeup in Salinas, CA and comprised approximately 92% of survey respondents. Asians and African American were slightly under represented in the survey by approximately 7%, and Native Americans were slightly over represented in the survey by approximately 2%.

Race	Frequency of Survey Responses %	Salinas Demographic % <sup>108</sup>
Caucasian	15.2	17.7
Hispanic	76.8	72.4
African American	.7	1.6
Asian	1.3	7.6
Native American	2.7	1
Other	3.4	---
No Race Provided	4	---

Table 3. Racial Demographics

Demographic responses indicated that 60% of those surveyed reside in East Salinas (Zip Code 93905), 18.3% reside in North Salinas (Zip Code 93906), and 18.3% reside in South Salinas (Zip Code 93901). While these three zip codes comprise the Salinas Metropolitan area in its entirety, there were approximately 3.3% of respondents that reside in the surrounding areas (93902, 93903, 93907, and 93908). See Table 7.

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<sup>108</sup> City-Data.com, "Salinas, California," <http://www.city-data.com/> (accessed 10/29/2010).

Zip Code	Frequency of Survey Responses %	Salinas Demographic % <sup>109</sup>
93901	18.3	24
93902	0.7	---
93903	0.3	---
93905	60	39
93906	18.3	37
93907	1.3	---
93908	1.0	---

Table 4. Respondents by Zip Code

The highest proportions of respondents were Hispanics residing in East Salinas (54.3%). The second highest response rate was from Hispanics residing in North Salinas (12.5%), while Caucasians residing in South Salinas (9.3%), ranked third.

## 2. Perceptions of Gang Violence

As discussed in Chapter I, the population of Salinas has historically viewed gang violence as a serious problem in their community. Unsurprisingly, then, in 2010 the CASP population survey indicated similar feelings still dominated popular perceptions (see Table 8). When asked if the gang violence problem in Salinas was serious (Q1), 85.5% of respondents strongly agreed. When asked if gang violence had increased compared to the year before, 58.3% of respondents strongly agreed.<sup>110</sup> While other forms of violence can be just as damaging to a society, street gang crime tends to be more

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<sup>109</sup> Percentages based on estimated population of 144,276 in July 2009. See City-Data.com, “Salinas-California.”

<sup>110</sup> All statements regarding frequency responses are from Appendix B, Table 61: Frequency of Response, Mean, and Standard Deviation by Question.

visible than other forms of violence and therefore galvanizes the attention of the populous as a whole. It is clear gang violence is at the forefront of the minds of Salinas's citizens. The interesting question remains, why has it not stirred the population to mobilize against this admittedly serious threat to the community?

<b>GANG VIOLENCE</b>	<b><u>Frequency of Responses %</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q1: The gang violence problem in Salinas is very serious.	3.6	1.0	3.0	6.9	85.5	4.7	0.9
Q2: Compared to last year, gang violence in Salinas has increased.	7.0	5.9	12.2	16.6	58.3	4.1	1.2

Table 5. Gang Violence Frequency of Response

### 3. Legitimacy

Our first variable, *Legitimacy*, can be summed up as the extent to which the citizens regard the city government as proper and deserving of support.<sup>111</sup> If legitimacy is an important factor in the city's ability to solicit information from the population, then questions describing the relationships between the population and the city government are important. Survey questions 3,4,5,6 and 9 were used to measure the population's attitude toward Salinas' city government and the SPD on issues such as: city council and SPD responsiveness to complaints, city government services, and support for tax increases to fight gang violence. See Table 9 for frequency of responses related to legitimacy.

Survey results indicate that 44.8% of respondents believe the Salinas Police care what happens to them (Q3). Demographic analysis of this question reveals a misalignment between racial groups on this topic, as 67% of Caucasians agreed compared to 42% of Hispanics. Questions oriented specifically at the responsiveness of

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<sup>111</sup> Barker, *Political Legitimacy and the State*, 185–186.

the police toward a complaint, showed less agreement (37%, Q5). Similarly, when asked whether the city council was responsive to complaints (Q6) only 38% agreed. Based on the assumption that improving popular perceptions of city and law enforcement responsiveness is beneficial to improving city-community relations, the results for Q5 and Q6 suggest areas where specific improvement could be made to increase the legitimacy of the city government and thereby increase the volume of information from the population.

Of the responses to Q9, 43.7% of respondents agreed that the Salinas city government could provide services that meet their needs. Further analysis reveals somewhat of a racial divide on this question, with 48% of Hispanics in agreement compared to 33% of Caucasians.

In an effort to get a sense of respondent's willingness to contribute monetarily to the city's efforts to counter gang proliferation, subjects were asked an opened ended question regarding what changes they would support to fight gang violence in their city. Of the recommendations given, increasing community programs was the highest (69.3%) followed by increasing employment programs (57.6%). Additionally, 46.6% of respondents recommended increasing the number of police officers, and 44.3% recommended increasing school budgets.

In 2009, Salinas's government officials attempted to pass measure K to provide the city with additional funding for anti-gang initiatives.<sup>112</sup> All of the recommendations above were part of the measure K initiative. A poll of registered voters in 2009 indicated that 63% of registered voters would support the measure.<sup>113</sup> However, the measure ultimately did not pass, with a final vote of 60.7% against the measure. In the CASP survey, when asked if respondents would support a local tax increase to support their recommendations most agreed (52.2%).

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<sup>112</sup> Measure K sought to add a 1% sales tax on taxable purchases in the City of Salinas to protect residents by increasing youth gang/violence prevention; after-school recreation/mentoring; expanding job training; hiring more police to patrol neighborhoods/schools; retaining firefighters/paramedics; establishing community policing; prostitution prevention; crime fighting technology; and protecting essential services (except vehicle purchases which are taxed based on the residency of the buyer)

<sup>113</sup> Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin & Associates (FMM&A) conducted a poll from May 2–4, 2009 of 400 City of Salinas registered voters likely to cast a ballot in an upcoming election.

The overall results for Legitimacy show relative neutrality about the legitimacy of the Salinas city government and law enforcement agencies. Often times, whether it is a counterinsurgency effort or counter-gang effort, there will be a small minority who support the government, a small minority who support the insurgent or gang, and a larger majority who are neutral. This neutral population is the objective over which the city and the gang will fight for influence. Understanding the population's perceptions about the legitimacy of the government is critical to understanding how susceptible the population is to the city's or the gang's influence. Results show that there is a large section of the population that can still be influenced by policy changes toward the favor of the Salinas city government in its fight against gang violence.

<b><u>Legitimacy</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q3: The Salinas Police care what happens to you.	18.4%	6.8%	30.0%	15.2%	29.6%	3.3	1.4
Q4: Your Salinas City Council Representative cares what happens to you.	16.9%	12.0%	28.0%	12.0%	31.1%	3.3	1.4
Q5: If I had some complaint about a police officer and took that complaint to a member of the police department, I can expect him or her to pay a lot of attention to what I say.	21.3%	15.6%	26.2%	12.7%	24.2%	3.0	1.5
Q6: If I had some complaint about a local government activity and took that complaint to a member of the Salinas City Council, I can expect him or her to pay a lot of attention to what I say.	17.1%	16.7%	28.2%	12.2%	25.7%	3.1	1.4
Q9: I am confident that Salinas's city government can provide services that meet my needs. (Education system, police, city council, mayor).	13.3%	16.7%	26.2%	19.0%	24.7%	3.3	1.3

Table 6. Legitimacy Frequency of Responses

#### 4. Unity of Effort

To capture the attitudes of the population regarding the need for a unified approach to gang violence we included questions 26, 27, 29, 30, and 31. Respondents agreed that combating the gang problem requires a unified approach between the population and the city government (87.1%, Q29). However the majority of respondents indicated that the city does not communicate effectively with only 38.6% agreeing with Q31, “city agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang

violence.” Interview results from city and law enforcement personnel confirmed this deficiency, and further highlighted the importance of increasing intra-agency communications.

Additionally, 52% of respondents acknowledged that the police do work with community leaders to fight gang violence, and 47% of respondents feel that the city has been effective at soliciting local citizen’s help in the fight against gang violence. In general it seems that a large portion of respondents perceive the city is taking a unified approach to confronting gang violence; however, if increasing communications among city agencies does affect unity of effort, results from Q31 suggest that an improvement in intra-agency communication could improve the popular sense of unity of effort and ultimately increase the volume of information from the population. See Table 10 for frequency of responses related to unity of effort.



<b><u>Unity of Effort</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q26: The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting gang violence.	18.3%	10.4%	25.0%	17.5%	28.8%	3.3	1.4
Q27: The police work with local community leaders to fight gang violence.	14.2%	11.6%	22.2%	19.6%	32.4%	3.4	1.4
Q29: The gang violence problem is something that requires the combined efforts of the population of Salinas and the city government (police, city council, mayor, educational system) to resolve.	5.0%	1.4%	6.4%	11.8%	75.4%	4.5	1.0
Q30: The City of Salinas has been effective in soliciting local citizens' help in fighting the gang violence problem.	17.1%	12.7%	22.9%	14.7%	32.7%	3.3	1.5
Q31: City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang violence.	19.0%	14.7%	27.7%	15.8%	22.8%	3.1	1.4

Table 7. Unity of Effort Frequency of Responses

## 5. Trust and Embeddedness

To measure the level of trust the community has toward the Salinas city government, and to measure the degree the government is embedded within the community, we analyzed the following areas: respondent's willingness to share information with the police; willingness to help other people; willingness to work in community groups to solve problems; whether the government was meeting the specific cultural needs of the population; whether there are differing opinions among the

population concerning the importance of cultural heritage; and how familiar the population is with city and laws enforcement personnel within their community. To understand the significance of each of these areas, the following section examines the frequency of responses for those questions that relate to trust and embeddedness, see Table 11.

A large majority of respondents (82.9%) agreed that it was important to pass crime information to the police (Q28). When participants were asked whether they felt it was important to help others that are less fortunate (Q19), 84.3% agreed. Additionally, when asked whether people should form community organizations to solve community problems in Salinas (Q25), 82.4% agreed. These results indicate that respondents understand the value of reaching out to their fellow citizens, and that community organizations are a good way of doing that. This analysis also suggests the potential for mobilization of the masses against gang violence, particularly among the Hispanic population (mean of 4.8). Additionally, if personal responsibility is shown to be a significant factor in the overall model (shown later in regression) these results suggest that increasing the citizen's ability to form community organizations may improve their sense of empowerment and increase their willingness to share information with law enforcement agencies on gang related activities.

To measure embeddedness we examined those areas of the city where the highest percentage of the population was acquainted with law enforcement personnel and city officials (Q34 and 35). Survey results indicate that the population in zip code 93901 had the highest familiarity with both law enforcement personnel and city officials (47.7% and 36.6% respectively).<sup>114</sup> Conversely the population in zip code 93906 had the lowest familiarity with law enforcement and city officials (11.9% and 11%). If the embeddedness of law enforcement and city officials is important to increasing information volume from the population, frequency analysis of this variable suggests that city officials need to establish closer ties with the community in northeast Salinas.

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<sup>114</sup> See Appendix B, Tables 59 and 60 for Frequency of Responses for Questions 34 and 35.

Because of Salinas' high Hispanic population, the perceptions of the population towards cultural alignment within the city were deemed significant factors to measure. Shared values, attitudes, beliefs, and overall patterns of thinking socially constructed among members of a society have a tremendous influence on its long term health and growth. A misalignment of these attitudes and beliefs between city leadership and the population, and even among the different ethnic groups of the population itself, can negatively affect how successful a city confronts a problem such as gang violence.

To measure the impact of cultural alignment on the population's willingness to provide information to law enforcement, we analyzed questions 17, 18 and 20 through 22. When asked if speaking English as a common language would unite Salinas' citizens (Q17), 73% of Hispanics disagreed compared to 47.5% of Caucasians. This indicates a polarization among the population about the importance of speaking one common language, and highlights the importance of language as a sense of identity. 74.3% of respondents stated that cultural heritage was important to their sense of identity, with a slightly higher rate of agreement from Hispanics than Caucasians.

Only a small minority (33.6%) of respondents agreed that their specific ethnic needs were being met by city institutions such as police, city hall, and the education system. While respondents indicated that cultural heritage was important, they also indicated that they would not necessarily be represented better by leaders of their own ethnic group. This suggests that ethnicity does not weigh heavily on the respondent's opinion of the city leadership, but rather action by those leaders matter more. When asked if Hispanics faced discrimination in getting a decent job (Q20), 54% of Hispanics agreed compared to 36.8% of Caucasians. This indicates another schism among the population in regards to discrimination in the job market and closely mirrors the opinions about city institutions failing to meet ethnic needs. If increasing cultural alignment does have a positive impact on the population's willingness to share information, then Q22 suggests that the city should focus on meeting the specific needs of the various ethnic groups in Salinas, particularly Hispanics.

<b><u>Trust and Embeddedness</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q17: Speaking English, as a common language, will unite all of Salinas's citizens.	58.3%	8.3%	12.2%	7.5%	13.8%	2.1	1.5
Q18: Salinas's citizens are best represented by leaders from their own racial or ethnic background.	30.4%	7.9%	29.6%	9.2%	22.9%	2.9	1.5
Q19: People should help others who are less fortunate.	3.8%	2.8%	9.1%	11.2%	73.1%	4.5	1.0
Q20: Hispanic Americans face discrimination in getting a decent job.	19.6%	6.3%	23.1%	16.1%	34.9%	3.4	1.5
Q21: My cultural heritage is very important to my sense of who I am.	6.7%	3.2%	15.8%	14.8%	59.5%	4.1	1.2
Q22: The needs of my ethnic group are met in the City of Salinas by institutions such as: (police, elected officials, educational system).	22.7%	9.5%	34.1%	13.3%	20.4%	2.9	1.4
Q25: People should form or participate in community organizations to solve community problems in Salinas.	5.0%	1.8%	10.8%	14.0%	68.5%	4.4	1.1
Q28: It is important and effective to pass crime information to the Salinas police department.	8.2%	3.9%	5.0%	11.4%	71.5%	4.3	1.2

Table 8. Trust and Embeddedness Frequency of Responses

## **6. Security**

The data for security was captured by the responses to questions 13 through 16, see Table 12. These questions were included to measure how individual perceptions about personal security in Salinas affected their willingness to share information with law enforcement agencies. There was largely a unanimous feeling (78.5%) among both Hispanics and Caucasians that Salinas was an unsafe place at night. While the majority of respondents felt unsafe at night, just over a quarter of respondents (27.2%) indicated they have actually been threatened by gangs. This alone is an alarming figure; however, the difference between those respondents that feel unsafe and those that have actually experienced negative effects from gangs illustrates how gangs can use a relatively small amount of violence as leverage to negatively affect the perceptions of the majority of the population. Lastly, there was low agreement that the Salinas police had made the city safer over the last year (Q16). While disagreement on this seems widespread overall, Hispanics seemed to disagree more (53.6%) than Caucasians (38.2%). This suggests that the violence is felt by a disproportionate segment of the population. If the perception of security contributes to how much information the population shares with the city, concerning gang activities, then this analysis suggests that law enforcement officials should make Hispanic neighborhood security a priority.

<u>Security</u>	<u>Frequency of Response (%)</u>						
<u>Question</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Std Dev</u>
Q13: The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk alone at night.	8.7%	4.5%	8.3%	10.1%	68.4%	4.3	1.3
Q14: I feel safe and secure in my home.	15.4%	8.8%	17.5%	19.6%	38.6%	3.6	1.5
Q15: I, or a member of my family have been threatened by a gang member in Salinas.	55.3%	7.0%	10.5%	7.0%	20.2%	2.3	1.6
Q16: As compared to a year ago, the Salinas police department has made the city a more secure and safe place to live.	35.4%	15.0%	27.2%	8.7%	13.8%	2.5	1.4

Table 9. Security Frequency of Responses

### C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS

We conducted regression analysis on the survey data to test our hypothesis that the willingness of the population to share information with law enforcement agencies is affected by (1) government legitimacy (*legit*), (2) unity of effort (*unity*), (3) trust and embeddedness, and (4) security (*security*). For regression analysis the variable for trust and embeddedness was further broken down into several independent variables: personal responsibility (*perresp*), embeddedness of local government within the population (*embed*), city government meeting ethnic needs (*culneed*), and cultural alignment (*culture*). As discussed earlier, we selected several questions from each category of the survey with the best expository potential for each variable. To get each variable's value, we took the average rating of all responses associated with that variable. We then ran regression to measure our independent variables against the willingness to share

information with the Salinas Police Department. For this model we used Q28 as the dependent variable, “it is important and effective to pass crime information to the Salinas police department”.<sup>115</sup>

We included a dummy variable, “race,” in the model to determine if ethnicity had any impact on the population’s willingness to share information. In order to incorporate race as a dummy variable answers to Q37 were re-coded for Hispanic and non-Hispanic answers. Answers that were positive for Hispanic race were coded with a “1”, and non-Hispanic answers were coded with a “0.”<sup>116</sup>

We conducted a Ramsey retest to test for omitted variables. Tests indicated valid results and that the model did not have any missing variables.<sup>117</sup>

## **1. The Dependent Variable**

To measure the willingness of the respondents to share information with the SPD, we used question 28, “it is important and effective to pass crime information to the Salinas police department” as our dependent variable, see Table 13. Regarding this statement, 82.9% of respondents agreed, 5% were neutral, and 12.1% disagreed. More Caucasians disagreed with this statement (13.6%) than did Hispanics (10.6%). Overall these results seem positive and show that respondents do perceive that it is important to share information with the police. However, what people feel and whether people act on those feelings are two separate things. Further analysis will attempt to explain what impacts people’s perceptions toward the importance of sharing information with the police, and understand what may prevent them from following through on their convictions.

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<sup>115</sup> Regression results are as follows: Adjusted  $R^2=0.4279$ ,  $f\text{ stat}=8.67$ ,  $p\text{ stat}=0.0000$ , root MSE =0.9585. See Appendix B for more details.

<sup>116</sup> See Appendix B, Figure 36 for more detail.

<sup>117</sup>For our model with, “willingness to share information” as the DV, the mean inflation factor (VIF) was 1.43. Using Ramsey retest resulted in a p-value of 0.0116 confirming the model does not appear to have omitted variables. See Appendix B for more detail.

DV	<u>Frequency of Responses %</u>						
<u>Question</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Std Dev</u>
Q28: It is important and effective to pass crime information to the Salinas police department.	3.6	1.0	3.0	6.9	85.5	4.7	0.9

Table 10. DV Frequency of Response

## 2. Regression Results

Overall our regression model explained 43% of the variance in the population's willingness to share information with the police (adjusted  $R^2 = .4279$ ). The most significant variables with the highest relationship with the dependent variable are personal responsibility (*perresp*,  $p=0.001$ ) and unity of effort (*unity 2*,  $p=0.004$ ). Further analysis of the data shows that race, security, and cultural needs also had interesting impacts upon the dependent variable. Some of our variable results are statistically insignificant ( $p>0.10$ ) and may suggest areas of study for future research (See Table 14). Our analysis leads to several important conclusions regarding the population's willingness to share information with the police.

Legitimacy		Unity of Effort		Trust and Embeddedness								Security		Dummy Variable	
IV1: <i>legit</i>		IV2: <i>unity</i>		IV3: <i>perresp</i>		IV4: <i>embed</i>		IV6: <i>culture</i>		IV7: <i>culneed</i>		IV5: <i>security</i>		<i>race</i>	
Coeff	P	Coeff	P	Coeff	P	Coeff	P	Coeff	P	Coeff	P	Coeff	P	Coeff	P
.02	.86	.39	.00	.45	.00	.03	.12	.07	.54	.11	.25	.13	.19	.12	NA

Table 11. Regression Analysis by coefficient and p-values from Appendix B. Shaded areas indicate  $p>0.10$

### a. Model Analysis

The independent variables, in rank order of regression coefficients, are: personal responsibility (0.45), unity of effort (0.39), security (0.13), race (0.12), cultural needs (0.11), cultural alignment (0.07), and embeddedness (0.03).



(1) Personal Responsibility. Examining the questions that make up the most important variable, personal responsibility (see Table 15), suggests the population is willing to help with the gang problem. However, more importantly, if the population was empowered through the formation of, and participation in community organizations, they would be more inclined to share crime information with the police. This makes sense, as many interviews with city and law enforcement officials noted, many people do not come forward with information because they do not want to single themselves out and become a target of retribution. Community organizations are a good way for a person to contribute information while maintaining anonymity among the group as a whole.

While there are established communication channels set up by the city for citizens to report anonymous crime information, these channels are being underutilized for reporting information on violent crime. This under utilization may be affected by the population's lack of confidence that anything will result from their information when left on a recording machine or email account. Furthermore, analysis of respondents who had negative comments about the responsiveness of the police (Q5) reinforces this finding. These results may also indicate that people are simply confused about which channel of communication to use to report crime information.

Engagement at the neighborhood level will allow dialogue to occur among members of the community and city officials on a routine basis. For this to occur, it will take the city to pro-actively engage the population through the establishment of community organizations at the neighborhood level to increase their level of information on gang activities.

Questions on Personal Responsibility		Mean	Standard Deviation
Q19: People should help others who are less fortunate.		4.5	1.0
Q25: People should form or participate in community organizations to solve community problems in Salinas.		4.4	1.1
Personal Responsibility Scale Statistics			
Mean	Standard Deviation	Sample Size	Coefficient Alpha
4.4	.91	270	.454

Table 12. IV 3 Personal Responsibility Component Questions

(2) Unity of effort. Examining the individual questions that make up another important variable, unity of effort (see Table 16), suggests that respondents view a close relationship between the community and city government as an important factor contributing to a citizen's willingness to share crime information with the police. These results not only quantifiably confirm the attitudes of the population, they also reinforce the most significant variable in the model, personal responsibility; unity of effort may be realized through the formation of community organizations. Through community organizations, citizens will feel empowered and be more willing to share information with the police on gang activity. The regression coefficient values then decrease significantly for the rest of the variables. Therefore, while statistically not as important as the first two, they do deserve some attention.

Questions on Unity of Effort		Mean	Standard Deviation
Q26: The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting gang violence.		3.3	1.4
Q27: The police work with local community leaders to fight gang violence.		3.4	1.4
Q29: The gang violence problem is something that requires the combined efforts of the population of Salinas and the city government (police, city council, mayor, educational system) to resolve.		4.4	1.0
Q31: City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang violence.		3.1	1.4
Unity of Effort Scale Statistics			
Mean	Standard Deviation	Sample Size	Coefficient Alpha
3.7	1.0	154	.396

Table 13. IV2 Unity of Effort Component Questions

(3) Security. While security had some affect on the dependent variable, it did not play as a significant role in predicting willingness to share information as we hypothesized (coefficient of 0.139, p value of 0.19). Table 17 illustrates those questions we felt best represented the variable security. An explanation for this may be that citizen's who do feel secure, either see no reason to share information with the police because they see no reason to go out of their way to provide information; or they live in an area where they have no access to the information police require. Conversely, those citizens who do not feel secure may feel that divulging information to the police may make their situation worse and therefore do not feel it is even possible to share information. Additionally, many respondents to Q5 answered negatively or neutral about

the responsiveness of the police. It is possible that this impacts the population's opinion on whether to share information, especially if the citizen already feels unsafe. This may have lowered the overall value of security in the model. More research in this area may be needed.

Questions on Security			Mean	Standard Deviation
Q13: The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk alone at night.			4.3	1.3
Q15: I, or a member of my family have been threatened by a gang member in Salinas.			2.3	1.6
Security Scale Statistics				
Mean	Standard Deviation	Sample Size	Coefficient Alpha	
3.3	.99	243	.139	

Table 14. IV5 Security Component Questions

(4) Cultural Needs. Cultural needs as represented by Q22 (see Table 18) had a slight impact on the willingness to share information. While the survey itself showed that cultural heritage was important to the respondents, regression analysis showed that it was not how much an individual valued their cultural heritage, but rather the ability of the city government to meet the ethnic needs of the population that affected their willingness to share information with the police. Each ethnic group has unique values, attitudes, beliefs, and overall patterns of thinking. For example, interviews during our research with city and law enforcement officials revealed that many Hispanic immigrants view the police as a corrupt institution. These beliefs stem from their negative experiences with law enforcement personnel in Mexico. Thus, an ethnic group's sense of worth is tied to how much they perceive that the city government cares about their particular values and beliefs. The ability of the city government to recognize these attitudes and align policy accordingly can instill a sense of worth and belonging to estranged ethnic groups and increase the level of trust they have in government institutions. This increase in trust will facilitate more frequent and honest communication between the population and city government agencies. This can positively affect how successful the city is at collectively confronting problems such as gang violence.

Questions on Cultural Needs			Mean	Standard Deviation
Q22: The needs of my ethnic group are met in the City of Salinas by institutions such as: (police, elected officials, educational system).			2.9	1.4
Cultural Needs Scale Statistics				
Mean	Standard Deviation	Sample Size	Coefficient Alpha	
2.9	1.4	211	.119	

Table 15. IV 7 Cultural Needs Component Questions

(5) Legitimacy. The relatively insignificant relationship between legitimacy and the willingness to share information could be due to an analysis problem. Accurately defining and measuring political legitimacy is a very difficult. It is possible that the questions used for this variable did not capture, to a sufficient degree, those ingredients that accurately reflect measurements for legitimacy. Furthermore, the concept of legitimacy is a complex concept that may need to be analyzed in multiple component parts rather than as an amalgamated variable as we have done in this model (See Table 19). While legitimacy may be an important factor in a counterinsurgency campaign, where the political legitimacy of the state is being directly challenged by the insurgent, it may not have any affect in a counter-gang scenario. It is quite possible that the legitimacy of the city is intact by the sheer fact of its existence, and plays no part in the perceptions of residents as it relates to their willingness to share information.

Questions for Legitimacy			Mean	Standard Deviation
Q3. The Salinas Police care what happens to you.			3.3	1.4
Q4. Your Salinas City Council Representative cares what happens to you.			3.2	1.4
Q5. If I had some complaint about a police officer and took that complaint to a member of the police department, I can expect him or her to pay a lot of attention to what I say.			3.0	1.5
Q6. If I had some complaint about a local government activity and took that complaint to a member of the Salinas City Council, I can expect him or her to pay a lot of attention to what I say.			3.1	1.4
Q9. I am confident that Salinas's city government can provide services that meet my needs. (Education system, police, city council, mayor).			3.3	1.3
Legitimacy Scale Statistics				
Mean	Standard Deviation	Sample Size	Coefficient Alpha	
3.0	1.2	167	.022	

Table 16. IV 1 Legitimacy Component Questions

(6) Embeddedness. As with legitimacy, embeddedness did not seem to play an integral role in shaping respondent's willingness to share information with police. While we attempted to show a causal link between the number of police and city officials people know, to their willingness to share information, this analysis proved this link to be very weak. An explanation for this may be that it does not matter how many police officers someone knows, but rather what the nature and quality of the relationship is.

(7) Race. Race was added as a dummy variable to the model to determine what affect race had on a respondent's willingness to share information with the police. While not a strong predictor of the dependent variable, adding race to the model did show that Hispanics are slightly more inclined to share information with the police than other ethnic groups. This may be because Hispanics are more affected by the gang problem than other ethnic groups in the city.

#### **D. RESULTS SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

Survey respondents confirmed the importance of some of our variables we hypothesized affect their willingness to share crime information with the police. Not all of the independent variables for our model showed to be statistically significant ( $p < .10$ ). Of the variables we tested in our model, personal responsibility and unity of effort provide the most clarity on where the city can focus its efforts to increase the level of information they are receiving from the population concerning gang crime. It is clear that a majority of respondents believe that a close relationship with the city is critical to fighting gang crime. Additionally, this close relationship may best be manifested through the development of a network of community organizations structured at the neighborhood level. Results indicate it is not the number of police officers people know, but rather the responsiveness of the police, and the quality of the communication, between them and the community, that matter most in eliciting information. In other words, it is not quantity of relationships, but rather the quality of those relationships that will affect the public's willingness to share information.

These findings are in line with what history tells us works well in counterinsurgency campaigns. A counterinsurgency fight is not won at the highest levels of government, but rather it is won at the village or neighborhood level. A government that can engage the population through meaningful dialogue at the lowest levels can establish credibility with the people, and can also empower the citizenry to make a significant contribution to the fight. While not all counterinsurgency doctrine can be applied to a counter-gang problem, as this analysis has shown, it is clear that the two are congruent on this point. Analysis of this survey shows the population has the potential for mobilization; however, it is incumbent upon the city leadership, particularly in the law enforcement agencies, to have a similar attitude in its approach to the gang problem. This point cannot be overemphasized. If the city does not strive to build closer ties to the community in which the gangs thrive, they will not be able to increase their knowledge about the gangs, and will not be able to effectively target them.

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## **VI. SALINAS POLICE DEPARTMENT SURVEY**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

To get a better sense of attitudes and perceptions of the enforcement arm of the Salinas city government, we conducted a voluntary survey of the city's 153 uniformed police officers at the rank of Commander or below. As previously described, this survey was intended to identify attitudes and perceptions that might influence the city's ability to effectively process information relevant to criminal gang activity. As this survey was targeted at those charged with "front-line" duty on the streets of Salinas, the three Deputy Chiefs and the Chief of Police were excluded from the potential sample population. The final survey questions were drawn from a combination of previous General Social Survey (GSS) research conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, the 2010 CASP survey of the Salinas population, as well as original questions we crafted to provide insight to the unique conditions in Salinas.<sup>118</sup>

To conduct the survey, we attended the Salinas Police Department's four daily shift change briefings over the course of two days: September 7 and 10, 2010. Based on feedback we received from Commander Juan Ruiz, these days were specifically identified so that we could canvas as much of the department as possible within a reasonable timeframe. At the beginning of each of the shift change briefings, we spent approximately five to ten minutes describing the intent and structure of the survey, reading the informed consent statement with an emphasis on the voluntary and anonymous nature of any participation, and answering questions. Each attendee at the shift change was provided with a survey and given as much time as necessary to complete the questionnaire. Completed surveys were collected after the shift change briefing, along with signatures indicating individual consent to participate in research. Each respondent was provided a personal copy of the informed consent statement, with contact information for our research team at the Naval Post Graduate School.

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<sup>118</sup> James Allan Davis and Tom W. Smith, *General Social Surveys, 1972–2008* (Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, 2009).



## B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

### 1. Descriptive Statistics

Of the potential 153 individuals we identified as eligible to participate in the survey, we received responses from 88 uniformed officers (57.5% response rate). Of the 88 completed surveys, 53 officers (60.2%) indicated that they lived outside the city limits of Salinas, while 35 responded that they were Salinas residents (39.8%), as described in Table 20.

Indicated Residency	# of Respondents	Response Rate (%)
Reside Inside Salinas City Limits	35	39.8%
Reside Outside Salinas City Limits	53	60.2%

Table 17. Salinas Police Survey Respondent Residency (Q34)

After conducting the surveys, each questionnaire was individually coded 1 through 88. The responses to each question were then input into a spreadsheet, with individual questions grouped according to their relevance to each of our independent variables.<sup>119</sup> Thus, the questions were grouped under the overall themes of legitimacy, security, trust, systems integration, unity of effort, and autonomy. We also included some general questions that we hoped might offer some discriminatory power for the end results.

The statistics for each question were individually calculated, with the respondent's answer to the residency question used as a discriminator in the overall analysis. The survey utilized a Likert Scale format, with a potential range of responses from 1 to 5, and "don't know." A response of "1" indicated that the respondent "completely disagreed" with the given statement. Likewise, a response of "5" indicated that the respondent "completely agreed" with the statement as written. As a mid-scale response of "3" would indicate a neutral opinion, any responses above a 3 were interpreted as agreement, while

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<sup>119</sup> See Appendix C, Table 62 for complete survey data.

those answers below a 3 were documented as disagreement with the given statement. If the survey respondent opted for "don't know," or did not indicate an answer, their response was recorded as a "0" in our tables.

Ultimately, we hoped to uncover specific causal factors that might contribute to improved information processing within the SPD. To do so, we utilized both descriptive and inferential statistics (multiple regression) to mathematically resolve patterns in the data we collected. We theorized that levels of information processing are impacted by the variables of systems integration, unity of effort, and autonomy. However, because we wanted to be able to compare attitudes and perceptions across the different survey populations, we also included survey questions for the variables that we conceptualized as responsible for information volume (legitimacy, security, and trust and embeddedness). In addition, including questions for both information volume and processing allowed us greater flexibility in adapting our final model of information processing to reflect any changes to our initial theory. The following sections describe the survey results for each condition variable for our overall theory of information volume and processing. Table 21 depicts a brief summary of results for the variables we considered in this survey.

<b><u>Variable</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Standard Deviation</u></b>
Legitimacy	3.1	0.6
Security	3.5	0.6
Trust and Embeddedness	3.0	0.5
Systems Integration	2.2	0.7
Unity of Effort	3.0	0.6
Levels of Autonomy	3.2	0.7

Table 18. Variable Means and Standard Deviation

*a. Legitimacy*

Our first independent variable, legitimacy, was addressed in the SPD survey with questions 3 through 8. These questions sought to understand individual law enforcement officer perceptions of the credibility of both Salinas city government, and the SPD organization itself.

The responses to Q3, "The Salinas Police care about Salinas citizens," are interesting in a way that is, perhaps, not quite apparent from the calculated mean of 4.1. Of the sampled population, 73.9% agreed with this statement. While a large majority of the SPD believes that their organization cares about their community, this also indicates, of course, that more than a quarter of the SPD feels some lack of confidence that the organization they serve cares about the citizens of Salinas. Also noteworthy, is the fact that 65% of the "3 or less" responses to Q3 were from officers who also indicated that they reside outside the Salinas city limits, which is a level slightly disproportionate to their representation in the survey.

The responses to Q4 and Q6 also indicate a significant pessimistic mood about Salinas's elected government, with only 31.9% agreeing that the City Council cares about Salinas citizens, and 36.5% agreeing that the City Council is responsive to citizen complaints. The overall results for the legitimacy questions are described in Table 22.

<b><u>Legitimacy</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q3. The Salinas Police care about Salinas citizens	1.1	3.4	21.6	33.0	40.9	4.1	0.9
Q4. The Salinas City Council cares about Salinas citizens	5.7	22.7	39.8	23.9	8.0	3.1	1.0
Q5. The Salinas Police are very responsive to citizen complaints.	0.0	5.7	18.2	43.2	33.0	4.0	0.9
Q6. The Salinas City Council are very responsive to citizen complaints.	5.4	20.3	37.8	24.3	12.2	3.2	1.1
Q7. I am confident in Salinas's courts and legal system.	9.1	34.1	33.0	20.5	3.4	2.8	1.0
Q8. I am satisfied with the quality of education in Salinas.	44.3	36.4	17.0	2.3	0.0	1.8	0.8

Table 19. Legitimacy Frequency of Response

***b. Security***

The data for our second independent variable, security, was captured by the responses to survey questions 12 through 15. These questions were included to better understand how individual perceptions and attitudes about personal security in Salinas contribute to a desire to share gang-related intelligence. It is interesting to note that there is strong agreement that Salinas is unsafe at night, with 83% of the respondents answering with a 4 or 5 to Q12. Additionally, it was rather unexpected to have the police department so divided in their responses to Q14. Overall, 44% of the respondents indicated that they, or a member of their family, had been threatened by a gang member in Salinas. Although it was somewhat surprising to see so many threatened, it might also

highlight a poorly worded question that failed to distinguish between on-duty and off-duty occurrences. The descriptive statistics that detail the overall responses to the security questions are detailed in Table 23.

<b><u>Security</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q12. The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk alone at night.	1.1	4.5	11.4	26.1	56.8	4.3	0.9
Q13. I feel safe and secure in my home.	3.6	9.5	16.7	29.8	40.5	3.9	1.1
Q14. I or a member of my family have been threatened by a gang member in Salinas.	46.5	2.3	7.0	12.8	31.4	2.8	1.8
Q15. As compared to a year ago, the Salinas police department has made the city a more secure and safe place to live.	17.4	20.9	36.0	20.9	4.7	2.7	1.1

Table 20. Security Frequency of Response

***c. Trust and Embeddedness***

The third independent variable we addressed in our survey was trust and embeddedness. Questions 16 through 22 were intended to capture the police department's attitudes on issues frequently associated with varying levels of social cohesion and trust.<sup>120</sup> Table 24, below, provides a summary of the survey results for these questions.

The analysis of the responses to Q16 reveals that a greater proportion of those who live outside the city limits agree that speaking English as a common language would unite Salinas citizens (35.3%), when compared to the same responses from Salinas

<sup>120</sup> Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla : Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*.

city residents (15.3%).<sup>121</sup> This may suggest that those who live and work in the city, have a greater appreciation for the different cultures within Salinas, and view this as an important aspect of the population's shared sense of identity. Ultimately, this points to a greater degree of embeddedness, or cultural respect, from those who live within the city that they patrol.

The responses to Q18 are somewhat discouraging. Of the 86 responses to this question, only 58.1% agreed with the statement "people should help others who are less fortunate." This response indicates some degree of ambivalence toward social responsibility within the Salinas police department. This response might also point to the presence of cognitive barriers to the sort of personal activism that might foster a greater familiarity and trust between the police department and the population. On the other hand, it might simply indicate a shared distaste for social welfare policies. Regardless, it seems clear that a significant portion of the police department believes that "less fortunate" people should carry their own weight in the city of Salinas.

Similarly, the responses to Q22 seem to confirm the perception within the SPD that the community needs to take action to correct problems. Of the 85 respondents, 78.8% answered with a 4 or 5 to the statement that "people should form or participate in community organizations to solve community problems in Salinas." While this response indicates a shared belief that community organizations serve a valuable purpose in solving problems, there is some potential for this attitude to obstruct efforts to develop government-citizen partnerships that might be even more effective versus gang violence. In other words, to develop the trusted government-population relationships necessary to overcome the information advantages enjoyed by the gangs, the SPD must not perceive gang violence as simply a "community problem."

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<sup>121</sup> See Table 62, Appendix C for the expanded frequency of response results for all questions.

<b><u>Trust and Embeddedness</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q16. Speaking English, as a common language, will unite all of Salinas's citizens.	17.6	12.9	18.8	15.3	35.3	3.4	1.5
Q17. Salinas's citizens are best represented by leaders from their own racial or ethnic background.	42.0	31.8	17.0	8.0	1.1	2.4	1.3
Q18. People should help others who are less fortunate.	5.8	5.8	30.2	26.7	31.4	3.7	1.1
Q19. Hispanic Americans face discrimination in getting a decent job.	48.8	28.6	13.1	3.6	6.0	1.9	1.1
Q20. My ethnic group membership is very important to my sense of who I am.	26.5	10.8	20.5	18.1	24.1	3.0	1.5
Q21. The needs of my ethnic group are met by the City of Salinas (police, city council, educational system, mayor).	22.8	20.3	31.6	16.5	8.9	2.7	1.2
Q22. People should form or participate in community organizations to solve community problems in Salinas.	1.2	2.4	17.6	29.4	49.4	4.2	0.9

Table 21. Trust and Embeddedness Frequency of Response

***d. Systems Integration***

Questions 9, 10, and 11 were included to get a sense of how the typical SPD officer receives his or her information about gang activity. Question 33 was directed more towards understanding perceptions about the efficiency of intra-government communication channels. Considered together, these questions were intended to offer some insight into how well city agencies are networked for the sharing

of gang-related intelligence (see Table 25). It is interesting to note the vast majority of the responses to Q9 indicated that they do not get most of their information about gang activity through official city communication channels; only 15.9% confirmed that they get most of their information through this source. As indicated in the responses to Q10, the channel of communication with the greatest proportionate use was "word of mouth or rumor." However, this still represented only 30.7% of those sampled. In Q11, even fewer indicated that media outlets provided useful information about gang activity (9.1%). The lack of any clear consensus on the use of these information channels illustrates a dependency on some alternative means of communication, and it is quite possible that the wording of our questions did not adequately canvas the possible sources of information used within the SPD. Combined with the largely negative response to Q33, this response pattern points to deficiencies in the integration (and usefulness) of official city communication channels. At the same time, these results may also highlight an over-reliance on limited personal information sources. This contention will be further investigated in Chapter VIII as we examine the social and professional networks used by the SPD, in detail.



<b><u>Systems Integration</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q9. I receive most of my information about gang activity through official city communication channels (Press releases, billboards, community meetings)	46.6	27.3	10.2	10.2	5.7	2.0	1.2
Q10. I receive most of my information about gang activity through word of mouth or rumors.	15.9	22.7	30.7	20.5	10.2	2.9	1.2
Q11. I receive most of my information about gang activity through media outlets (TV, newspaper, radio).	42.0	31.8	17.0	8.0	1.1	1.9	1.0
Q33. City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang violence.	34.2	29.1	29.1	6.3	1.3	2.1	1.0

Table 22. Systems Integration Frequency of Response

*e. Unity of Effort*

To get a better sense of the SPD's attitudes regarding the need for a more unified response to gang violence, as well as perceptions of ongoing city government efforts to reach out to the community, we included questions 23, 24, 27, 28, 31, and 32 (see Table 26). In general, there seems to be agreement among SPD officers that city agencies are not executing a unified counter-gang strategy (Q23 and Q28), though there is nearly universal agreement that a unified approach is what is needed (Q31, 95.5%). In addition, over half of the respondents indicated that information about gang activities should be more freely distributed (Q27, 51.2%), rather than compartmentalized on a need to know basis.

<b><u>Unity of Effort</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q23. The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting gang violence.	20.2	39.3	14.3	17.9	8.3	2.5	1.2
Q24. The police work with local community leaders to fight gang violence.	2.4	17.1	30.5	37.8	12.2	3.4	1.0
Q27. Information related to gang activities should only be shared with other individuals or departments on a need to know basis.	31.0	20.2	19.0	16.7	13.1	2.6	1.4
Q28. The city of Salinas and the Salinas PD have a unified counter-gang strategy.	27.2	35.8	19.8	14.8	2.5	2.3	1.1
Q31. The gang violence problem is something that requires the combined efforts of the population of Salinas and the city government (police, city council, mayor, educational system) to resolve.	0.0	0.0	4.5	10.2	85.2	4.8	0.5
Q32. The City of Salinas has been effective in soliciting local citizens' help in fighting the gang violence problem.	21.6	39.8	28.4	6.8	3.4	2.3	1.0

Table 23. Unity of Effort Frequency of Response

*f. Levels of Autonomy*

Survey questions 26, 29 and 30 were included to better understand the individual's perceptions of their own capacity to act in a timely manner to counter gang activities (Table 27). The responses to Q26 reveal that just under half (48.8%) agree that they "have a role in implementing the city's counter-gang strategy." If a counter-gang

campaign is viewed as something that requires the combined efforts of all citizens (including citizen-police) to eliminate the criminal gang's inherent information advantage, then this survey response points to an under-utilization of available resources.

The results for Q29 and Q30 are interesting for their even distribution across the different responses. While this is clearly not the most desirable outcome to questions about individual initiative and freedom to act, it was more positive than we expected.

<b><u>Levels of Autonomy</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q26. I have a role in implementing the city's counter-gang strategy.	13.1	14.3	23.8	15.5	33.3	3.4	1.4
Q29. Existing Police Department policies suppress individual initiative and or hinder my ability to reduce gang activities.	19.8	14.0	27.9	20.9	17.4	3.0	1.4
Q30. I have freedom to act on gang related intelligence in a timely manner.	10.3	21.8	31.0	25.3	11.5	3.1	1.2

Table 24. Autonomy Frequency of Response

### ***g. General***

For the purposes of enhancing our ability to extract useful information from the survey responses, we included a selection of general questions. Questions 1, 2, and 25 served to provide a baseline sense of the attitudes of the respondents toward the gang violence "problem" in Salinas (Table 28). We wanted to ensure there was some agreement that the level of gang violence was problematic. The responses to these questions confirmed that there is, indeed, a very strong consensus within the SPD that the current level of gang violence is "serious" (Q2, 100%). There is also strong agreement that gang violence will not simply resolve itself over time (Q25, 95.2%). Question 34 (Table 20) was also a "general" question, and asked the respondents to indicate whether they resided within the city limits of Salinas. This question was used as a discriminator,

intended to help us determine if an officer's perceptions were influenced either positively or negatively by where they lived in relation to the gang problem.

<b><u>General</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q1. Compared to last year, gang violence in Salinas has increased.	9.4	31.8	43.5	12.9	2.4	2.7	0.9
Q2. The gang violence problem in Salinas is very serious.	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	96.6	5.0	0.2
Q25. The gang violence problem will resolve itself with time regardless of how the City responds to the situation.	84.3	10.8	3.6	0.0	1.2	1.2	0.6

Table 25. General Question Frequency of Response

## 2. Regression Analysis

Using information processing ("infopro") as our dependent variable, we tested several multiple regression models with various independent variables. Initially, we constructed models including the variables associated with our theory of information processing; we tested the variables of systems integration, unity of effort, and autonomy.<sup>122</sup> Ultimately, the model that included the variables of police legitimacy ("legitpol"), city government legitimacy ("legitcity"), security ("security"), personal responsibility ("perresp"), community ("community"), and government agency unity of effort ("unity") offered the strongest statistical explanation of the factors influencing the SPD's capacity for information processing.

We also included a dummy variable for officer residency to determine if the location of the respondent's housing had any influence on their perceptions of the city's information processing capacity. Those responding to the residency question (Q34, Table 20), were coded as a "1" if living within city limits, and as a "0" if living outside city limits.

<sup>122</sup> See Appendix C, Figure 39 for a detailed description of the models tested.

Finally, we conducted a Ramsey retest to ensure that our model addressed all necessary variables. Testing indicated valid results with no missing variables. The resulting best fit model, and associated analysis, is described in the following sections.

*a. The Dependent Variable*

The questions we posed, specifically about information and intelligence, were intended to get a sense of current attitudes about sharing gang-related intelligence freely. If we could realistically gauge individual feelings about the appropriateness of sharing gang intelligence, we concluded that it would be possible to compare these attitudes with those measured by the other questions in the survey to better understand what factors most influence the SPD's capacity for information processing. In essence, we assume that changes in attitudes about information processing will result in quantitative and qualitative changes in the processing of information about criminal gangs. Accordingly, we selected several questions from the survey with the best expository potential, and ran multiple regression models to determine the variables offering the best fit. Of those tested, the use of questions 30 and 33 for the dependent variable offered the most statistically interesting results (Adjusted  $R^2 = .44$ ).

Questions about Information Processing	Mean	Standard Deviation
Q30. I have freedom to act on gang related intelligence in a timely manner.	3.1	1.2
Q33. City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang violence.	2.1	1.0

Table 26. Information Processing Dependent Variable

*b. Regression Results*

Multiple models were run to determine the independent variables offering the most statistically significant model for information processing. As described earlier, our initial theory pointed toward systems integration, unity of effort, and autonomy as the variables responsible for differing qualitative levels of information processing. Ultimately, however, our analysis pointed toward a different causal relationship.

The model offering the most statistically significant results in our multiple regression included variables for: unity of effort, trust and embeddedness, security, and legitimacy. Although this explanation diverges from our initial theory regarding information processing, the overlapping significance of personal responsibility and unity of effort variables for both volume (see Chapter V, Section B) and processing provides a more focused solution set for those seeking to attain information dominance.

Legitimacy				Security		Trust and Embeddedness		Unity of Effort				Dummy Variable	
IV1: <i>legitpol</i>		IV2: <i>legitcity</i>		IV3: <i>security</i>		IV4: <i>perresp</i>		IV5: <i>community</i>		IV6: <i>unity</i>		<i>SPD Officer Residency (Q34)</i>	
Coeff	P	Coeff	P	Coeff	P	Coeff	P	Coeff	P	Coeff	P	Coeff	P
-0.20	.03	.04	.66	-.02	.70	-.27	.00	.85	.00	-.05	.58	-.09	.48

Table 27. Regression Analysis by coefficient and p-values from Appendix C.  
(Shaded areas indicate  $p > 0.10$ )

Of the independent variables included in the model (Table 30), the most statistically relevant were: community unity of effort ( $p = 0.00$ , coefficient = 0.85), personal responsibility ( $p = 0.00$ , coefficient = -0.27), and police legitimacy ( $p = 0.03$ , coefficient = -0.20). Although the other variables did not show a strong causal relationship with our information processing dependent variable (i.e.,  $p < 0.10$ ), our results do not exclude the possibility that further research might reveal stronger linkages.

(1) Unity of Effort with the Community. As the variable with the strongest relationship to attitudes about information processing, unity of effort with the community requires the most focus within the police department (Table 31). In other words, to achieve a stronger positive consensus about information sharing, the SPD must convince officers that the city and the community are working toward common goals in the fight against gang violence. There are powerful psychological forces that come into play with a perceived group consensus. As Robert Cialdini notes in *Influence: The*

*Psychology of Persuasion*, "one [psychological mechanism] we use to determine what is correct is to find out what other people think is correct."<sup>123</sup> He further elaborates, noting that "we view a behavior as more correct in a given situation to the degree that we see others performing it."<sup>124</sup> Perhaps this notion provides some rational for why it is so important for individuals to perceive that the city government is reaching out to the population. If individual police officers sense that there is an organizational impetus to develop ties and share information toward a common purpose, then those same individuals might be more compelled to adopt this "common" behavior themselves.

<b>Questions about Unity of Effort with Community (<i>community</i>)</b>		<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
Q24. The police work with local community leaders to fight gang violence.		3.4	1.0
Q31. The gang violence problem is something that requires the combined efforts of the population of Salinas and the city government (police, city council, mayor, educational system) to resolve.		4.8	0.5
Q32. The City of Salinas has been effective in soliciting local citizens' help in fighting the gang violence problem.		2.4	1.0
<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Sample Size</b>	<b>Coefficient Alpha</b>
3.5	0.6	82	0.85

Table 28. IV 5 Unity of Effort with Community Component Questions

(2) Personal Responsibility. The negative coefficient with personal responsibility seems to illustrate that officers who care more about the community are more likely to be frustrated with the quality of information sharing within the SPD (Table 32). Although a large number may value an improved *professional* relationship (i.e., unity of effort), one cannot help but get a sense that there is some lack of desire to get personally involved with the community. Cara J. Wong argues that "what [makes] a city a vibrant "community"—and not simply a municipality of solitary TV addicts burrowed deep in their dens—would be the presence of relational ties among its residents."<sup>125</sup> Derivatively, if a counter-gang campaign requires a vibrant, engaged community that is more cognizant of gang activity, then the police, as representatives of

<sup>123</sup> Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*, 2nd ed. (New York: William Morrow, 1993), 116.

<sup>124</sup> Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*.

<sup>125</sup> Cara J. Wong, *Boundaries of Obligation in American Politics: Geographic, National, and Racial Communities* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 7.

the government, must foster that sort of interaction through personal engagement with the population. This requires the sort of personal concern for others that strengthens the fabric of social trust, as well as generating an intra-departmental desire to improve information sharing so that the SPD might better serve the community. In other words, the negative coefficient does not mean that in order to improve information sharing the police need less personal responsibility. Instead, the negative relationship perhaps points to a mechanism for improvement within the SPD: improve officer attitudes towards personal responsibility and they will want to make the organization better.

Questions about Personal Responsibility ( <i>perresp</i> )			Mean	Standard Deviation
Q18. People should help others who are less fortunate.			3.7	0.6
Q22. People should form or participate in community organizations to solve community problems in Salinas.			4.2	1.0
Mean	Standard Deviation	Sample Size	Coefficient Alpha	
4.0	0.8	85	-0.27	

Table 29. IV 4 Personal Responsibility Component Questions

(3) Police Legitimacy. The negative coefficient associated with the police legitimacy variable in our model indicates that the less the police perceive themselves as a legitimate force, the more they will be satisfied with how Salinas government agencies are sharing information about gangs (Table 33). Although this result may seem somewhat counterintuitive, a closer examination might offer some explanation. Legitimacy has been defined as the extent to which the citizens regard the city government as proper and deserving of support.<sup>126</sup> Accordingly, if the police see themselves as "undeserving of support," then execution of daily operations require a more independent, isolationist adaptation to compensate for the lack of external support. This, too, is contrary to what we would like to see from the enforcement arm of the city government in order to effectively fight a networked foe with an inherent information advantage. As with personal responsibility, this likely points to another leverage point for creating a culture of excellence within the SPD. The more individual officers

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<sup>126</sup> Rodney Barker, *Political Legitimacy and the State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 185–186.



perceive the SPD as a legitimate force, the more conscious they will be of internal deficiencies, which, in turn, should create more of a hunger for continuous improvement.

<b>Questions about Police Legitimacy (<i>legitpol</i>)</b>			<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
Q3. The Salinas Police care about Salinas citizens.			4.1	0.9
Q5. The Salinas Police are very responsive to citizen complaints.			4.0	0.9
<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Sample Size</b>	<b>Coefficient Alpha</b>	
4.1	0.8	88	-0.20	

Table 30. IV 1 Police Legitimacy Component Questions

(4) SPD Officer Residency. Officer residency was coded as a dummy variable for the regression model to determine what effect location had on respondent perceptions on information sharing. While not a strong influence on officer perceptions about information processing, living inside the city limits tended to indicate a less than favorable opinion about the city's information sharing.

## C. CONCLUSION

The survey of the SPD proved quite descriptive in our quest to better understand the factors contributing to improved information processing within the enforcement arm of the city government. Of the variables we sampled in our questionnaire, the attitudes related to unity of effort, trust, and legitimacy provide perhaps the most compelling story of what needs to be changed to measurably improve the SPD's capacity for the production and distribution of actionable intelligence. Based on our survey results, we found that officers who care less about helping others (personal responsibility) and see themselves as an illegitimate force are likely to be satisfied with lower levels of information sharing. In other words, less concern for others and a poor self-image translate to less desire for improvement within the SPD. To generate an increased appetite for improved information sharing, SPD leadership must work to reverse these attitudes within the ranks. In the long-term, the individual officer's commitment to organizational excellence is essential to garnering the public trust and minimizing the gang presence.

Overall, however, the finding requiring the most immediate prioritized focus is that individual officers must perceive that government agencies are working with the community toward the same goals in countering gang violence before they will perceive that information is being (or perhaps needs to be) shared effectively. We will examine this point further in Chapter IX as we offer some potential course of action to improve Salinas' capacity for information volume and processing to reduce gang violence.

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## VII. SALINAS CITY EMPLOYEE SURVEY

### A. INTRODUCTION

As discussed in Chapter II, fighting an insurgency requires a unified, whole-of-government approach to secure the loyalty of the masses. Accordingly, based on our theoretical framework, fighting a "war" versus the entrenched gangs of Salinas requires more than just a dedicated police department; the entire city government must operate in unison toward a shared vision of victory. Therefore it was important for us to get a sense of the attitudes of civilian city employees in Salinas who interface with the public as the "faces" of government bureaucracy. To measure the attitudes and perceptions of the city employees of the Salinas city government, we conducted a voluntary survey of the city's 643 full- and part-time workers. As previously described in our methodology chapter, this survey was intended to identify attitudes and perceptions that might influence the city's ability to effectively process information relevant to criminal gang activity. As this survey was intended to capture the attitudes of those responsible for interfacing with the Salinas population, as well as policy-making, all city employees were deemed eligible for participation in the survey. The final survey questions were drawn from a combination of previous GSS research conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, the 2010 CASP survey of the Salinas population, as well as original questions we crafted to provide insight to the unique conditions in Salinas.<sup>127</sup>

To conduct the survey, we attended the scheduled city employee meetings on October 6 and 13, 2010. Based on feedback we received from the city manager, these days were specifically chosen so that we could canvas as much of the department as possible within a reasonable timeframe. At the beginning of each of the meetings, we spent approximately five to ten minutes describing the intent and structure of the survey, reading the informed consent statement with an emphasis on the voluntary and anonymous nature of any participation, and answering questions. Each attendee at the

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<sup>127</sup> Davis and Smith, *General Social Surveys, 1972–2008*.

meeting was provided with a survey and given as much time as necessary to complete the questionnaire. Completed surveys were collected after the briefing, along with signatures indicating individual consent to participate in research. Each respondent was provided a personal copy of the informed consent statement, with contact information for our research team at the Naval Postgraduate School. Of the potential 643 individuals we identified as eligible to participate in the survey, we received responses from 65 city employees (10% response rate). Of the 65 completed surveys, 42 respondents (64.6%) indicated that they lived inside the city limits of Salinas, 21 responded that they resided outside the city limits (32.3%), and 2 (3.1%) provided no indication of their home of residence (Table 34).

<b>Indicated Residency</b>	<b># of Respondents</b>	<b>Response Rate (%)</b>
Reside Inside Salinas City Limits	42	64.6%
Reside Outside Salinas City Limits	21	32.3%
No Residency Answer Provided	2	3.1%

Table 31. Salinas City Employee Survey Respondent Residency (Q33)

## **B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS**

### **1. Descriptive Statistics**

After conducting the surveys, each questionnaire was individually coded from 1 to 65. The responses to each question were then input into a spreadsheet, with individual questions grouped according to their relevance to each of our independent variables.<sup>128</sup> Thus, the questions were grouped under the overall themes of legitimacy, security, trust, systems integration, unity of effort, and autonomy. We also included some general questions that we hoped might offer some insight of baseline perceptions about gang violence.

The statistics for each question were individually calculated, with the respondent's answer to the residency question used as a discriminator for the overall analysis. The survey utilized a Likert Scale format, with a potential range of responses from 1 to 5, or

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<sup>128</sup> Reference Appendix D, Table 67 for the complete data set.

"don't know." A response of "1" indicated that the respondent "strongly disagreed" with the given statement. Likewise, a response of "5" indicated that the respondent "strongly agreed" with the statement as written. As a mid-scale response of "3" would indicate a neutral opinion, any numbers above a 3 were interpreted as agreement, while those answers below a 3 were documented as disagreement with the given statement. If the survey respondent opted for "don't know," or did not indicate an answer, their response was recorded as a "0" in our data.

As with the survey of the Salinas Police Department, we hoped to uncover specific causal factors that might contribute to improved information processing of gang-related intelligence within city government. To do so, we utilized both descriptive and inferential statistics (multiple regression) to mathematically resolve patterns in the data we collected. We theorized that levels of information processing are impacted by the variables of systems integration, unity of effort, and autonomy. However, because we wanted to be able to compare attitudes and perceptions across the different survey populations, we also included survey questions for the variables we conceptualized as responsible for information volume (legitimacy, security, and trust and embeddedness). In addition, including questions for both information volume and processing allowed us greater flexibility in adapting our final model of information processing to reflect any changes to our initial theory. The following sections describe the survey results for each independent variable for our overall theory of information volume and processing. Table 35 depicts a brief summary of results for the variables we considered in this survey.

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>
Legitimacy	3.0	0.8
Security	3.0	0.5
Trust and Embeddedness	3.4	0.5
Systems Integration	3.0	0.5
Unity of Effort	3.2	0.6
Levels of Autonomy	3.0	1.4

Table 32. Variable Means and Standard Deviation

*a. Legitimacy*

Our first independent variable, legitimacy, was addressed in the Salinas city employee survey with questions 3 through 8 (Table 36). These questions sought to understand individual city worker perceptions of the credibility of both the SPD, and the larger city government organization itself. Interestingly, the results for Q3, "The Salinas Police care about Salinas citizens," indicated a largely negative attitude toward the police department, with only 45.2% agreeing with the statement. Similarly, only 46.9% agreed with Q4, "The Salinas City Council cares about Salinas citizens." Both clearly represent ambivalence towards the rightful authority of government institutions, from those who actually *work for* government institutions. If the government doesn't consider itself legitimate, it is hard to see why the citizens of Salinas should feel compelled to see things any differently.

<b><u>Legitimacy</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q3. The Salinas Police care about Salinas citizens	9.7%	16.1%	29.0%	22.6%	22.6%	3.3	1.3
Q4. The Salinas City Council cares about Salinas citizens	4.7%	14.1%	34.4%	18.8%	28.1%	3.5	1.2
Q5. The Salinas Police are very responsive to citizen complaints.	15.0%	25.0%	35.0%	23.3%	1.7%	2.7	1.0
Q6. The Salinas City Council are very responsive to citizen complaints.	4.8%	12.9%	46.8%	24.2%	11.3%	3.2	1.0
Q7. I am confident in Salinas's courts and legal system.	11.5%	24.6%	18.0%	29.5%	16.4%	3.1	1.3
Q8. I am satisfied with the quality of education in Salinas.	25.4%	39.7%	17.5%	12.7%	4.8%	2.3	1.1

Table 33. Legitimacy Frequency of Response

***b. Security***

The data for our second independent variable, security, was captured by the responses to survey questions 12 through 15 (Table 37). These questions were included to better understand how individual perceptions and attitudes about personal security in Salinas contribute to a desire to share gang-related intelligence. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a majority of those surveyed perceived Salinas to be a dangerous place to walk alone at night, with 60% agreeing with Q12. However, despite their fear of the



streets of Salinas, approximately the same percentage felt safe and secure in their home (Q13, 62.3%). Interestingly, the fear expressed in the survey did not seem to be significantly based upon personal encounters with gang violence. Only 20.6% indicated that they, or a member of their family, had been threatened by a gang member in Salinas (Q14). This *perception* suggests an attitude of fear that might be changed through better internal marketing of the city's successes in combating gang violence. A focus on shifting negative attitudes about security is one approach for government officials looking for ways to create a more vibrant, trusting government.

<b><u>Security</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q12. The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk alone at night.	6.2%	7.7%	26.2%	24.6%	35.4%	3.8	1.2
Q13. I feel safe and secure in my home.	11.5%	6.6%	19.7%	37.7%	24.6%	3.6	1.3
Q14. I or a member of my family have been threatened by a gang member in Salinas.	52.4%	17.5%	9.5%	14.3%	6.3%	2.0	1.3
Q15. As compared to a year ago, the Salinas police department has made the city a more secure and safe place to live.	25.4%	25.4%	30.2%	15.9%	3.2%	2.5	1.1

Table 34. Security Frequency of Response

***c. Trust and Embeddedness***

The third independent variable we addressed in our survey was trust and embeddedness. Questions 16 through 22 were intended to capture the city employees' attitudes on issues frequently associated with varying levels of social cohesion and

trust.<sup>129</sup> The respondents were evenly distributed in their views of the importance of English as a common unifying language within Salinas in Q16 (mean = 3.0, standard deviation = 1.5). When asked if citizens would be best represented by members of their own ethnic group however, the results were far more skewed, with 72.3% in agreement (Q17). The results for Q18 suggest a greater sense of personal responsibility among city government employees versus SPD officers (see also Chapter VI, Table 24). When asked if people should help others who are less fortunate, 84.4% agreed. Similarly, 84.4% agreed that people should form or participate in community organizations to solve community problems in Salinas (Q22). Considered together, these results describe a city government that sympathizes with the need to reach out and get personally involved to solve community problems. Table 38 provides a summary of the survey results for these questions.

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<sup>129</sup> Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*.

<b><u>Trust and Embeddedness</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q16. Speaking English, as a common language, will unite all of Salinas's citizens.	21.9%	17.2%	21.9%	17.2%	21.9%	3.0	1.5
Q17. Salinas's citizens are best represented by leaders from their own racial or ethnic background.	12.7%	22.2%	38.1%	23.8%	3.2%	2.8	1.0
Q18. People should help others who are less fortunate.	0.0%	0.0%	15.6%	32.8%	51.6%	4.4	0.7
Q19. Hispanic Americans face discrimination in getting a decent job.	20.3%	28.1%	25.0%	17.2%	9.4%	2.7	1.2
Q20. My ethnic group membership is very important to my sense of who I am.	15.4%	12.3%	27.7%	29.2%	15.4%	3.2	1.3
Q21. The needs of my ethnic group are met by the City of Salinas (police, city council, educational system, mayor).	8.5%	20.3%	37.3%	22.0%	11.9%	3.1	1.1
Q22. People should form or participate in community organizations to solve community problems in Salinas.	0.0%	3.1%	12.5%	29.7%	54.7%	4.4	0.8

Table 35. Trust and Embeddedness Frequency of Response

***d. Systems Integration***

Questions 9, 10, and 11 were included to get a sense of how the typical Salinas city employee receives his or her information about gang activity. Question 32 was directed more towards understanding perceptions about the efficiency of intra-government communication channels. All of these questions, however, were intended to

offer some insight into how well city agencies were networked for the distribution of gang-related information (Table 39).

The response to Q32, "City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang violence," was largely negative, with only 15.7% agreeing with the statement. When asked how they get their information about gangs, most indicated that media outlets were the primary source (Q11, 72.3% agree). The second most used information source about gangs was through official city communication channels (Q9, 34.9% agree), followed by "word of mouth or rumors" (Q10, 21.5% agree). Clearly there is room for improvement here, as a more networked government would be better able to ensure a consistency of vision and purpose in a counter-gang campaign. In the absence of adequate official information, however, people will seek out alternative, and often inaccurate, sources.

<b><u>Systems Integration</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q9. I receive most of my information about gang activity through official city communication channels (Press releases, billboards, community meetings)	12.7%	23.8%	28.6%	23.8%	11.1%	3.0	1.2
Q10. I receive most of my information about gang activity through word of mouth or rumors.	12.3%	32.3%	33.8%	16.9%	4.6%	2.7	1.0
Q11. I receive most of my information about gang activity through media outlets (TV, newspaper, radio).	4.6%	7.7%	15.4%	38.5%	33.8%	3.9	1.1
Q32. City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang violence.	17.6%	31.4%	35.3%	13.7%	2.0%	2.5	1.0

Table 36. Systems Integration Frequency of Response

*e. Unity of Effort*

To get a better sense of city employee attitudes regarding the need for a more unified response to gang violence, as well as perceptions of ongoing city government efforts to reach out to the community, we included questions 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, and 31. The overall results for the questions composing the unity of effort variable are described in Table 40.

Based on the response to Q30, Salinas city employees overwhelmingly believe the gang violence problem requires the combined efforts of the population of Salinas and the city government (93.9% agree). However, only 43.9% agree that the city is taking a unified approach (Q23), and only 29.4% agree that the city of Salinas and the SPD have a unified counter-gang strategy (Q29). Similarly, there is a sizeable negative view of the city's efforts to reach out to local citizens for help in fighting the gang problem. Although 22% agreed with Q31, "The city of Salinas has been effective in soliciting local citizens' help in fighting the gang violence problem," nearly twice as many disagreed. It is clear that city employees believe there should be more unity of effort between the population and the government, but it is also fairly clear that this is not perceived to be happening in the struggle versus gang violence.

Finally, when asked how freely information related to gang activities should be shared within city government, 64.5% of those surveyed indicated that information sharing should not be executed on a need-to-know basis (Q28). This indicates a desire for more inter-departmental/inter-agency communication and cooperation, yet from the results to Q29, we see that this is also not perceived to be happening.

<b><u>Unity of Effort</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q23. The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting gang violence.	7.0%	10.5%	38.6%	29.8%	14.0%	3.3	1.1
Q24. The police work with local community leaders to fight gang violence.	6.9%	13.8%	29.3%	39.7%	10.3%	3.3	1.1
Q28. Information related to gang activities should only be shared with other individuals or departments on a need to know basis.	43.5%	21.0%	16.1%	8.1%	11.3%	2.2	1.4
Q29. The city of Salinas and the Salinas PD have a unified counter-gang strategy.	15.7%	27.5%	27.5%	23.5%	5.9%	2.8	1.2
Q30. The gang violence problem is something that requires the combined efforts of the population of Salinas and the city government (police, city council, mayor, educational system) to resolve.	0.0%	0.0%	6.2%	7.7%	86.2%	4.8	0.5
Q31. The City of Salinas has been effective in soliciting local citizens' help in fighting the gang violence problem.	8.5%	33.9%	35.6%	15.3%	6.8%	2.8	1.0

Table 37. Unity of Effort Frequency of Response

*f. Levels of Autonomy*

Survey question 27 was included to better understand the individual's perceptions of their own capacity to act in a timely manner in to counter gang activities (Table 41). However, based on the even distribution of the responses (mean = 3.0, standard deviation = 1.4), it is hard to draw any powerful conclusions from this one

question. However, it is interesting to note that 30.5% perceive no personal role in the city's counter-gang strategy.

<b><u>Levels of Autonomy</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q27. I have a role in implementing the city's counter-gang strategy.	25.4%	5.1%	25.4%	28.8%	15.3%	3.0	1.4

Table 38. Autonomy Frequency of Response

***g. General***

For the purposes of enhancing our ability to extract useful information from the survey responses, we included a selection of general questions. Questions 1, 2, 25 and 26 served to provide a baseline sense of the attitudes of the respondents toward the "problem" of gang violence in Salinas (Table 42). We wanted to ensure there was some consensus that the level of gang violence was problematic. The responses to these questions confirmed that there is, indeed, a very strong consensus within the Salinas government that the current level of gang violence is "serious" (Q2, 98.5%). There is also strong agreement that gang violence will not simply resolve itself over time (Q26, 89%). Question 33 (Table 34) was also a "general" question, and asked the respondents to indicate whether they resided within the city limits of Salinas.

<b><u>General</u></b>	<b><u>Frequency of Response (%)</u></b>						
<b><u>Question</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>Mean</u></b>	<b><u>Std Dev</u></b>
Q1. Compared to last year, gang violence in Salinas has increased.	3.3%	18.0%	32.8%	16.4%	29.5%	3.5	1.2
Q2. The gang violence problem in Salinas is very serious.	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	15.4%	83.1%	4.8	0.4
Q25. It is important and effective to pass crime information to the Salinas Police Department.	0.0%	3.1%	4.7%	20.3%	71.9%	4.6	0.7
Q26. The gang violence problem will resolve itself with time regardless of how the City responds to the situation	78.1%	10.9%	3.1%	6.3%	1.6%	1.4	0.9

Table 39. General Question Frequency of Response

## 2. Regression Analysis

Using information processing ("infopro") as our dependent variable, we ran several multiple regression models with various independent variables. Initially, we constructed models including the variables associated with our theory of information processing; we tested the variables of systems integration, unity of effort, and autonomy.<sup>130</sup> Ultimately, however, the best model included variables for: the perception of a gang problem ("gangprob"), legitimacy ("legit"), security ("security"), personal responsibility ("perresp"), unity of effort with the community ("community"), and government agency unity of effort ("unity"). This model offered the strongest statistical explanation of the factors influencing the Salinas city employees' capacity for information processing. This best fit model, and the resulting analysis, is depicted in Appendix D, Figure 40, and is described in Tables 43, 44, 45, and 46.

We also included a dummy variable for city employee residency to determine if the location of the respondent's residence had any influence on their perceptions of the

<sup>130</sup> See Appendix D, Figure 40 for a detailed description of the models tested.



city's information processing abilities. Those responding to the residency question (Q33, Table 34), were coded as a "1" if living within city limits, and as a "0" if living outside city limits.

Finally, we conducted a Ramsey retest to ensure that our model addressed all necessary variables. Testing indicated valid results with no missing variables. The resulting best-fit model, and associated analysis, is described in the following sections.

*a. The Dependent Variable*

The questions we posed specifically about information and intelligence were intended to get a sense of current attitudes about sharing gang-related intelligence freely. If we could realistically gauge individual feelings about the appropriateness of sharing gang intelligence, we concluded that it would be possible compare these attitudes with those measured by the other questions in the survey to better understand what factors most influence the city government's capacity for information processing. In essence, we assume that changes in attitudes about information processing will result in quantitative, and qualitative, changes in the processing of information about criminal gangs. Accordingly, we selected several questions from the survey with the best expository potential, and ran several regression models to determine the variables offering the best fit. Of those tested, the use of questions 25 and 32 for the dependent variable offered the most statistically interesting results (Adjusted  $R^2 = .35$ , see Table 43).

Questions about Information Processing	Mean	Standard Deviation
Q25. It is important and effective to pass crime information to the Salinas Police Department.	4.6	0.7
Q32. City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang violence.	2.5	1.0

Table 40. Information Processing Dependent Variable

*b. Regression Results*

Multiple models were run to determine the independent variables offering the most statistically significant model for information processing. As described earlier,

our initial theory pointed toward systems integration, unity of effort, and autonomy as the variables responsible for differing qualitative levels of information processing. Ultimately, however, our analysis pointed toward a different causal relationship. The model offering the most statistically significant results in our multiple regression included variables for: legitimacy, security, trust and embeddedness, and unity of effort.

Legitimacy				Security		Trust and Embeddedness		Unity of Effort				Dummy Variable	
IV1: <i>gangprob</i>		IV2: <i>legit</i>		IV3: <i>security</i>		IV4: <i>perresp</i>		IV5: <i>community</i>		IV6: <i>unity</i>		City Employee Residency (Q33)	
Coeff	P	Coeff	P	Coeff	P	Coeff	P	Coeff	P	Coeff	P	Coeff	P
.08	.32	.12	.30	-.20	.04	.03	.82	.26	.16	.10	.45	.00	N/A

Table 41. Regression Analysis by Coefficient and p-values from Appendix D.  
(Shaded areas indicate  $p > 0.10$ )

Of the independent variables included in the model (Table 44), the most statistically relevant was "security" ( $p = 0.04$ , coefficient = -0.20). Although the variable for unity of effort with the community, "community," did not present a strong result in the model analysis, its borderline results warrant some discussion along with "security." The other variables did not show a strong causal relationship with the information processing dependent variable (i.e.,  $p < 0.10$ ); however, our results do not exclude the possibility that further research might reveal stronger linkages.

(1) Security. As the variable with the strongest relationship to attitudes about information processing among Salinas city employees, security requires the most focus within the city government (Table 45). With a negative resultant coefficient in our model, greater feelings of fear correlate to less interest in sharing information about gang activity. In other words, to achieve a stronger positive consensus about information sharing, city employees must perceive that Salinas is a secure place to live and work. As presented in the descriptive analysis of the security variable, although

60% of the respondents harbored a fear of Salinas only 20.6% indicated that they had actually had personal experiences with gang violence. This would seem to indicate that the sense of fear is more of a perception than it is reality for most city employees. Accordingly, the city should focus its efforts on altering this consensus of fear. In the absence of any contradictory information from the city, however, this perception will continue to be reality for most employees. Based on our modeling, fearful employees are more "closed-off," and less likely to see the value in communicating information that might be useful to counter gangs in Salinas.

<b>Questions about Security (<i>security</i>)</b>			<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
Q12. The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk alone at night.			3.8	1.2
Q14. I or a member of my family have been threatened by a gang member in Salinas.			2.0	1.3
<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Sample Size</b>	<b>Coefficient Alpha</b>	
2.9	0.9	63	-.20	

Table 42. IV 3 Security Component Questions

(2) Unity of Effort with the Community. Although unity of effort with the community exhibited a rather high p-value (0.16), we still believed that this marginal result warranted some discussion (Table 46). With a positive coefficient of 0.26, a greater degree of perception that the city and community are working toward shared counter-gang objectives will lead to improved interest in sharing information about gang activity among city agencies. This is an outcome similar to that of the SPD survey, where unity of effort was deemed a significant causal factor in increased information sharing. As we noted in Chapter VI, this causal link might be explained by a psychological impetus to mimic the behavior of a larger group. Stated another way, people have a "tendency to see an action as more appropriate when others are doing it."<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>131</sup>Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*, 116.

<b>Questions about Unity of Effort with the Community (community)</b>			<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
24. The police work with local community leaders to fight gang violence.			3.3	1.1
30. The gang violence problem is something that requires the combined efforts of the population of Salinas and the city government (police, city council, mayor, educational system) to resolve.			4.8	0.5
31. The City of Salinas has been effective in soliciting local citizens' help in fighting the gang violence problem.			2.8	1.0
<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Sample Size</b>	<b>Coefficient Alpha</b>	
3.6	0.6	53	.26	

Table 43. IV 5 Unity of Effort with the Community Component Questions

(3) City Employee Residency. City employee residency was coded as a dummy variable for the regression model to determine what effect location had on respondent perceptions on information sharing. Residency was found to not be a significant influence on perceptions about information processing.

## C. CONCLUSION

As with the SPD survey, the results of our sampling of Salinas city employee attitudes pointed to variables for information processing that were different than we expected to see. Our original theory presupposed that changes in attitudes about information processing are affected by changes in attitudes about systems integration, unity of effort, and autonomy. However, as a result of our regression testing, it appears that security and, to a lesser degree, unity of effort with the community, are the causal factors leading to changes in perceptions about sharing gang-related information among city agencies.

Based on our descriptive analysis, city employees exhibited a relatively high degree of personal responsibility, indicating a strong willingness to reach out to others in need. They also indicated a strong belief that efforts to reduce or eliminate gang violence require a unified effort from the government and the community. Unfortunately, few agree that the government is doing enough to reach out to the community in the interest of developing a shared vision for success versus the gangs. Perhaps this personal frustration with how the government is handling the counter-gang campaign explains the negative perceptions so many have about Salinas government and the SPD. It is quite

possible that these negative perceptions of the City's efforts to work with the community contribute to negative attitudes about taking more of a personal role and sharing gang related information with others in city government. This connection, however, was weak (at best) in our model.

The most significant finding from our regression model was that by reducing perceptions of fear it is possible to improve attitudes about sharing gang-related information. Descriptively, city employees indicated a relatively high degree of perceived danger in Salinas. Perhaps through better marketing of the city's successes in improving the overall security of Salinas, it would be possible to shape the government into an organization of less fearful employees, that are more willing to openly communicate in a more beneficial way. We will examine this point further in Chapter IX as we offer some potential course of action to improve Salinas' capacity for information volume and processing to counter gang violence.

## VIII. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: INFORMATION PROCESSING AND OTHER IMPLICATIONS

### A. INTRODUCTION

Measuring information handling and processing within an organization can be a difficult proposition at best. However, visualizing how an organization communicates, shares, and uses this information, through both its formal and informal networks, can help illuminate just how information is processed. Dr. Jeffrey Pfeffer observes that “knowledge that produces power in organizations is not only technical knowledge about the work process itself, but also knowledge of the [organization’s] social system.”<sup>132</sup> Descriptively, an organization’s formal network is nothing more than its hierarchical chart, denoting command and supervisory relationships. However, the informal organization tends to encompass the more subtle side of an organization, consisting largely of its personal contacts, relationships, and friendships, generally demonstrating how members of an organization conduct most of the important and even difficult organizational tasks. These informal networks are commonly referred to as social networks.<sup>133</sup> More precisely, a social network “can be defined as a finite set or sets of actors and the relation or relations defined on them, where individuals are reduced to nodes, and relationships to links.”<sup>134</sup> Dr. Stuart Koschade of the Queensland University of Technology, opines that a proper analysis of the social network “focuses on uncovering the patterning of people’s interactions, and correctly interpreting these networks assists in predicting behavior and decision making within the network.”<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> Jeffrey Pfeffer, "Chapter 6: Location in the Communication Network," in *Managing with Power* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1993), 111.

<sup>133</sup> David Krackhardt and Jeffrey R. Hanson, "Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart," *Harvard Business Review* (July-August, 1993), 105.

<sup>134</sup> Stuart Koschade, "A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Application to Counterterrorism and Intelligence," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, no. 1 (2006), 559.

<sup>135</sup> Koschade, "A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Application to Counterterrorism and Intelligence."

Koschade's statement alludes to the introspective benefit that a social network analysis might offer to an organization seeking to better understand its information processing capabilities.

## **B. ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY OF THE SALINAS POLICE DEPARTMENT**

The Salinas Police Department, by any organizational standard, possesses a common hierarchical format. Figure 11 depicts the current SPD organizational design. This clearly illustrates the Chief of Police as being at the strategic apex of the SPD and its three organizational divisions, which manage the day-to-day operations of the Police Department. These divisions are further organized into distinct units that allow the organization, as a whole, to cope with the highly complex and moderately uncertain environment common to community policing initiatives found throughout the United States.<sup>136</sup> This organizational structure relies on what Dr. Henry Mintzberg calls the professional bureaucratic model.<sup>137</sup> Specifically, this model seeks to maximize the standardization of skill sets while simultaneously creating as much horizontal specialization as possible. In other words, the SPD seeks to flatten its structure, while maximizing the capabilities of its officers. This organizational design results in a degree of vertical and horizontal decentralization that is relatively common to highly specialized military and paramilitary organizations. However, this structure's reliance upon internal administrative focal points, such as Sergeants and Commanders, to provide both inter- and intra-unit liaison can limit what social network experts call consensus building and information flow.<sup>138</sup> Consequently, this limits the police department's ability to capitalize on the experience, knowledge, and expertise of individual officers.

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<sup>136</sup> Fetherolf, *90 Day Report to the Community: An Overview of the Salinas Police Department*, 17.

<sup>137</sup> Henry Mintzberg, "Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?" *Harvard Business Review* (January-February, 1981), 8.

<sup>138</sup> Mintzberg, "Organizational Design: Fashion of Fit?" 5-6.




Figure 9. Formal Organization of the SPD<sup>139</sup>

Like many such organizations throughout the United States, the SPD is struggling to maintain effectiveness while dealing with a multitude of budget and personnel cuts. A recent public relations bulletin from the SPD noted that for the FY 2010/2011 budget, the police department lost 19 sworn officer and seven civilian positions, forcing the SPD to restructure in order to provide “mission critical” services.<sup>140</sup> Additionally, the SPD will “no longer respond to minor non-injury traffic collisions...civil matters; or minor nuisance calls, etc. Other low priority calls for service are being screened more closely to determine if a police officer is really needed at the scene.”<sup>141</sup> Perhaps even more disconcerting is the fact that “specialized police units are being reduced and personnel reassigned to Patrol and Investigation Divisions to meet ‘mission critical’ functions.”<sup>142</sup> Regardless of the current financial or political situation, the police department must

<sup>139</sup> The formal organization of the SPD comes from public records provided by the SPD to the research team on 19 August 2010. Specific Officer Names and unit assignments have been redacted at the request of SPD to help maintain a degree of operational security for the police department. For a more comprehensive organizational perspective, see Fetherolf, *90 Day Report to the Community: An Overview of the Salinas Police Department*, 1–40.

<sup>140</sup> Fetherolf, *Report to the Community July 2010*, 1.

<sup>141</sup> Fetherolf, *Report to the Community July 2010*.

<sup>142</sup> Fetherolf, *Report to the Community July 2010*, 1.



continue to provide the community with services, looking for ways to start “doing more with less.. [and becoming] innovative.”<sup>143</sup> Social network analysis can aid the SPD in this initiative.

## C. NETWORK ANALYSIS

### 1. Social Network Methodology

This section will focus on the importance of the informal social network and how it affects operations within the SPD. To analyze the topography of the SPD’s informal network, four questions were posed to the entire population of the sworn police officer force at the SPD, in survey format.<sup>144</sup> These questions were designed to measure, visualize, and understand the contact network, the advice network, the intelligence network, and the assistance or trust network that exist within the SPD. Specifically, each officer rated his or her survey responses using a scale of 0 (Rarely or never), 1 (Every few months), 2 (Every few weeks), 3 (Every week), and 4 (Everyday) in relation to other officers and outside organizations and agencies that work with the SPD on gang-related issues. The precise questions of the survey included:

**Contact:** On average, how often do you have contact with the following individuals or organizations? (Contact can be meetings, phone calls, or emails)

**Advice:** On average, how often do you go to the following individuals or organizations for help or advice concerning work related matters?

**Intel Sharing:** On average, how often do you share gang related intelligence with the following individuals or organizations?

**Assistance / Trust:** On average, how often did the following individuals and or organizations provide assistance and or expertise to your gang prevention activities over the last year?

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<sup>143</sup> Scott Anthony, "Doing More with Less," Forbes.com, <http://www.forbes.com/> (accessed 10/20/2010).

<sup>144</sup> See Appendix E. The survey used for this research was developed using the David Krackhardt informal network model, and was adapted by Bruce Hoppe, Ph.D. from Boston University. Used with permission, from Hoppe, *Organizational Network Survey Spreadsheet Utility*.

Accordingly, these survey results were compiled to produce a series of network analyses and maps.<sup>145</sup> These network maps are useful in visually identifying the strengths and weaknesses within a particular network, demonstrating how these informal positions can be used to enhance information processing and utilization.

## **2. Social Network Construction**

### ***a. Social Network Analysis Indicators Defined***

In order to best understand the social network and its analysis, there are several important characteristics and tools that must be defined. The characteristics of "betweenness," "network density," "degree centrality," "connectedness," and "clustering" are the analytical ways and means that describe the functional relationships between the actors within the network itself. The most important of these characteristics is the concept of centrality. The question of centrality, according to Dr. Jeffrey Pfeffer, is paramount to individual and organizational success within networks. Centrality is the vehicle that creates and harnesses institutional power. In this case, the exercise of power is generally a reflection of the degree of influence one holds within the confines of certain social networks. Pfeffer opines, "To develop influence, we need to be plugged into the structure of communication and interaction, and that means seeking out interactions, even social interactions, strategically."<sup>146</sup> Thus concluding, "social networks are...structures that can be built deliberately, and our place in the network of communication is something that is under our own control."<sup>147</sup>

Pfeffer explains that position is everything and that ultimately, power or influence, is a function of being centrally located within a network. To illustrate, Pfeffer conveys that individuals within a network structure that are the most central, or at a point

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<sup>145</sup> Two network mapping software programs were used to produce the normalized network data and accompanying social network map. UCINET was used to normalize and analyze all related data, and can be found at Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*. Netdraw was used to produce all network map products, and can be found at Brogatti, *Netdraw Network Visualization*.

<sup>146</sup> Pfeffer, *Chapter 6: Location in the Communication Network*, 123–124.

<sup>147</sup> Pfeffer, *Chapter 6: Location in the Communication Network*, 125.

at which the flow of work or ideas move, tend to gravitate towards informal leadership roles, assuming higher levels of power and influence. Thus, Pfeffer argues that individuals and organizational elements gain power *precisely because* of their centrality in the overall flow of communication and work. Centrality is achieved through either social or physical location within a particular network. The closer an individual or organization is to the action (figuratively and literally), the higher the degree of power and influence it or they will enjoy.

Refining centrality into its relevant components is important in demonstrating its utility. One of these components or tools is the measure of “betweenness.” Betweenness is “a particularly useful indicator of information control; it assesses the extent to which a person falls between pairs of other individuals on the communication paths that link them.”<sup>148</sup> Betweenness is an essential part of social network analysis, identifying, to a large degree, which node is controlling and distributing information effectively. This is extremely important to networks that rely on timely intelligence to remain effective.

Network density is another factor that aids in measuring centrality. According to Sean Everton, density “is formally defined as the total number of ties within a network divided by the total possible number of ties, which means that network density measures range for 0.0 to 1.0.”<sup>149</sup> If a network has a lower density, closer to 0, then there are fewer connections between nodes. Conversely, if the density is higher, closer to 1, then there is a greater degree of connections.<sup>150</sup> Everton continues by indicating that “network density is positively related to the likelihood that actors within the network follow accepted [informal social] norms.”<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> Pfeffer, *Chapter 6: Location in the Communication Network*, 111–112.

<sup>149</sup> Sean Everton, “Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis” (Dark Networks Course Manual, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 94.

<sup>150</sup> Everton, “Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis,” 94–95.

<sup>151</sup> Everton, “Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis,” 95.

However, network density has its limitation, thus other measures must be used.<sup>152</sup> Degree centrality, or the degree to which information flows in or out of a particular node, comprises an important measure used by this analysis. Specifically, this measures the number of ties that a particular node exhibits, suggesting that the more ties that a node has, the greater its influence and power it is within the network.<sup>153</sup> Degree centrality is used to calculate an average degree centrality, which measures the “average of every individual actor’s degree centrality score.”<sup>154</sup> Additionally, it “attempts to capture the overall makeup of a network. It helps determine how centralized (e.g., hierarchical) or decentralized (e.g., “flat” organizations) a network is.”<sup>155</sup> “In-degree” centralization describes the specific ratio of connections in-bound to a particular node or set of nodes; whereas, “out-degree” centralization measures all out-bound connections. This is a particularly useful measure in determining if information is received, processed, and disseminated effectively within an organization, and then moved to the most effective consumers.

Connectedness is another measure of centrality, though much weaker and less useful than betweenness or degree centrality. Connectedness describes those actual connections between persons or nodes within the social networks. It describes whom is in contact with whom, and provides an idea of the strength of those connections. This is an important tool, as it illuminates the actual communication that is occurring in the network, suggesting trends associated with trust, influence, and expertise.<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>152</sup> Everton, “Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis,” 98.

<sup>153</sup> Everton, “Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis,” 98, 109–110.

<sup>154</sup> Everton, “Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis,” 98.

<sup>155</sup> Everton, “Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis,” 100.

<sup>156</sup> Pfeffer, Chapter 6: Location in the Communication Network, 112. Also see Krackhardt and Hanson, *Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart*, 106–111 for implications on how connectedness impacts trust, influence, and expertise.

Finally, the visual analytic tool of clustering provides the analyst with the ability to determine network relationships through visual and statistical examination. The appearance of clustering in a social network suggests that some sort of physical relationship exist between nodes. Clustered nodes tend to indicate mutual trust, influence, or expertise. While closely related to connectedness, clustering depicts the “nearness” of individuals in the way they interact, and not necessarily how many individual connections a particular node may have.<sup>157</sup> Statistically, clustering is described by the clustering coefficient, average path length, and cohesion. The higher the clustering coefficient and path length, the more likely a network exhibits “small world” characteristics. In other words, the “smaller” the world (higher clustering coefficients and path lengths), the more tightly knit the network is.<sup>158</sup> Cohesion measures the strength of this “small world” characteristic on a scale of 0.0 to 1.0, providing an indication of reliability for the clustering data.

#### ***b. Limitations of Social Network Analysis***

Network analysis also has some important limitations. This type of survey, taken exclusively on an individual basis, may provide some inconsistencies that will potentially skew the results. For example, patrol officer A may consider patrol officer B more central to his individual network than he really is. In other words, officer A may state that he communicates with officer B on a daily basis. However, officer B may describe their communication as a weekly event. This lack of perceptual consensus produces some inconsistencies that will clearly weaken the overall results.<sup>159</sup> This particular survey analysis endeavored to reduce this inconsistency by placing priority on responses that reflected consensus between respondents. However, it is important to bear in mind that individual perceptions can skew survey results, which would, in turn, negatively impact the overall value of the analysis.

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<sup>157</sup> Hoppe, *Network Characteristics*.

<sup>158</sup> Everton, “Tracking, Destabilizing, and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Network Analysis,” 102.

<sup>159</sup> Krackhardt and Hanson, *Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart*, 106.

This analysis is also limited, to some degree, by the fact that not every member of the SPD participated in this voluntary survey. Table 47 outlines the number of participants, by unit and rank, in the SPD that completed the social network survey.<sup>160</sup> Of all sworn officers, only 38% completed the survey. Ideally, this type of analysis becomes more effective and focused when the entire study population participates. Regardless of the sample size, the results are still sufficient since a representative population from each relevant SPD unit provided input. For example, important gang related special units of the SPD, such as the Violence Suppression Unit (38% participation) and the Salinas police officers involved with the Monterey County Joint Gang Task Force (40% participation), participated on a level equal to or near that of the survey's total participation. Other units, such as the Patrol unit (33% participation) and the Investigations unit (35% participation), which consistently deal with gang related issues, participated slightly less than the VSU and the MCJGTF. Their results are still consistent enough with the combined participation levels to merit consideration. Ultimately, while this analysis would have certainly benefited from a more complete representation from all divisions, we consider the current data to be sufficient to provide useful observations about the SPD's informal network.

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<sup>160</sup> See Appendix E for further explanation.

Rank	Admin Division										Investigations Division										Field Ops Division					
	Leadership		Internal Affairs		Training		Comm-unity Services		PAL		MC Joint Gang Task Force		DNC Task Force		VSU		NARC /Vice		Investigations		Patrol		Traffic			
	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey		
Officer							3	1	1	1	3	1	4	4	11	5			14	4	84	27	1			
Sergeant			1	1	1	1	2				1	1			2		1		2	1	14	4	1	1		
Criminalist																					1	1				
Commander											1								1	1	4	2				
Deputy Chief of Police	3	2																								
Chief of Police	1	1																								
% Complete by Unit	75%		100%		100%		20%		100%		40%		100%		38%		0%		35%		33%		80%			
% Complete by Rank				Totals (Total)	Totals (Survey)	%																				
Officer				121	43	36%																				
Sergeant				25	8	36%																				
Criminalist				1	1	100%																				
Commander				8	3	50%																				
Deputy Chief of Police				3	2	87%																				
Chief of Police				1	1	100%																				
Totals:				157	58	38%																				

Table 44. Salinas Police Department Network Analysis Survey Participation Results

Another important limitation to consider is the timeliness of the survey results. Social networks are constantly evolving, developing, and reshaping. For example, new members of the organization join the network, old members leave, and new relationships are formed as a result of joint problem solving opportunities. Thus, organizational leaders and managers need to constantly reevaluate existing networks. Dr. Koschade points out that “although the use of social network analysis looking at historical groups is capable of providing some levels of predictability and foresight, the method is at its most powerful when employed in real time, allowing the clear visualization of the interactional, communicational, and structural cohesion of an [organization].”<sup>161</sup> Accordingly, while the near-real time results of this survey provide the most powerful insight into how *present-day* social relationships contribute to SPD functionality, the long-term implications of this analysis (i.e., predictability and foresight) must be tempered by the physical changes that will inevitably occur within the organization over time.

<sup>161</sup> Koschade, *A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Application to Counterterrorism and Intelligence*, 572–573.

*c. Other Factors Affecting the Scope of the Network Analysis*

Although the survey used in this study captured monthly relationship data, for the sake of relevancy and brevity, our analysis only focused on those results related to daily and weekly communications and interactions. While interesting conclusions might be drawn from less frequent interactions, they were not deemed to be as effective in analyzing trends and producing conclusions when compared with more frequent communication patterns.

In the following sections, SPD social networks will be depicted graphically using the legend found in Figure 12. Often times these network maps can become crowded, presenting a significant amount of information in a small space. This legend is designed to aid in the analysis and reading of the network maps. Additionally, SPD units are represented by a numerical value, simplifying the map data. When referenced in the body of this study, the unit will be listed, followed by a number in parentheses indicating their numerical descriptor on the map; for example, Patrol (2). The information on this legend will be referenced throughout the remainder of this chapter.




Figure 10. Social Network Color Legend



### 3. The Contact Network

This first network analysis of the SPD examines the contact or friend network. Essentially, the contact network shows how an individual maintains contact, whether through personal interface, meetings, phone calls, or emails, with another member of the police department. Individual nodes represent a single police officer, who are labeled, colored, and represented according to the network legend found in Figure 12. Figure 13, visually depicts the contact relationships experienced weekly by members of the SPD that participated in the survey.




Figure 11. Contact Network—Participants maintain contact weekly (through meetings, phone calls, or emails) at least once per week

This particular network map demonstrates some interesting clustering characteristics. While many nodes seemingly have connections to other nodes of differing units, like units tend to cluster together on the map's peripheries, indicating a preference with whom they interact. This is likely the result of normal working relationships, but physical proximity within the network suggests that informal relationships are shaped by the SPD's formal structure. Descriptively, this network has a clustering coefficient of 0.444, indicating moderately close knit clusters of individually

identified police units, with average path lengths between nodes being 1.943 connections. Additionally, a cohesion ratio of 0.523 shows a moderate level of compactness within each cluster.<sup>162</sup> In reality this is a bit disconcerting. Any time formal structure diminishes an organization's ability to cross bureaucratic boundaries and form informal relationships across units (or cluster) lines, there is a weakening of potential innovations, reducing the organization's ability to process and share important information in a timely manner. This phenomenon is more clearly observed in Figure 14, which depicts the contact network according to its daily connections. Network centralization is also very telling in this particular map, describing how information flows. Out-degree centralization is nearly 73%, suggesting a highly hierarchical structure managing the flow of information out of individual nodes.<sup>163</sup> This is consistent with observations made about the SPD's formal organization, suggesting that the informal structure has minimal impact.




Figure 12. Contact Network—Participants maintain contact daily (through meetings, phone calls, or emails) at least daily

<sup>162</sup> See Appendix E for statistically supporting data.

<sup>163</sup> See Appendix E for statistically supporting data.

The SPD Patrol (2) unit was the most prominent participant in the survey. It exhibits strong physical clustering characteristics, indicating that there are adequate internal links within the unit itself. However, connections outside of this cluster are limited, generally filtered through unit leaders, and then on to the police department leadership. In other words, communications moving outside of the Patrol (2) unit must flow through certain “gate keepers” or “bottlenecks.” This type of clustering is observed in the BNE Task Force (3), VSU (4), and Investigations (6) units as well. The SPD Leadership (5), being located centrally in the map, act as “connectors” between units, suggesting a level of hierarchal centrality. However, statistical analysis describes a different story. Out-degree and In-degree centralization are relatively low for this network, roughly 25% and 7% respectively, suggesting a flatter organizational dynamic. The clustering coefficient (0.379) is relatively unchanged from the weekly contact network map, indicating that the two networks exhibit similar clustering dynamics. While the average path length (4.382) and cohesion ratio (0.176) suggest weaknesses in how this network interacts internally, the SPD’s daily contact and friendship interaction are far more effective than its weekly networks.<sup>164</sup>

Simplifying the daily network map to depict only the MCJGTF (1), VSU (4), and Investigation (6) units provides for a more thorough analysis—see Figure 15.

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<sup>164</sup> See Appendix E for statistically supporting data.




Figure 13. Daily Contact Relationships (through meetings, phone calls, or emails) between the MCJGTF, VSU, and Investigations

These units work most closely with gang related issues, so it is important to observe their behavior in relation to one another. Incidentally, when a betweenness analysis is conducted on this map, we see that information flow is largely controlled by members of the unit in positions of authority, aiding to the argument that the contact network is highly affected by the SPD's formal organization.

Another interesting simplification of the daily contact network map relates the previous map showing the MCJGTF (1), VSU (4), and Investigation (6) with the Patrol (2) unit added—see Figure 16. A betweenness analysis demonstrates the same dynamic as the previous map; however, this map illustrates that there is no informal connections with the Patrol (2) unit and the other units. Intuitively, the Patrol (2) unit should have the majority of casual information concerning Salinas since they canvass the city on a daily basis. Accordingly, if gang activity is observed by members of Patrol (2), then it is seemingly unlikely that gang related information will make it to those units responsible for specific counter-gang initiatives.




Figure 14. Daily Contact Relationships (through meetings, phone calls, or emails) between the MCJGTF, VSU, Investigations, and Patrol Unit

The SPD also maintains a contact network with supporting California, Federal, and community agencies. Figures 17 and 18 describe these relationships, demonstrating nominal interaction. The interaction between the SPD and these agencies is not hierarchical in nature; however, weekly network densities (0.0405) and daily network densities (0.0122) suggest a low level of normalization of activities.<sup>165</sup> These informal relationships suggest a low level of coordination and unity, possibly negatively affecting counter-gang initiatives. A higher “norming” or an expansion of the informal network, of network behaviors will likely strengthen ties, converging organizational goals.

<sup>165</sup> See Appendix E for statistically supporting data.




Figure 15. Weekly Contact Relationships (through meetings, phone calls, or emails) between the SPD and Supporting Agencies




Figure 16. Daily Contact Relationships (through meetings, phone calls, or emails) between the SPD and Supporting Agencies

#### 4. The Advice Network

Analysis of the advice network tends to show those individuals that are the most influential figures within an organization. The nodes that are most prominent in this network tend to exhibit the greatest degree of technical and subject matter expertise.<sup>166</sup> For the purposes of this study, the advice network will “help identify gaps in information flow, the inefficient use of resources, and the [potential] failure to generate new ideas.”<sup>167</sup> The first network map, presented as Figure 19, depicts weekly interactions between members of the SPD. Participants were asked how often they sought advice from other individuals or agencies concerning work related matters. Here, high unit clustering is also observed, similar to the contact network. Descriptively, there are some important distinctions between this network and the contact network. Overall, network density (0.0710) is extremely low, suggesting that despite the potential ties available, individual nodes have fewer average degree (4.119) connections as compared to the contact network, which had an average degree of (12.763). This means that an officer is likely to only seek out one or two others for advice, though they may be in contact with many more. This “bottlenecks” expertise and information flow, keeping it isolated in small pockets within the network itself. Additionally, unlike the contact network, the degree of both the out and in centrality is much smaller, suggesting that this network is much flatter and informal, resulting in a structure less tied to the formal hierarchy of the police department.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> Krackhardt and Hanson, *Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart*, 106–107.

<sup>167</sup> Krackhardt and Hanson, *Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart*, 106.

<sup>168</sup> See Appendix E for statistically supporting data.




Figure 17. Weekly Advice Network

Continued examination of the advice network's daily interactions echoes the analysis of the weekly network. The daily advice network is depicted in Figure 20, showing strong clustering by unit. The clustering coefficient associated with this network map is 0.425, a moderately strong ratio, suggesting that the advice network suffers from "small world" characteristics - a dangerous trait in this type of network. Realistically, this suggests that a particular individual will likely centralize his efforts to share or receive information and expertise, limiting innovation and reducing the potential for new ideas to be generated. This negatively impacts organizational value creation. Connections reaching outside of individual units are also limited. On average, there are 2.931 connections between any two units within the network, suggesting a reduced betweenness and connectedness within the network in general.<sup>169</sup> This attests to the network's incapacity to flow advice, expertise, and information in a timely and effective manner.

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<sup>169</sup> See Appendix E for statistically supporting data.






Figure 18. Daily Advice Network

Reducing the daily advice network to examine the specific connections that exist between the MCJGTF (1), Patrol (2), VSU (4), and Investigations (6) continues to show a startling trend—see Figure 21. There are no “advice” connections between the “gang-specific” units and the Patrol (2) unit. Whether this is a function and effect of the formal organization of the police department, or a result of access and conflicting schedules, these units tend to become “one way” repositories of expertise and information. This characteristic reduces the possibility for a better and well-rounded enforcement approach. SPD Police Chief, Louis Fetherolf, supports this observation, claiming “we are systems poor—[internal] information is often held close to the chest” (personal communication, Chief Fetherolf, 2010). This disconnect has the potential to negatively impact the SPD’s ability to foster an organizational learning environment, with a greater capacity for proactive policing versus reactive enforcement.




Figure 19. Daily Advice Network Measuring Betweenness from MCJGTF, VSU, Investigations, and Patrol

Community, State, and Federal level expertise appear to not play a critical role in the SPD's advice network either. Figures 22 and 23 summarize limited connections and interactions at this level. Community programs, such as Second Chance and the Boys & Girls Clubs, who have daily interactions with gang members and other community youth, do not figure into these maps, suggesting that the SPD is not maximizing its resources and using all available sources of information. While successful joint law enforcement efforts, such as "Operation Knockout," conducted in April 2010, show the SPD's capacity to work with State and Federal law enforcement agencies to great effect, in reality, these relationships can be fleeting.<sup>170</sup> However, the SPD recognizes this shortcoming and has taken significant steps to improve its connections outside of its own

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<sup>170</sup> Operation Knockout was a highly successful joint law enforcement operation, demonstrating a near perfect blend of local, state, and federal law enforcement efforts, arresting "over 100 gangsters and associates" in a short period of time. See Fetherolf, *Report to the Community July 2010*, 4.

organization.<sup>171</sup> In conclusion, the advice network conceptualizes “holes” in the SPD’s informal network, demonstrating the need for stronger advice and expertise relationships.




Figure 20. Weekly Advice Network between SPD and Supporting Organizations and Agencies

<sup>171</sup> As a result of Operation Knockout and other similar operations, a “violent crime and narcotic task force is being established in Salinas and extending county-wide to combat gang violence and narcotics trafficking.” This undoubtedly will improve the advice connections between the SPD and other supporting agencies. However, the SPD must make every effort to ensure these connections are used on a regular basis. See Fetherolf, *Report to the Community July 2010*, 4.




Figure 21. Daily Advice Network between SPD and Supporting Organizations and Agencies

## 5. The Intelligence Network

One of the central themes advanced by our study is the premise that better intelligence processing leads to a stronger capacity to act. This, in turn, necessitates a better understanding of the SPD intelligence network in order to fully assess how this concept relates to Salinas and the SPD's efforts to reduce gang related violence. Figure 24 shows the intelligence interactions within the SPD that occur on a weekly basis. Arguably, there is a continuing pattern within this network similar to that observed in the previous two networks.




Figure 22. Weekly Intelligence Network

For example, there is a significant level of clustering along unit lines, suggesting that intelligence sharing is an individual unit priority, with information remaining isolated within a unit. Again, this may be an impact of the professional bureaucracy common to the SPD and other military and law enforcement agencies. However, analysis suggests that this network is moderately affected by centralization, roughly 31% for intelligence flowing out of nodes, and 10% for intelligence flowing in, demonstrating that the impact of the formal organizational structure may not be completely to blame.<sup>172</sup> To prove this point, a look at the daily intelligence network, Figure 25, and a reduced model found in Figure 26, depict interactions between units most likely to encounter gang related intelligence. These network maps demonstrate a weakness in the SPD's ability to manage this type of information, both formally and informally. At best, connections are loose and isolated along unit lines. Statistically, both the weekly and daily intelligence networks are not dense enough (0.0731 and 0.0234 respectively) to suggest that

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<sup>172</sup> See Appendix E for supporting data.

intelligence is being shared freely. However, if densities were represented as a percentage of the SPD’s maximum capacity to share intelligence, they would be doing so at a rate of roughly 7% weekly, and 2% daily.<sup>173</sup>




Figure 23. Daily Intelligence Network

Additionally, average path lengths between nodes are high, with 3.09 path lengths between individuals observed in the weekly map and 2.753 in the daily map.<sup>174</sup> This shows that there is little difference in how information is shared over time (weekly versus daily intelligence networks), and that intelligence may have to move across several boundaries in order to reach the nodes capable of reacting to it.

There is a difference between the idea of “proactive” intelligence and traditional law enforcement intelligence. Proactive intelligence seeks to predict what a criminal is likely to do, while traditional law enforcement intelligence is largely gathered to aid in prosecution. However, recognition by law enforcement that proactive intelligence is essential has helped to change the shape of intelligence use for aid in prevention and

<sup>173</sup> See Appendix E for related data and trends.

<sup>174</sup> See Appendix E for related data and trends.

suppression of violence and other related crimes.<sup>175</sup> In the end, the SPD intelligence network maps demonstrate clear relationship barriers (both individual and organizational) to developing a more robust capacity to share the sort of information necessary to build an effective proactive intelligence apparatus.




Figure 24. Daily Intelligence Network Measuring Betweenness from MCJGTF, VSU, Investigations, and Patrol

Lastly, the bi-modal intelligence network, Figure 27, demonstrates that inter-organizational and inter-agency intelligence relationships also suffer from intelligence network weaknesses. Regular contacts are limited with supporting agencies; however, significant operations, like Knockout, strengthen these ties and the SPD's overall capacity to share and use information when the situation presents itself. Regardless, network densities continue to be low (0.0160), suggesting the need for improved connections.<sup>176</sup> In the end, intelligence sharing is isolated and limited, with a strong possibility for improvement based on the informal system already in place.

<sup>175</sup> Ball, *Rethinking Intelligence to Integrate Counterterrorism into the Local Law Enforcement Mission*, 91.

<sup>176</sup> See Appendix E for supporting data.




Figure 25. Weekly Intelligence Network between SPD and Supporting Organizations and Agencies

## 6. The Assistance Network

The assistance network is essentially the SPD's trust network. Of note, the assistance network is distinct from the advice network in that it measures relationships impacted by individual alliances and not expert direction. Thus, this network analysis helps to identify who individual nodes gravitate towards when faced with uncertainty about organizational issues. Like the other networks already examined, the assistance network displays strong clustering ties along unit lines—see Figures 28 and 29. This characteristic suggests that the boundaries drawn by the formal SPD organizational structure significantly impact an individual officer's ability to seek out assistance from others in the organization at-large. Additionally, centrality measures for both the weekly and daily (40% and 20% respectively) network maps are moderate, giving some validity to this observation.



Closer examination of those units most directly involved in gang related enforcement activities reinforces previous observations—see Figure 30. Trust within an organization is critical, especially when information flow, expertise, and commonality of purpose are important to mission success.




Figure 26. Weekly Assistance or Trust Network




Figure 27. Daily Assistance or Trust Network




Figure 28. Daily Assistance or Trust Network Measuring Betweenness from MCJGTF, VSU, Investigations, and Patrol

But, who is trusted most in the SPD? Within the Patrol (2) unit, for example, those nodes that are most prominent (larger in size) tend not to be the formal

organizational leaders. Here the betweenness measure helps to show that individuals with the rank of “officer” (down triangles) tend to be those sought after most for assistance. Why is this, and what does it mean? Essentially, those that are perceived to have the most practical experience are sought after most often when questions arise. These individuals become unwanted “trust managers,” stagnating the trust process and providing no value added to the organization as a whole. To counter this, managers and other leaders must be vigilant, using principles of centrality to locate, or relocate, these “trust managers” effectively, so that more individual nodes can access and use their assistance.<sup>177</sup>

#### **D. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS: PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER**

A thorough analysis of the SPD contact, advice, intelligence, and assistance networks provides keen insight into how information is organized, shared, and used. Our study hypothesizes, in part, that the ability to process information effectively is critical in achieving information dominance and allowing authorities to reduce gang violence. Essentially, this social network analysis demonstrated that while there are holes and challenges in the way that both the formal and informal networks at the SPD accomplish this, there is a sufficient base from which to strengthen the process.

Essentially, the SPD suffers from several organizational “configuration” problems. Dr. David Krackhardt and Dr. Jeffrey Hanson outline some of these configurations, explaining their implications. The first such configuration is the “imploded relationships” phenomenon. In this situation, clusters have few links to other clusters. This happens when individual nodes fail to reach out and develop these relationships, preferring to communicate internally. The impacts are obvious; information does not get shared across unit boundaries, thereby “bottlenecking” the processing procedures. Consequently, information relating to gang enforcement issues becomes stymied and ineffective. Each of the four networks exhibited this configuration,

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<sup>177</sup> See Krackhardt and Hanson, *Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart*, 106–111. for specific solutions to this problem, which are beyond the scope of this study. While this is not necessarily a negative trait, it can produce friction within an organization, degrading effectiveness and value creation efforts.

but the contact and intelligence networks are perhaps the most affected. However, the assistance network may reap some benefits from this configuration, allowing for higher levels of internal unit camaraderie and cohesion. In the end, the risks far outweigh the potential benefits; if there is no mechanism to encourage the free flow of information, it is likely that localized intelligence efforts may fail.<sup>178</sup>

Another configuration prominent in the analysis of the four social networks is that of “fragile structures.” This occurs when units only communicate internally and with one or two other units. This is clearly seen in those networks depicting the relationships between the MCJGTF, VSU, Investigations, and Patrol units. According to Krackhardt and Hanson, this “can be problematic when contributions [in] several areas [becomes] necessary to accomplish work quickly and spawn creativity.”<sup>179</sup> In a low-intensity situation, such as counter-gang operations, effective and creative strategies are essential to success. It is hard to quantify this type of success if the most important enforcement elements are having a difficult time synchronizing their efforts and goals.<sup>180</sup>

Lastly, the “bow tie” configuration also impacts the SPD and its assistance network in particular. When one node becomes too central in a trust network, that individual may garner too much power and control, undermining organizational structural integrity and creating the conditions for this bow tie type configuration. While this is not a specifically observable problem at the SPD, there is potential for it to become so. While this chapter has endeavored to underscore the value of informal networks, there is purpose in having an effective formal network, as it tries to streamline organizational processes. Bow tie configuration tends to undermine the formal organizational structure, isolating small clusters of individuals in the network, possibly exacerbating some imploded relationships already in existence. The result is that “organizational processes

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<sup>178</sup> Krackhardt and Hanson, *Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart*, 110.

<sup>179</sup> Krackhardt and Hanson, *Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart*, 111.

<sup>180</sup> Krackhardt and Hanson, *Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart*, 106–111.

tend to become rigid and slow.”<sup>181</sup> The ultimate danger is that information stops flowing, making inter-unit communication impossible.<sup>182</sup>

Overcoming these organizational configuration challenges is easier said than done. A holistic approach must be developed. Using the informal network as an organizational advantage should become a focus of the SPD leadership. While the formal structure is important in developing and maintaining the overall direction of the SPD, it is the informal network that provides the catalyst for true value creation, innovation, and problem solving. Table 48, summarizing the analytical data associated with this section of the study, should be examined closely, along with the other significant findings, in order to develop unique organizational solutions.

Network	Density	Average Degree (Out and In)	Centralization		Clustering Coefficient	Average Path Length	Cohesion
			Out	In			
Weekly Contact	0.2200	12.763	72.325%	19.709%	0.444	1.943	0.532
Daily Contact	0.0500	2.898	24.732%	7.194%	0.379	4.382	0.176
Weekly Contact-Agency	0.0405	Bi-Modal - Analysis Matrix is not Available					
Daily Contact-Agency	0.0122	Bi-Modal - Analysis Matrix is not Available					
Weekly Advice	0.0710	4.119	31.361%	15.577%	0.244	3.383	0.281
Daily Advice	0.0231	1.339	23.960%	6.421%	0.425	2.931	0.048
Weekly Advice-Agency	0.0160	Bi-Modal - Analysis Matrix is not Available					
Daily Advice-Agency	0.0070	Bi-Modal - Analysis Matrix is not Available					
Weekly Intelligence	0.0731	4.237	31.153%	10.107%	0.324	3.09	0.235
Daily Intelligence	0.0234	1.356	13.407%	6.391%	0.475	2.753	0.049
Weekly Intelligence-Agency	0.0160	Bi-Modal - Analysis Matrix is not Available					
Daily Intelligence-Agency	0.0060	Bi-Modal - Analysis Matrix is not Available					
Weekly Assistance	0.0751	4.3560	39.715%	11.653%	0.3760	2.9590	0.2500
Daily Assistance	0.0248	1.4410	20.273%	6.243%	0.4710	3.0810	0.0550
Weekly Assistance-Agency	0.0199	Bi-Modal - Analysis Matrix is not Available					
Daily Assistance-Agency	0.0080	Bi-Modal - Analysis Matrix is not Available					

Table 45. Consolidated Multi-Network Statistical Analysis<sup>183</sup>

The end result of this analysis was to demonstrate the varying network weaknesses, showing that there is potential for improvement. Information processing is not easy, but a critical component to success against an asymmetric problem such as the

<sup>181</sup> Krackhardt and Hanson, *Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart*, 111.

<sup>182</sup> Krackhardt and Hanson, *Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart*.

<sup>183</sup> See Appendix E for supporting calculations and original data.

gang phenomenon in Salinas. Informal networks, in conjunction with established formal norms, are critical to understanding relationships in the struggle for information dominance.<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> Krackhardt and Hanson, *Informal Networks: The Company Behind the Chart*, 111.

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## **IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This research project began with the intent of exploring what aspects of counterinsurgency doctrine, when applied to counter-gang operations, can have the most affect on reducing the levels of gang violence in Salinas, CA. More specifically we sought to understand how Salinas city officials and law enforcement agencies can increase the level of information they receive from the population about gang activities, and how the city can increase its ability to process that information in order to effectively target street gangs in their community. To accomplish this, our team studied the perceptions of the general population, the SPD, and city hall employees in great detail through the survey and interview process described in previous chapters. Through regression analysis we found conditions, that when met, can increase the population's willingness to share information with the SPD. Our analysis showed that when the population perceives they are part of a unified effort with the city toward the removal of gangs, and they have been empowered to make a difference toward this goal the population is more likely to share information that they have about gang related activity.

Similarly we found conditions, that when met, can improve the SPD's attitudes toward sharing information internally. Our analysis of the SPD showed that when police officers perceive that the government and the community are working towards common goals they have more favorable attitudes about information processing. We also found that officers with less of an inclination to personal responsibility and a poor perception of police legitimacy are more likely to be satisfied with the current quality of information processing within the city government.

Finally, our survey of the Salinas city employees revealed two primary factors contributing to attitudes about the quality of information processing within the city government. Of all the variables considered, the reduction of fear and a perception that the government and the community were working together to solve the gang problem were most important in predicting attitudes about gang-related information sharing.



## **B. SURVEY CROSS EXAMINATION AND OBSERVATIONS**

While regression analysis and analytical statistics are good tools for predicting behavior, they do not always tell the complete story. In the previous chapters we examined the descriptive statistics for each of our three surveys independently of one another (population, police, and civilian city employees). We felt it was valuable to this research to include a comparison of the survey results across all three demographics. The following section contains the results of this cross examination, and highlights those areas where opinions diverge as well as converge on different topics. This we felt would provide Salinas's city leaders a concise list on where focus should be applied to repair the schisms within their community.

### **1. Legitimacy**

#### ***a. Strains on Legitimacy***

Differences in perceptions between the Salinas population and city organizations (city government and the SPD) were clear when examining the effects of legitimacy across all three surveys. There is significant disagreement over how legitimate the SPD or City Hall portray themselves. When asked if the police department cares about the average citizen, the SPD overwhelmingly believes that it does (73.9%). It is clear that the SPD works hard to ensure that Salinas is a safe community, within the bounds of its limited resources. However, only 44.8% of the general population and 45.2% of the city employees agree that the Salinas police care about them. This schism demonstrates the SPD's difficulty in reassuring a weary population that it is doing all that it can to protect them. Additionally, there is a similar schism with regards to police responsiveness to citizen complaints and concerns. While 76.2% of the police indicate that they are doing the best that they can to respond to citizen needs, only 36.9% of the general population and 25% of the city employees felt the same way. In the end, these perceptions may be damaging to the SPD's legitimacy, suggesting a possible misalignment of expectations between the city's residents and the SPD.

Lastly, when queried concerning the effectiveness of the courts and legal system affecting Salinas, 76.2% of the SPD indicated a lack of confidence in the legal system, suggesting that it may not be an effective tool in dealing with criminals or deterring future crime. Interestingly, the population places more legitimacy in the courts and legal system than the SPD does, indicating that they believe the legal system is largely effective.

***b. Agreeing to Disagree***

Despite ardent disagreements concerning perceived levels of legitimacy, there are some areas of agreement. Regardless, these agreements are presented as negative results, meaning that the three surveys agree that there is a lack of legitimacy with regards to some aspect of governance. For example, it is clear that the general population, the SPD, and city employees have little faith in city council's ability to care about citizen needs or to respond to those needs in an effective manner. The consequential impact on legitimacy is potentially enormous. A possible consequence may include difficulties in establishing effective policy designed to unify efforts against gang violence, and subsequent community support for those policies.

**2. Security**

***a. Areas of Agreement***

Across all three surveys, the consensus was that the gang problem is serious and that Salinas was not a safe place at night. With this type of unanimous response one would believe that many Salinas citizens have been directly affected by gang activity; however, this does not seem to be the case. The majority of responses indicated that most people have not been directly threatened by gangs in their community. This observation tells us two things: (1) the ability of the gangs in Salinas to use violence as leverage to incite fear in the community is strong, and (2) perceptions are stronger than reality. Compounding the problem is the perception that the Salinas Police have not made the city any safer over the last year.

***b. Areas of Disagreement***

The security topic that was most disagreed upon was the perception that gang violence had gotten worse over the last year. Analysis showed that 74.9% of the general population and 45.9% of the city hall employees believed the gang problem had gotten worse, but only 15.3% of police believe it had. Either the police are in denial that the gang problem is getting worse, or the population is not informed enough about the facts concerning gang activity. Since the police are intimately involved in the day to day fight against gangs, giving them a better understanding of the problem, and the majority of the public is not, it is likely that the locus of disagreement lies with the population's lack of accurate information concerning gang activity. Previous research in Salinas indicated that overall levels of violence have either decreased or stabilized over the past 30 years, demonstrating a modicum of consistency.<sup>185</sup> Furthermore, our research shows that over the last year, the proportion of gang violence has declined, confirming the SPD's assertion that violence has not worsened.<sup>186</sup> This confirms our hypothesis that the public's inaccurate perception of the gang problem stems from their lack of accurate information about the current level of gang violence. In order for the population to effectively participate in counter-gang initiatives it needs to know what is going on; therefore, an aggressive information campaign must be undertaken within the city to inform the public on current gang issues.

**3. Trust and Embeddedness**

***a. Areas of Agreement***

On issues of trust and embeddedness, all three survey populations shared the belief that people should form community groups to solve social problems. They also

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<sup>185</sup> This assertion is consistent with research conducted by Majors Jason Clarke and Tracy Onufer, who aptly demonstrate the effects of varying economic, educational, social, and enforcement factors on violence levels in Salinas. Of particular note, Chapter 2 "Data Analysis," clearly shows the violence trends in Salinas since 1981. See Jason Clarke and Tracy Onufer, "Understanding Environmental Factors that Affect Violence in Salinas, California" (Master of Science in Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School), 21–58 (accessed 11/23/2010).

<sup>186</sup> Reference Appendix A, Section C.

agreed that it is important to share crime information with the police. There was partial agreement that ethnic needs were met by the city of Salinas. Agreement in these areas suggest that there is a willingness among the population to get involved; however, this will require a concerted effort from the city government to tap into this capability.

***b. Areas of Disagreement***

Participants disagreed on issues of cultural identity. There was sharp disagreement between the police, the population, and city employees about whether speaking English as a common language would unite Salinas's citizens. These results indicate that the population values cultural heritage and language as critical to their identity. This feeling was less prominent among the police and city employees. Cross examination of these responses reveals that the "front line troops," those which interact with the citizenry on a daily basis, do not regard culture as an important aspect of understanding the community that they protect. Additionally, when asked whether people should help others who are less fortunate, 58.1% of police agreed compared to 84.3% of the population and 84.4% of city employees.

**4. Unity of Effort**

***a. Agreement***

Cross examination of survey data indicates an agreement that in order to reduce gang violence, a unified approach between the city government and the population is required. There is significant agreement that there is currently no unified approach being taken to counter gang violence, particularly among the SPD where 59.5% of respondents felt that the city lacked a unified approach to gang violence. We hypothesize that the disconnect between what *should* be happening and what *is* happening is due to a lack of a unified counter-gang strategy. Further survey results confirm this hypothesis. There is a consensus among city employees and the SPD that no unified gang strategy currently exists. These findings indicate that the city government understands what needs to be done, but is having a difficult time executing this type of unified policy.

***b. Disagreement***

The only large disagreement among the surveys concerning unity of effort was whether the city government was effective at soliciting help from the citizens. Regarding this subject, 22.1% of city employees and 10.2% of the SPD felt that city government had been effective at soliciting help from the citizens, while 47.3% of the population had a higher regard for the city in this area.

**C. POLICY DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

These recommendations are intended to be practical and implementable in order for the Salinas City Government to see a decrease in gang violence. For precise data on why and which variables are seen as more important, refer to Chapters IV through VIII and the corresponding appendices.

**1. Increasing Information**

These suggestions are targeted at those areas that will help Salinas city government increase its ability to gather crime information from the population.

***a. Empower Local Citizens***

(1) **Discussion.** As shown in Chapter V, *personal responsibility* and *unity of effort* proved to be the most strongly correlated IVs for the population's willingness to share information. Personal responsibility was a subset of trust from our overall hypothesis. Salinas citizens showed that they retain a tremendous desire to help other people. Additionally, our research showed that if the population was empowered through the formation of, and participation in community organizations, they would be more inclined to share crime information with the police. Our research has found that the police are pleading with the local community to provide information about criminal activity, and no one is talking. We hypothesize this is due to the current passive nature of the relationship between the city government and the population. The city has failed to empower the population through active engagement at the neighborhood level.

(2) **Recommendation.** As leaders of the community, city officials and law enforcement personnel must make community engagement at the neighborhood level a priority. It is not enough to establish a tip line and then wait for reports to trickle in. There exists in Salinas a perception among the population that neither the city council nor the police are responsive to complaints. A passive tip line approach to acquiring information is not working. There must be engagement between the city and the population through an active two way dialogue. The establishment of community groups at the neighborhood level accomplishes several things: (1) increase the unity of effort between the community and the city, (2) allow dialogue to occur among members of the community and city officials on a routine basis, (3) establish a sense of trust between group members, (4) allow police to provide the community with specific information requirements they are seeking, and (5) reassure the community that their input counts. Building strong community group networks allows the city to build a more personal relationship with the community, and ultimately receive more information about criminal activity through those relationships.

Based on our research we recommend these community groups include law enforcement personnel who patrol that particular part of the city in which the group members live, as well as civil servant and social service representatives. We realize that the formation of community groups across the city will take time and resources, so we recommend the groups should be started in neighborhoods in East Salinas particularly among Hispanic neighborhoods. Some group members may not feel safe meeting in their neighborhoods, depending on their proximity to the gangs. In these instances off site meetings could be set up.

The community groups described here, in their simplest form, are hubs in the city's information network. When properly manned, resourced, and utilized they have the potential to be a great force multiplier against gang violence. The gangs that thrive in Salinas are also a network. What we are recommending is the city of Salinas fight the gang network with a network of their own.

***b. Incorporating City Employees Into the Process***

(1) **Discussion.** Oftentimes the myriad of jobs conducted by city workers gives them access and placement to the neighborhoods rife with gang activity, such as sanitation workers and public works employees. In contrast to police officers, city workers are accepted entities in neighborhoods that would be non-permissive to a police presence. The “invisible” nature of these workers gives them the capacity to observe community conditions that would be beneficial to law enforcement’s situational awareness.

(2) **Recommendation.** We recommend the city leadership establish a forum between city workers and law enforcement officers to facilitate information sharing. This approach would accomplish several things: (1) increase police resources, (2) give people a chance to share their observations, and (3) give city employees a sense of participation in fighting the gang problem. Additionally, this empowerment may reduce the sense of fear and uncertainty among city employees, as they feel they are contributing to a unified effort.

***c. Additional Considerations***

(1) **Feedback.** Our research found that many times when arrests are made based on a tip provided by someone in the community, there is little to no feedback to the public that an anonymous tip provided the valuable information. When this occurs, it fosters the idea that “no one is really listening”, and leads to an apathetic population. Our recommendation is the city should provide feedback to the population when their input leads to action against gang activity. For obvious safety concerns, no attributable information should be shared about the source of the information; however, the method by which the police received the tip could be made public to bolster more support from the population. Face to face feedback at a community group meeting, as described above, would be the most productive mechanism for providing this type of feedback.

(2) **Virtual Community Groups: Harnessing Existing Social Networks.** Existing social network websites such as *Facebook*, *MySpace*, and *Yahoo*

*Groups* provides an existing network for the city to tap into for the collection of information. There are over 500 million people with *Facebook* accounts. In instances where groups cannot be easily formed in the physical sense, community groups can be formed using existing social networking sites. Community groups can establish their own accounts on one of these websites that would facilitate daily interaction among the group members in between physical meetings. It would also provide a channel for passing information to the police that the group is familiar with. The group members know who is receiving the information and they know they will get feedback. Growth of networks on sites such as *Facebook* can expand quickly, more so than in a physical sense. As these networks grow, the momentum of this exponential growth may likely bring in people that otherwise may not have gotten involved.

## **2. Increasing Processing Power**

These suggestions are targeted at those areas that will help the Salinas city government increase its ability to process, understand, and use the information that it gathers from the population.

### ***a. Effective Formal and Informal Organization***

(1) **Discussion.** As indicated in Chapter VIII, the potential for improving the way information is used, formally and informally, within the SPD exists. Currently, it is the assessment of this research that this potential is not being fully maximized, thus limiting the SPD's ability to successfully confront the gang phenomenon in Salinas. In the end, this challenge is a function of organization, and how individuals within the organization interact. As previously noted, overcoming these organizational challenges is easier said than done. Two specific organizational challenges face the SPD, degrading its informal, and even its formal capacity to process information: imploding relationships and fragile structures. Each of these challenges work against the SPD's ability to effectively process and use potential information and intelligence. Thus, a holistic approach must be developed that uses the informal network as an organizational advantage. While an organization's formal structure is important in developing and maintaining the overall direction, it is the informal network that provides the catalyst for



true innovation and problem solving. The following recommendations will provide ideas that may help the SPD maximize this network and improve its information processing.

(2) **Recommendations.**

**Overcome imploded relationships with more informal intra-departmental coordination.** In this situation, as stated before, units have few links to other units within the police department. This happens when individuals fail to reach out and develop these relationships, preferring to communicate internally. The impacts are obvious; information does not get shared across unit boundaries, thereby “bottlenecking” the processing procedures. Consequently, information relating to gang enforcement issues becomes stymied and ineffective. Purposeful integration of units through collaborative sessions offers equal input from every participant. Such meetings offer a forum for people to share information that might not typically have the opportunity to do so. This can also be accomplished through intra-departmental training sessions, providing social opportunities in a mix unit environment. Leaders must consciously break reliance on internal ties and force units to interact in a more holistic manner. This is a leadership responsibility, and time and opportunity must be made for individuals to create relationships across unit boundaries.

**Strengthen fragile structures through the establishment of formal intelligence reporting and analysis mechanisms.** The use of a formal reporting system, detailing gang related information or intelligence can be used to generate dialogue within the department. These reports are freely shared and distributed; thus, units that traditionally share across limited boundaries now will potentially reach every unit within the SPD. This type of reporting must be done daily, and managed through a single point. Essentially, reports are collected by one person, analyzed and organized, and then shared with every other unit in the form of a daily intelligence summary. This will allow the department to formulate an overall “common intelligence picture” and ensure that everyone is using the same information to plan and conduct operations.

*b. Establish Commanders Critical Information Requirements*

(1) **Discussion.** If information is to be synchronized across the Salinas Police Department, the officers need to know what information is relevant and important to the command. On a typical day, officers may come in contact with a variety of information and may find it hard to sort what is important and what is not.

(2) **Recommendation.** In order to clearly establish what information is critical to the operations of the police department we recommend the police department leadership issue critical information requirements to officers outlining the latest “gaps” in intelligence. While these information requirements should be issued from the command level, they needn’t be devised by the command. Input from all units should be collated to provide a comprehensive list of information gaps in their particular area. The commands job then becomes prioritizing this list and putting emphasis behind its use. As information about a particular requirement comes in, it gets reported back down to the unit that originally needed the information. The command can continue to issue revised information requirements as the intelligence picture develops.

*c. Database Management*

(1) **Discussion.** In the course of our research, we observed a general inconsistency in crime tip data collection and archiving within the SPD. Current distribution channels send crime tips to various locations within the SPD, with no central repository for collection. Because efficient crime analysis demands accurate and complete records of incoming information, the SPD would benefit from improvements in this area. If analysis was possible, the SPD would be better able to evaluate the effectiveness of various methods of intelligence collection.

(2) **Recommendation.** We recommend the establishment of a central collection database for all crime tip information within the SPD. This will facilitate easier access to a complete record of incoming intelligence from the various available sources (telephone, internet, CI, etc.). This enables a greater understanding of what the public is communicating to the police, in addition to presenting a clear picture of

which line of communication is most useful, as well as areas where these processes could be improved.

### **3. Additional Recommendations**

#### ***a. Coordinated Media Plan***

(1) **Discussion.** Interviews with city government officials revealed that currently the city does not have a coordinated plan to provide routine feedback to media outlets and the population of Salinas specifically regarding progress in countering gang activity. While the police department does have a public information officer tasked to coordinate this effort, a coordinated plan across city agencies has yet to be realized. It is critical for the city to maintain transparency in how it is combating gang proliferation in their community.

(2) **Recommendation.** (1) Establish a formal anti-gang theme that is understood and used by both city hall and the police department. (2) Develop media talking points prior to large operations to facilitate the dissemination of information to the public quickly and accurately after the operation occurs. (3) Establish standard procedures for routine interactions with the media to provide feedback to the community about how resources are being used to counter gang activity.

### **D. CONCLUSION**

The purpose of our thesis was to understand what aspects of counterinsurgency doctrine, when applied to counter-gang operations, can have the most affect on reducing the levels of gang violence in Salinas, CA. While this study has shown there to be clear applications of this theory toward fighting gang violence, the concept of using these techniques is still in its early stages. The models and theories put into practice by law enforcement agencies in the past have served an invaluable purpose, and still have many important capabilities that can be brought to bear against criminal organizations. However, current information about gangs has consistently shown that they are growing in sophistication and are becoming increasingly networked in their operations. As a result, the nature of the conflict between gangs and city government is becoming more

asymmetric. The problem then becomes how can current suppression, intervention, and prevention techniques be modified to overcome the asymmetric nature of this conflict between city government and street gangs? We believe counterinsurgency practices shed light on how this can be achieved

To overcome this asymmetry will require a new paradigm, one that incorporates the focused use of information to achieve an advantage in suppression, intervention, and prevention efforts against gang activity. A strategy focused heavily on the use of information can aid the Salinas city government in “seeing” the gang’s infrastructure and effectively targeting it. Current counter-gang strategies seem to understate the importance of engagement at the local community level as necessary to generate “bottom up buy in” from the population. A focused effort in extracting information from the population will disrupt the gang’s link to the population, which is their center of gravity. The axiom, “information is power” seems to befit this situation. If this is true, to exert this power successfully, information must be processed and shared across all agencies involved in the conflict. Processing and sharing of information will allow the city to wield intelligence effectively to root out an entrenched and networked enemy such as gangs.

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## **APPENDIX A. SALINAS CRIME STATISTICS, TIP INFORMATION, AND SUPPORTING EMPIRICS**

### **A. DESCRIPTION**

Gang related statistics and tip information lie at the heart of this paper's research efforts. These statistics helped to understand the corollary relationships that have impacted community and police efforts to combat gang crime in Salinas, California over the past several years. The following appendix outlines the data collection and analysis efforts as they relate to gang crime in Salinas, providing an overview of our analytical results.

### **B. METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS**

All crime statistics and tip information were collected using public police records given for use by the SPD. This data was sorted and compiled into relevant categories pertinent to this study.

The analysis procedures used two techniques: descriptive comparison and analytical statistical analysis. The descriptive comparison analysis compiled and analyzed the results using graphical representations. This method allowed the drawing of conclusions about the data based on temporal trends. The analytical statistical analysis used standard regression and the Prais-Winsten autocorrelation regression techniques to correlate relationships between varying independent variables.

### **C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICAL RESULTS**

The following tables, 49 and 50, describe those crime statistics observed by the SPD from January 2006 thru October 2010.<sup>187</sup> Definitive analysis of this data is presented in the body of this study in Chapter IV.

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<sup>187</sup> Salinas Police Department, *Salinas Police Department in-House Crime Statistics (Public Record)* (Salinas, CA: Salinas Police Department, 2006–2010).

			Comprehensive Crime Statistics													
Year	Qtr	Month	Total Crime				Gang Related					Non-Gang Related				
			Homicide	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Total	Homicide	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Total	% of Gang Crime out of all crime in Salinas	Homicide	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Total	% of Non Gang Related Crime out of all Crime in Salinas
2006	QTR1	Jan-06	1	32	30	63	0	6	6	12	19%	1	26	24	51	81%
		Feb-06	1	26	53	80	1	4	18	23	29%	0	22	35	57	71%
		Mar-06	1	25	40	66	1	3	13	17	26%	0	22	27	49	74%
	QTR2	Apr-06	0	29	59	88	0	5	18	23	26%	0	24	41	65	74%
		May-06	1	43	77	121	1	8	24	33	27%	0	35	53	88	73%
		Jun-06	1	22	64	87	1	3	31	35	40%	0	19	33	52	60%
	QTR3	Jul-06	0	36	78	114	0	5	24	29	25%	0	31	54	85	75%
		Aug-06	0	33	50	83	0	6	14	20	24%	0	27	36	63	76%
		Sep-06	0	31	53	84	0	7	21	28	33%	0	24	32	56	67%
	QTR4	Oct-06	0	36	77	113	0	3	22	25	22%	0	33	55	88	78%
		Nov-06	2	19	39	60	1	4	8	13	22%	1	15	31	47	78%
		Dec-06	0	48	52	100	0	6	7	13	13%	0	42	45	87	87%
2007	QTR1	Jan-07	0	37	40	77	0	6	13	19	25%	0	31	27	58	75%
		Feb-07	1	30	60	91	1	3	21	25	27%	0	27	39	66	73%
		Mar-07	2	19	55	76	2	4	18	24	32%	0	15	37	52	68%
	QTR2	Apr-07	1	16	58	75	1	3	22	26	35%	0	13	36	49	65%
		May-07	2	31	60	93	2	7	10	19	20%	0	24	50	74	80%
		Jun-07	0	25	51	76	0	5	6	11	14%	0	20	45	65	86%
	QTR3	Jul-07	1	35	73	109	1	8	15	24	22%	0	27	58	85	78%
		Aug-07	1	25	68	94	0	1	21	22	23%	1	24	47	72	77%
		Sep-07	1	49	84	134	1	4	40	45	34%	0	45	44	89	66%
	QTR4	Oct-07	3	39	58	100	0	13	18	31	31%	3	26	40	69	69%
		Nov-07	2	32	47	81	2	4	23	29	36%	0	28	24	52	64%
		Dec-07	0	33	49	82	0	2	17	19	23%	0	31	32	63	77%
2008	QTR1	Jan-08	1	35	46	82	1	7	19	27	33%	0	28	27	55	67%
		Feb-08	3	22	37	62	2	2	12	16	26%	1	20	25	46	74%
		Mar-08	3	22	48	73	3	3	15	21	29%	0	19	33	52	71%
	QTR2	Apr-08	2	24	56	82	2	3	21	26	32%	0	21	35	56	68%
		May-08	5	25	47	77	5	4	8	17	22%	0	21	39	60	78%
		Jun-08	2	20	40	62	2	1	17	20	32%	0	19	23	42	68%
	QTR3	Jul-08	1	28	64	93	1	5	18	24	26%	0	23	46	69	74%
		Aug-08	0	43	88	131	0	9	18	27	21%	0	34	70	104	79%
		Sep-08	3	30	52	85	3	3	22	28	33%	0	27	30	57	67%
	QTR4	Oct-08	0	25	62	87	0	0	19	19	22%	0	25	43	68	78%
		Nov-08	4	21	48	73	4	0	9	13	18%	0	21	39	60	82%
		Dec-08	1	39	45	85	0	4	18	22	26%	1	35	27	63	74%
2009	QTR1	Jan-09	6	37	50	93	6	7	19	32	34%	0	30	31	61	66%
		Feb-09	3	28	39	70	3	6	10	19	27%	0	22	29	51	73%
		Mar-09	3	30	53	86	3	3	14	20	23%	0	27	39	66	77%
	QTR2	Apr-09	0	34	51	85	0	6	20	26	31%	0	28	31	59	69%
		May-09	2	24	70	96	2	3	22	27	28%	0	21	48	69	72%
		Jun-09	0	32	53	85	0	4	15	19	22%	0	28	38	66	78%
	QTR3	Jul-09	2	31	68	101	2	7	28	37	37%	0	24	40	64	63%
		Aug-09	5	28	59	92	5	4	8	17	18%	0	24	51	75	82%
		Sep-09	1	32	60	93	1	4	19	24	26%	0	28	41	69	74%
	QTR4	Oct-09	2	32	67	101	2	9	18	29	29%	0	23	49	72	71%
		Nov-09	1	30	57	88	1	4	18	23	26%	0	26	39	65	74%
		Dec-09	4	36	36	76	3	2	10	15	20%	1	34	26	61	80%
2010	QTR1	Jan-10	0	26	75	101	0	3	14	17	17%	0	23	61	84	83%
		Feb-10	1	24	58	83	0	2	10	12	14%	1	22	48	71	86%
		Mar-10	1	40	60	101	1	6	12	19	19%	0	34	48	82	81%
	QTR2	Apr-10	1	34	47	82	1	3	12	16	20%	0	31	35	66	80%
		May-10	0	34	71	105	0	5	21	26	25%	0	29	50	79	75%
		Jun-10	1	28	67	96	1	6	12	19	20%	0	22	55	77	80%
	QTR3	Jul-10	5	24	66	95	3	3	23	29	31%	2	21	43	66	69%
		Aug-10	3	18	67	88	2	1	19	22	25%	1	17	48	66	75%
		Sep-10	1	33	58	92	1	5	11	17	18%	0	28	47	75	82%
	QTR4	Oct-10	3	0	0	3	3	0	0	3	100%	0	0	0	0	0%
		Nov-10														
		Dec-10														

Table 46. Comprehensive Crime Statistics Observed in Salinas, California from January 2006 to October 2010

Year	Qtr	Month	Gang Related Crime				Gang Related Tip Data						Gang Arrests
			Homicide	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Total	Gang Related Tips from Confidential Informants (CI)	Gang Related Anonymous Tips from Internet	Narcotics Related Anonymous Tips from Telephone	Narcotics Related Anonymous Tips from Internet	Total Narcotics Tips	Total Combined Tips	
2006	QTR1	Jan-06	0	6	6	12	12					12	21
		Feb-06	1	4	18	23	2					2	9
		Mar-06	1	3	13	17	0					0	10
	QTR2	Apr-06	0	5	18	23	6					6	14
		May-06	1	8	24	33	4					4	20
		Jun-06	1	3	31	35	3					3	21
	QTR3	Jul-06	0	5	24	29	13					13	13
		Aug-06	0	6	14	20	21					21	13
		Sep-06	0	7	21	28	10					10	22
	QTR4	Oct-06	0	3	22	25	7					7	6
		Nov-06	1	4	8	13	8					8	11
		Dec-06	0	6	7	13	27					27	4
2007	QTR1	Jan-07	0	6	13	19	19					19	20
		Feb-07	1	3	21	25	8					8	24
		Mar-07	2	4	18	24	31					31	35
	QTR2	Apr-07	1	3	22	26	26					26	23
		May-07	2	7	10	19	10					10	20
		Jun-07	0	5	6	11	13					13	11
	QTR3	Jul-07	1	8	15	24	4					4	19
		Aug-07	0	1	21	22	8					8	23
		Sep-07	1	4	40	45	16					16	23
	QTR4	Oct-07	0	13	18	31	16					16	25
		Nov-07	2	4	23	29	6					6	28
		Dec-07	0	2	17	19	1					1	16
2008	QTR1	Jan-08	1	7	19	27	1	0		1	1	2	25
		Feb-08	2	2	12	16	7	0		0	0	7	25
		Mar-08	3	3	15	21	4	0		0	0	4	24
	QTR2	Apr-08	2	3	21	26	10	0		0	0	10	21
		May-08	5	4	8	17	3	5		1	1	9	15
		Jun-08	2	1	17	20	6	2		0	0	8	34
	QTR3	Jul-08	1	5	18	24	17	6		0	0	23	27
		Aug-08	0	9	18	27	4	2		0	0	6	18
		Sep-08	3	3	22	28	14	0		0	0	14	23
	QTR4	Oct-08	0	0	19	19	16	3		0	0	19	25
		Nov-08	4	0	9	13	30	0		0	0	30	20
		Dec-08	0	4	18	22	13	0		1	1	14	18
2009	QTR1	Jan-09	6	7	19	32	26	1	30	2	32	59	10
		Feb-09	3	6	10	19	33	1	26	0	26	60	17
		Mar-09	3	3	14	20	20	0	27	0	27	47	22
	QTR2	Apr-09	0	6	20	26	11	0	25	1	26	37	12
		May-09	2	3	22	27	7	1	19	2	21	29	9
		Jun-09	0	4	15	19	14	0	15	0	15	29	14
	QTR3	Jul-09	2	7	28	37	30	1	14	1	15	46	26
		Aug-09	5	4	8	17	40	0	20	1	21	61	18
		Sep-09	1	4	19	24	34	2	30	1	31	67	11
	QTR4	Oct-09	2	9	18	29	23	0	22	2	24	47	14
		Nov-09	1	4	18	23	38	1	18	0	18	57	23
		Dec-09	3	2	10	15	16	3	19	0	19	38	26
2010	QTR1	Jan-10	0	3	14	17	19	1	16	1	17	37	32
		Feb-10	0	2	10	12	11	2	17	0	17	30	31
		Mar-10	1	6	12	19	10	0	23	1	24	34	15
	QTR2	Apr-10	1	3	12	16	15	4	23	1	24	43	24
		May-10	0	5	21	26	13	7	22	1	23	43	24
		Jun-10	1	6	12	19	14	2	10	1	11	27	15
	QTR3	Jul-10	3	3	23	29	8	6		2	2	16	9
		Aug-10	2	1	19	22	9	1		3	3	13	23
		Sep-10	1	5	11	17	12				0	12	
	QTR4	Oct-10	3	0	0	3					0	0	
		Nov-10											
		Dec-10											

Table 47. Gang Related Crime Statistics Observed in Salinas, California from January 2006 to October 2010





## APPENDIX B. SALINAS POPULATION SURVEY SUPPORTING EMPIRICS

### A. REGRESSION ANALYSIS

As mentioned in Chapter V, we analyzed the survey data to designate a question to represent our dependent variable for our regression model. Q28, “It is important and effective to pass crime information to the Salinas police department”, was chosen to represent our dependent variable as it most represented the population’s willingness to share information with the city. Figure 33 illustrates the results of our regression model for volume of information. The source for all of the regression analysis is StataCorp. 2007, *Stata Statistical Software: Release 10*. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.

. reg q28 legit unity2 perresp embed security race culture culneed						
Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 83		
Model	63.7008961	8	7.96261201	F( 8, 74) = 8.67		
Residual	67.9858509	74	.918727715	Prob > F = 0.0000		
Total	131.686747	82	1.60593594	R-squared = 0.4837		
				Adj R-squared = 0.4279		
				Root MSE = .9585		
q28	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
legit	.022367	.1264719	0.18	0.860	-.2296337	.2743677
unity2	.3963825	.1314425	3.02	0.004	.1344775	.6582874
perresp	.4539542	.1342344	3.38	0.001	.1864864	.7214221
embed	.0363863	.0299851	1.21	0.229	-.0233603	.096133
security	.139657	.1078349	1.30	0.199	-.0752088	.3545228
race	.1206112	.2441054	0.49	0.623	-.3657794	.6070018
culture	.0784748	.1300472	0.60	0.548	-.1806499	.3375996
culneed	.1194218	.1030006	1.16	0.250	-.0858113	.3246549
_cons	-.3445702	.6145796	-0.56	0.577	-1.569147	.8800064

Figure 29. Regression Results

### B. REGRESSION TESTS

We used a variety of tests in order to determine the validity of our dependent variable regression. In order to test collinearity we analyzed the mean variance inflation factor (VIF), results are in Figure 34. To test for model specificity and omitted variables,

we used the Ramsey retest, see Figure 35. All tests confirmed the statistical validity of our model.

. vif		
Variable	VIF	1/VIF
unity2	1.83	0.547797
legit	1.70	0.589228
culneed	1.50	0.666385
culture	1.50	0.667182
perresp	1.46	0.685720
race	1.16	0.863499
embed	1.15	0.865932
security	1.13	0.885088
Mean VIF	1.43	

Figure 30. Variance Inflation Factor for Regression Model

Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of q28		
Ho:	model has no omitted variables	
	F(3, 71) =	3.94
	Prob > F =	0.0116

Figure 31. Ramsey Test for Regression Model

```
replace race = 0 if race>1
(36 real changes made)
```

```
. tab race
```

	Q37	Freq.	Percent
Cum.			
-----+-----			
-			
	0	81	26.21
26.21			
	1	228	73.79
100.00			
-----+-----			
-			
Total		309	100.00

Figure 32. Recoded racial responses for Q37

### C. FREQUENCY ANALYSIS

Table 59 and 60 show frequency of responses for questions 34 and 35.

<b>Q34: How many police officers are you acquainted with?</b>										
<u>Zip Code</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Hispanic</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Native American</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Total by Zip Code</u>	<u>%</u>
93901	77	24.8	68	21.9	0	0.0	3	1.0	148	47.7
93902	10	3.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	10	3.2
93903		0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
93905	16	5.2	92	29.7	0	0.0	0	0.0	108	34.8
93906	3	1.0	33	10.6	1	0.3	0	0.0	37	11.9
93907	2	0.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.3	3	1.0
93908	2	0.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	0.6	4	1.3
TOTAL	110	35.5	193	62.3	1	0.3	6	1.9	310	100.0

Table 48. Police Embeddedness by Race and Zip Code

<b>Q35: How many city officials are you acquainted with?</b>										
<u><b>Zip code</b></u>	<u><b>White</b></u>	<u><b>%</b></u>	<u><b>Hispanic</b></u>	<u><b>%</b></u>	<u><b>Native American</b></u>	<u><b>%</b></u>	<u><b>Other</b></u>	<u><b>%</b></u>	<u><b>Total by Zip Code</b></u>	<u><b>%</b></u>
93901	80	25.2	32	10.1	0	0.0	3	0.9	116	36.6
93902	10	3.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	10	3.2
93903		0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
93905	6	1.9	70	22.1	1	0.3	0	0.0	77	24.3
93906	9	2.8	23	7.3	2	0.6	1	0.3	35	11.0
93907	12	3.8	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	12	3.8
93908	2	0.6	0	0.0	1	0.3	0	0.0	3	0.9
<b>TOTAL</b>	119	37.5	193	60.9	4	1.3		0.0	317	100.0

Table 49. City Council Embeddedness by Race and Zip Code

Table 61 contains the frequency of responses by race, mean, and standard deviation for each question of the survey.

	Frequency of Responses %						
Question	1: Strongly Disagree	2: Disagree	3: Neutral	4: Agree	5: Strongly Agree	Mean	Std Dev
Q1: 1. The gang violence problem in Salinas is very serious.	3.6%	1.0%	3.0%	6.9%	85.5%	4.7	0.9
White	4.9%	---	2.4%	2.4%	90.2%	4.7	0.9
Hispanic	1.8%	1.3%	3.1%	7.5%	86.3%	4.7	1.0
African American	---	---	---	50.0%	50.0%	4.5	0.7
Asian	50.0%	---	---	---	50.0%	4.6	1.0
Native American	12.5%	---	---	12.5%	75.0%	4.4	1.4
Other	10.0%	---	---	10.0%	80.0%	4.5	1.3
No Race Provided	8.3%	---	8.3%	---	83.3%	4.5	1.2
Q2: Compared to last year, gang violence in Salinas has increased.	7.0%	5.9%	12.2%	16.6%	58.3%	4.1	1.2
White	11.1%	8.3%	11.1%	22.2%	47.2%	3.1	2.0
Hispanic	4.4%	5.3%	13.6%	17.0%	59.7%	4.3	1.1
African American	---	50.0%	---	---	50.0%	3.5	2.1
Asian	50.0%	25.0%	---	---	25.0%	4.0	1.3
Native American	16.7%	---	---	16.7%	66.7%	4.2	1.6
Other	14.3%	---	---	---	85.7%	4.4	1.5
No Race Provided	20.0%	---	10.0%	10.0%	60.0%	3.9	1.7
Q3: The Salinas Police care what happens to you.	18.4%	6.8%	30.0%	15.2%	29.6%	3.3	1.4
White	11.9%	2.4%	19.0%	31.0%	35.7%	3.5	1.6
Hispanic	19.7%	8.4%	29.8%	12.9%	29.2%	3.3	1.2
African American	---	---	50.0%	---	50.0%	4.0	N/A
Asian	---	25.0%	75.0%	---	---	3.6	1.3
Native American	14.3%	---	28.6%	14.3%	42.9%	3.7	1.5
Other	28.6%	---	57.1%	---	14.3%	2.7	1.4
No Race Provided	30.0%	---	40.0%	10.0%	20.0%	2.9	1.5

	Frequency of Responses %						
Question	1: Strongly Disagree	2: Disagree	3: Neutral	4: Agree	5: Strongly Agree	Mean	Std Dev
Q4: Your Salinas City Council Representative cares what happens to you.	16.9%	12.0%	28.0%	12.0%	31.1%	3.3	1.4
White	9.1%	15.2%	18.2%	27.3%	30.3%	3.5	1.3
Hispanic	17.7%	12.2%	28.7%	9.8%	31.7%	3.2	1.3
African American	100.0%	---	---	---	---	1.0	NA
Asian	---	25.0%	25.0%	---	50.0%	3.6	1.3
Native American	14.3%	---	42.9%	---	42.9%	3.6	1.5
Other	25.0%	12.5%	25.0%	12.5%	25.0%	3.0	1.6
No Race Provided	25.0%	---	50.0%	12.5%	12.5%	2.9	1.4
Q5: If I had some complaint about a police officer and took that complaint to a member of the police department, I can expect him or her to pay a lot of attention to what I say.	21.3%	15.6%	26.2%	12.7%	24.2%	3.0	1.5
White	17.1%	14.3%	28.6%	14.3%	25.7%	2.5	1.8
Hispanic	21.0%	16.6%	26.0%	12.7%	23.8%	3.1	1.1
African American	50.0%	---	50.0%	---	---	2.0	1.4
Asian	100.0%	---	---	---	---	3.2	1.5
Native American	---	---	40.0%	---	60.0%	4.2	1.1
Other	28.6%	---	28.6%	28.6%	14.3%	3.0	1.5
No Race Provided	25.0%	25.0%	16.7%	8.3%	25.0%	2.8	1.6
Q6: If I had some complaint about a local government activity and took that complaint to a member of the Salinas City Council, I can expect him or her to pay a lot of attention to what I say.	17.1%	16.7%	28.2%	12.2%	25.7%	3.1	1.4
White	13.5%	21.6%	32.4%	8.1%	24.3%	2.6	1.7
Hispanic	16.9%	16.9%	26.4%	14.0%	25.8%	3.5	1.1
African American	---	---	100.0%	---	---	3.0	0.0
Asian	100.0%	---	---	---	---	3.4	1.4
Native American	---	---	28.6%	---	71.4%	4.4	1.0
Other	25.0%	12.5%	25.0%	12.5%	25.0%	3.0	1.6
No Race Provided	27.3%	18.2%	36.4%	9.1%	9.1%	2.5	1.3

	Frequency of Responses %						
Question	1: Strongly Disagree	2: Disagree	3: Neutral	4: Agree	5: Strongly Agree	Mean	Std Dev
Q7: I am confident in Salinas's courts and legal system.	13.9%	10.5%	30.0%	19.9%	25.8%	3.3	1.3
White	12.5%	10.0%	32.5%	25.0%	20.0%	2.9	1.6
Hispanic	13.1%	11.1%	28.3%	19.2%	28.3%	3.5	0.9
African American	---	50.0%	---	50.0%	---	3.0	1.4
Asian	33.3%	---	66.7%	---	---	3.6	1.3
Native American	---	---	40.0%	20.0%	40.0%	4.0	1.0
Other	33.3%	11.1%	22.2%	11.1%	22.2%	2.8	1.6
No Race Provided	20.0%	---	50.0%	20.0%	10.0%	3.0	1.2
Q8: I am satisfied with the quality of education in Salinas.	20.6%	15.7%	26.9%	14.7%	22.0%	3.0	1.4
White	23.8%	28.6%	26.2%	9.5%	11.9%	2.4	1.4
Hispanic	19.8%	12.3%	28.8%	16.0%	23.1%	3.0	1.3
African American	---	50.0%	---	50.0%	---	3.0	1.4
Asian	33.3%	---	66.7%	---	---	3.0	1.4
Native American	---	16.7%	16.7%	16.7%	50.0%	4.0	1.3
Other	40.0%	20.0%	10.0%	10.0%	20.0%	2.5	1.6
No Race Provided	18.2%	27.3%	9.1%	9.1%	36.4%	3.2	1.7
Q9: I am confident that Salinas's city government can provide services that meet my needs. (Education system, police, city council, mayor).	13.3%	16.7%	26.2%	19.0%	24.7%	3.3	1.3
White	11.6%	23.3%	32.6%	25.6%	7.0%	2.9	1.2
Hispanic	13.2%	15.3%	23.3%	19.0%	29.1%	3.2	1.1
African American	---	50.0%	50.0%	---	---	2.5	0.7
Asian	33.3%	---	33.3%	---	33.3%	3.4	1.2
Native American	---	---	66.7%	---	33.3%	3.7	1.0
Other	22.2%	11.1%	22.2%	22.2%	22.2%	3.1	1.5
No Race Provided	18.2%	27.3%	27.3%	9.1%	18.2%	2.8	1.4



	Frequency of Responses %						
Question	1: Strongly Disagree	2: Disagree	3: Neutral	4: Agree	5: Strongly Agree	Mean	Std Dev
Q10: I receive most of my information about gang activity through official city communication channels (Press releases, billboards, community meetings).	21.6%	11.1%	19.9%	15.7%	31.7%	3.2	1.5
White	25.0%	20.5%	15.9%	25.0%	13.6%	2.8	1.5
Hispanic	21.3%	9.5%	17.1%	15.2%	37.0%	3.0	1.3
African American	---	50.0%	50.0%	---	---	2.5	0.7
Asian	50.0%	---	50.0%	---	---	3.3	1.5
Native American	16.7%	16.7%	16.7%	16.7%	33.3%	3.3	1.6
Other	12.5%	12.5%	37.5%		37.5%	3.4	1.5
No Race Provided	16.7%	---	58.3%	8.3%	16.7%	3.1	1.2
Q11: I receive most of my information about gang activity through word of mouth or rumors.	13.9%	8.5%	21.0%	14.2%	42.4%	3.6	1.4
White	26.7%	20.0%	26.7%	11.1%	15.6%	2.7	1.4
Hispanic	12.4%	6.0%	17.4%	15.1%	49.1%	2.9	1.3
African American	---	---	50.0%	50.0%	---	3.5	0.7
Asian	33.3%	---	33.3%	---	33.3%	3.3	1.5
Native American	---	16.7%	---	33.3%	50.0%	4.2	1.2
Other	11.1%	---	55.6%	---	33.3%	3.4	1.3
No Race Provided	---	16.7%	41.7%	---	41.7%	3.7	1.2
Q12: I receive most of my information about gang activity through media outlets (TV, newspaper, radio).	6.4%	7.8%	15.5%	21.6%	48.6%	4.0	1.2
White	4.4%	8.9%	13.3%	26.7%	46.7%	4.0	1.2
Hispanic	6.9%	8.3%	15.1%	20.2%	49.5%	4.3	0.9
African American	---	---	50.0%	---	50.0%	4.0	1.4
Asian	---	---	---	25.0%	75.0%	3.5	1.5
Native American	---	---	33.3%	---	66.7%	4.3	1.0
Other	22.2%	---	33.3%	11.1%	33.3%	3.3	1.6
No Race Provided	---	8.3%	8.3%	50.0%	33.3%	4.1	0.9

	Frequency of Responses %						
Question	1: Strongly Disagree	2: Disagree	3: Neutral	4: Agree	5: Strongly Agree	Mean	Std Dev
Q13: The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk alone at night.	8.7%	4.5%	8.3%	10.1%	68.4%	4.3	1.3
White	12.2%	2.4%	12.2%	14.6%	58.5%	3.8	1.7
Hispanic	7.9%	4.6%	6.9%	9.3%	71.3%	4.5	1.0
African American	---	---	---	50.0%	50.0%	4.5	0.7
Asian	25.0%	---	---	---	75.0%	4.3	1.3
Native American	---	---	14.3%	14.3%	71.4%	4.6	0.8
Other	---	25.0%	25.0%	12.5%	37.5%	3.6	1.3
No Race Provided	20.0%	---	10.0%	---	70.0%	4.0	1.7
Q14: I feel safe and secure in my home.	15.4%	8.8%	17.5%	19.6%	38.6%	3.6	1.5
White	4.5%	11.4%	22.7%	25.0%	36.4%	3.8	1.2
Hispanic	20.2%	8.2%	15.9%	19.2%	36.5%	3.8	1.1
African American	---	---	---	50.0%	50.0%	4.5	0.7
Asian	---	25.0%	25.0%	25.0%	25.0%	3.6	1.3
Native American	---	---	28.6%	---	71.4%	4.4	1.0
Other	---	---	10.0%	20.0%	70.0%	4.6	0.7
No Race Provided	---	20.0%	30.0%	10.0%	40.0%	3.7	1.3
Q15: I, or a member of my family have been threatened by a gang member in Salinas.	55.3%	7.0%	10.5%	7.0%	20.2%	2.3	1.6
White	61.9%	7.1%	9.5%	4.8%	16.7%	2.0	1.6
Hispanic	53.8%	7.0%	9.7%	8.1%	21.5%	3.1	1.8
African American	50.0%	50.0%	---	---	---	1.5	0.7
Asian	100.0%	---	---	---	---	2.1	1.5
Native American	66.7%	16.7%	16.7%	---	---	1.5	0.8
Other	37.5%	---	12.5%	---	50.0%	3.3	2.0
No Race Provided	50.0%	---	30.0%	10.0%	10.0%	2.3	1.5
Q16: As compared to a year ago, the Salinas police department has made the city a more secure and safe place to live.	35.4%	15.0%	27.2%	8.7%	13.8%	2.5	1.4
White	20.6%	17.6%	23.5%	23.5%	14.7%	2.3	1.7
Hispanic	39.2%	14.4%	27.8%	6.2%	12.4%	3.1	1.4
African American	50.0%	---	---	50.0%	---	2.5	2.1
Asian	---	---	75.0%	---	25.0%	2.5	1.4
Native American	---	60.0%	---	---	40.0%	3.2	1.6
Other	28.6%	---	28.6%	14.3%	28.6%	3.1	1.7
No Race Provided	50.0%	12.5%	25.0%	---	12.5%	2.1	1.5

	Frequency of Responses %						
Question	1: Strongly Disagree	2: Disagree	3: Neutral	4: Agree	5: Strongly Agree	Mean	Std Dev
Q17: Speaking English, as a common language, will unite all of Salinas's citizens.	58.3%	8.3%	12.2%	7.5%	13.8%	2.1	1.5
White	42.5%	5.0%	20.0%	17.5%	15.0%	2.5	1.6
Hispanic	64.5%	8.6%	8.6%	6.5%	11.8%	2.0	1.4
African American	---	50.0%	---	---	50.0%	3.5	2.1
Asian	33.3%	---	33.3%	---	33.3%	2.3	1.6
Native American	50.0%	---	50.0%	---	---	2.0	1.1
Other	37.5%	25.0%	---	---	37.5%	2.8	1.9
No Race Provided	44.4%	---	33.3%	---	22.2%	2.6	1.7
Q18: Salinas's citizens are best represented by leaders from their own racial or ethnic background.	30.4%	7.9%	29.6%	9.2%	22.9%	2.9	1.5
White	37.5%	2.5%	37.5%	5.0%	17.5%	2.4	1.6
Hispanic	27.2%	8.7%	28.9%	9.8%	25.4%	2.7	1.3
African American	50.0%	50.0%	---	---	---	1.5	0.7
Asian	50.0%	---	50.0%	---	---	2.8	1.5
Native American	40.0%	---	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	2.8	1.8
Other	22.2%	11.1%	33.3%	11.1%	22.2%	3.0	1.5
No Race Provided	55.6%	11.1%	11.1%	11.1%	11.1%	2.1	1.5
Q19: People should help others who are less fortunate.	3.8%	2.8%	9.1%	11.2%	73.1%	4.5	1.0
White	4.7%	2.3%	4.7%	11.6%	76.7%	4.5	1.0
Hispanic	2.8%	3.3%	10.4%	10.4%	73.1%	4.6	0.7
African American	---	---	---	50.0%	50.0%	4.5	0.7
Asian	25.0%	---	---	---	75.0%	4.5	1.0
Native American	---	---	16.7%	---	83.3%	4.7	0.8
Other	22.2%	---	---	11.1%	66.7%	4.0	1.7
No Race Provided	---	---	10.0%	30.0%	60.0%	4.5	0.7
Q20: Hispanic Americans face discrimination in getting a decent job.	19.6%	6.3%	23.1%	16.1%	34.9%	3.4	1.5
White	36.8%	2.6%	23.7%	21.1%	15.8%	2.5	1.7
Hispanic	15.5%	7.2%	23.2%	13.4%	40.7%	3.5	1.3
African American	50.0%	---	---	50.0%	---	2.5	2.1
Asian	50.0%	---	50.0%	---	---	3.4	1.5
Native American	---	---	33.3%	66.7%	---	3.7	0.6
Other	37.5%	12.5%	12.5%	25.0%	12.5%	2.6	1.6
No Race Provided	12.5%	---	25.0%	25.0%	37.5%	3.8	1.4

	Frequency of Responses %						
Question	1: Strongly Disagree	2: Disagree	3: Neutral	4: Agree	5: Strongly Agree	Mean	Std Dev
Q21: My cultural heritage is very important to my sense of who I am.	6.7%	3.2%	15.8%	14.8%	59.5%	4.1	1.2
White	4.7%	4.7%	27.9%	14.0%	48.8%	3.9	1.3
Hispanic	5.7%	3.3%	15.2%	14.7%	61.1%	4.2	1.1
African American	---	---	---	50.0%	50.0%	4.5	0.7
Asian	25.0%	---	---	---	75.0%	4.2	1.3
Native American	16.7%	---	16.7%	16.7%	50.0%	3.8	1.6
Other	22.2%	---	---	11.1%	66.7%	4.0	1.7
No Race Provided	11.1%	---	---	22.2%	66.7%	4.3	1.3
Q22: The needs of my ethnic group are met in the City of Salinas by institutions such as: (police, elected officials, educational system).	22.7%	9.5%	34.1%	13.3%	20.4%	2.9	1.4
White	23.7%	7.9%	36.8%	26.3%	5.3%	2.5	1.5
Hispanic	21.5%	10.7%	32.2%	10.7%	24.8%	3.2	1.2
African American	---	50.0%	50.0%	---	---	2.5	0.7
Asian	50.0%	---	50.0%	---	---	3.0	1.3
Native American	---	---	40.0%	20.0%	40.0%	4.0	1.0
Other	37.5%	37.5%	12.5%	12.5%	---	2.6	1.5
No Race Provided	42.9%	---	42.9%	---	14.3%	2.4	1.5
Q23: In Salinas, elections are a good way of making government pay attention to what the people think.	17.4%	8.1%	21.7%	17.1%	35.7%	3.5	1.5
White	15.0%	12.5%	12.5%	25.0%	35.0%	3.2	1.7
Hispanic	17.0%	6.9%	23.4%	16.5%	36.2%	3.8	1.0
African American	---	50.0%	---	---	50.0%	3.5	2.1
Asian	33.3%	---	---	33.3%	33.3%	3.5	1.5
Native American	16.7%	33.3%	50.0%	---	---	3.7	1.6
Other	50.0%	---	20.0%	---	30.0%	2.6	1.8
No Race Provided	---	22.2%	22.2%	22.2%	33.3%	3.7	1.2
Q24: It is important for people to vote on local community issues. (Salinas elections, school boards elections)	3.8%	1.0%	7.6%	10.7%	76.8%	4.6	1.0
White	9.3%	---	7.0%	---	83.7%	4.4	1.4
Hispanic	1.9%	1.4%	7.5%	12.1%	77.1%	4.7	0.6
African American	---	---	---	50.0%	50.0%	4.5	0.7
Asian	25.0%	---	---	---	75.0%	4.5	1.0
Native American	---	---	16.7%	---	83.3%	4.7	0.8
Other	22.2%	---	---	11.1%	66.7%	4.0	1.7
No Race Provided	---	---	18.2%	27.3%	54.5%	4.4	0.8

	Frequency of Responses %						
Question	1: Strongly Disagree	2: Disagree	3: Neutral	4: Agree	5: Strongly Agree	Mean	Std Dev
Q25: People should form or participate in community organizations to solve community problems in Salinas.	5.0%	1.8%	10.8%	14.0%	68.5%	4.4	1.1
White	7.0%	2.3%	7.0%	20.9%	62.8%	4.2	1.3
Hispanic	3.4%	2.0%	10.7%	11.7%	72.2%	4.8	0.6
African American	---	---	---	50.0%	50.0%	4.5	0.7
Asian	33.3%	---	---	---	66.7%	4.3	1.2
Native American	---	---	33.3%	---	66.7%	4.3	1.0
Other	22.2%	---	11.1%	22.2%	44.4%	3.7	1.7
No Race Provided	9.1%	---	18.2%	27.3%	45.5%	4.0	1.3
Q26: The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting gang violence.	18.3%	10.4%	25.0%	17.5%	28.8%	3.3	1.4
White	21.2%	12.1%	15.2%	24.2%	27.3%	2.4	1.9
Hispanic	16.8%	8.9%	27.4%	17.3%	29.6%	3.3	1.4
African American	---	50.0%	---	---	50.0%	3.5	2.1
Asian	33.3%	---	33.3%	33.3%	---	3.5	1.3
Native American	---	16.7%	33.3%	---	50.0%	3.8	1.3
Other	25.0%	37.5%	12.5%	---	25.0%	2.6	1.6
No Race Provided	44.4%	---	22.2%	22.2%	11.1%	2.6	1.6
Q27: The police work with local community leaders to fight gang violence.	14.2%	11.6%	22.2%	19.6%	32.4%	3.4	1.4
White	9.4%	6.3%	21.9%	31.3%	31.3%	2.7	2.0
Hispanic	15.4%	12.4%	21.3%	18.3%	32.5%	3.4	1.2
African American	---	50.0%	---	---	50.0%	3.5	2.1
Asian	33.3%	---	---	33.3%	33.3%	3.6	1.3
Native American	---	---	40.0%	---	60.0%	4.2	1.1
Other	16.7%	16.7%	50.0%	---	16.7%	2.8	1.3
No Race Provided	12.5%	12.5%	25.0%	25.0%	25.0%	3.4	1.4

	Frequency of Responses %						
Question	1: Strongly Disagree	2: Disagree	3: Neutral	4: Agree	5: Strongly Agree	Mean	Std Dev
Q28: It is important and effective to pass crime information to the Salinas police department.	8.2%	3.9%	5.0%	11.4%	71.5%	4.3	1.2
White	11.4%	2.3%	9.1%	13.6%	63.6%	4.1	1.5
Hispanic	6.3%	4.3%	4.3%	11.1%	74.0%	4.9	0.3
African American	50.0%	---	---	---	50.0%	3.0	2.8
Asian	33.3%	---	---	33.3%	33.3%	4.5	1.1
Native American	---	---	---	---	100.0%	5.0	0.0
Other	42.9%	---	---	---	57.7%	3.3	2.1
No Race Provided	---	10.0%	10.0%	20.0%	60.0%	4.3	1.1
Q29: The gang violence problem is something that requires the combined efforts of the population of Salinas and the city government (police, city council, mayor, educational system) to resolve.	5.0%	1.4%	6.4%	11.8%	75.4%	4.5	1.0
White	9.3%	---	---	14.0%	76.7%	4.3	1.5
Hispanic	2.9%	1.4%	7.7%	11.5%	76.4%	4.5	0.9
African American	---	50.0%	---	---	50.0%	3.5	2.1
Asian	33.3%	---	---	---	66.7%	4.5	1.1
Native American	---	---	16.7%	---	83.3%	4.7	0.8
Other	22.2%	---	11.1%	---	66.7%	3.9	1.8
No Race Provided	11.1%	---	---	33.3%	55.6%	4.2	1.3
Q30: The City of Salinas has been effective in soliciting local citizens' help in fighting the gang violence problem.	17.1%	12.7%	22.9%	14.7%	32.7%	3.3	1.5
White	11.1%	30.6%	27.8%	16.7%	13.9%	2.3	1.6
Hispanic	17.5%	8.7%	19.1%	15.8%	38.8%	2.8	1.4
African American	---	---	50.0%	---	50.0%	4.0	1.4
Asian	33.3%	33.3%	---	33.3%	---	3.5	1.4
Native American	16.7%	---	66.7%	---	16.7%	3.0	1.3
Other	33.3%	33.3%	33.3%	---	---	2.0	0.9
No Race Provided	22.2%	11.1%	44.4%	---	22.2%	2.9	1.5

	Frequency of Responses %						
Question	1: Strongly Disagree	2: Disagree	3: Neutral	4: Agree	5: Strongly Agree	Mean	Std Dev
Q31: City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang violence.	19.0%	14.7%	27.7%	15.8%	22.8%	3.1	1.4
White	14.3%	25.0%	28.6%	14.3%	17.9%	1.9	1.8
Hispanic	18.2%	11.7%	28.5%	18.2%	23.4%	2.9	1.1
African American	---	50.0%	---	---	50.0%	3.5	2.1
Asian	50.0%	---	50.0%	---	---	3.2	1.5
Native American	---	---	50.0%	---	50.0%	4.0	1.2
Other	80.0%	20.0%	---	---	---	1.2	0.4
No Race Provided	16.7%	33.3%	16.7%	---	33.3%	3.0	1.7
Q33: Would you support a local tax increase to fund your suggestions?	26.7%	2.6%	18.5%	15.5%	36.6%	3.3	1.6
White	17.1%	2.4%	17.1%	12.2%	51.2%	3.5	1.8
Hispanic	27.7%	2.9%	20.2%	16.8%	32.4%	3.2	1.6
African American	---	---	---	---	100.0%	5.0	0.0
Asian	---	---	---	---	100.0%	3.7	1.5
Native American	---	---	---	50.0%	50.0%	4.5	0.7
Other	57.1%	---	---	14.3%	28.6%	2.6	2.0
No Race Provided	42.9%	---	14.3%	---	42.9%	3.0	2.0

Table 50. Frequency of Responses by Question

## D. SURVEY

Below is a copy of the CASP survey.

**Your Zip code** \_\_\_\_\_

*We are conducting a survey among Salinas residents regarding issues in your community, especially gang violence and law enforcement, and we would like to include your views in our study. This survey will be used for research purposes, and we assure you we are only seeking opinions and there will be no attempt to sell you anything or solicit a donation. It should take about 10 minutes to complete this survey. Thank you for making a valuable contribution to your neighbors and friends in the City of Salinas. This information will help make Salinas a safer place to live.*

Rate the following on a scale from 1 to 5 (1—completely disagree, 3—neutral, 5—completely agree. Or, Don't Know.) Please circle the appropriate answer.

1. The gang violence problem in Salinas is very serious.  
**1    2    3    4    5    Don't Know**
2. Compared to last year, gang violence in Salinas has increased.  
**1    2    3    4    5    Don't Know**
3. The Salinas Police care what happens to you.  
**1    2    3    4    5    Don't Know**
4. Your Salinas City Council Representative cares what happens to you.  
**1    2    3    4    5    Don't Know**
5. If I had some complaint about a police officer and took that complaint to a member of the police department, I can expect him or her to pay a lot of attention to what I say.  
**1    2    3    4    5    Don't Know**
6. If I had some complaint about a local government activity and took that complaint to a member of the Salinas City Council, I can expect him or her to pay a lot of attention to what I say.  
**1    2    3    4    5    Don't Know**
7. I am confident in Salinas's courts and legal system.  
**1    2    3    4    5    Don't Know**
8. I am satisfied with the quality of education in Salinas.  
**1    2    3    4    5    Don't Know**
9. I am confident that Salinas's city government can provide services that meet my needs. (Education system, police, city council, mayor).  
**1    2    3    4    5    Don't Know**
10. I receive most of my information about gang activity through official city communication channels (Press releases, billboards, community meetings).  
**1    2    3    4    5    Don't Know**
11. I receive most of my information about gang activity through word of mouth or rumors.  
**1    2    3    4    5    Don't Know**
12. I receive most of my information about gang activity through media outlets (TV, newspaper, radio).  
**1    2    3    4    5    Don't Know**
13. The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk alone at night.  
**1    2    3    4    5    Don't Know**
14. I feel safe and secure in my home.  
**1    2    3    4    5    Don't Know**
15. I, or a member of my family have been threatened by a gang member in Salinas.  
**1    2    3    4    5    Don't Know**
16. As compared to a year ago, the Salinas police department has made the city a more secure and safe place to live.  
**1    2    3    4    5    Don't Know**
17. Speaking English, as a common language, will unite all of Salinas's citizens.  
Implies Spanish or other language is bad and divisive



- 1    2    3    4    5    **Don't Know**
18. Salinas's citizens are best represented by leaders from their own racial or ethnic background.
- 1    2    3    4    5    **Don't Know**
19. People should help others who are less fortunate.
- 1    2    3    4    5    **Don't Know**
20. Hispanic Americans face discrimination in getting a decent job.
- 1    2    3    4    5    **Don't Know**
21. My cultural heritage is very important to my sense of who I am.
- 1    2    3    4    5    **Don't Know**
22. The needs of my ethnic group are met in the City of Salinas by institutions such as: (police, elected officials, educational system).
- 1    2    3    4    5    **Don't Know**
- a. If answer is a 4 or 5 in Question 22, who do you think is responsible?
- i. Police
  - ii. City Council
  - iii. Schools
  - iv. Mayor
  - v. Other \_\_\_\_\_ (Please specify)
23. In Salinas, elections are a good way of making government pay attention to what the people think.
- 1    2    3    4    5    **Don't Know**
24. It is important for people to vote on local community issues. (Salinas elections, school boards elections)
- 1    2    3    4    5    **Don't Know**
25. People should form or participate in community organizations to solve community problems in Salinas.
- 1    2    3    4    5    **Don't Know**
26. The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting gang violence.
- 1    2    3    4    5    **Don't Know**
27. The police work with local community leaders to fight gang violence.
- 1    2    3    4    5    **Don't Know**
28. It is important and effective to pass crime information to the Salinas police department.
- 1    2    3    4    5    **Don't Know**
29. The gang violence problem is something that requires the combined efforts of the population of Salinas and the city government (police, city council, mayor, educational system) to resolve.
- 1    2    3    4    5    **Don't Know**
30. The City of Salinas has been effective in soliciting local citizens' help in fighting the gang violence problem.
- 1    2    3    4    5    **Don't Know**

31. City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang violence.

1      2      3      4      5      **Don't Know**

**The following questions address different ways that the city may increase their ability to serve you as a citizen. Please choose an answer provided, or include your own recommendations.**

32. What changes, if any, do you feel should be supported to help fight gang activity in Salinas? You may choose all that apply.

- a. Increasing police officers
- b. Increase in community programs and Services (Parks, after school programs, libraries, athletics, etc.)
- c. Increase in school budgets
- d. Employment programs
- e. None
- f. Other \_\_\_\_\_ (Please Specify)

33. Would you support a local tax increase to fund your suggestions?

1      2      3      4      5      **Don't Know**

**The following questions deal with people that you are acquainted with, meaning that you know their name and would stop and talk at least for a moment if you ran into the person on the street or in a shopping mall.**

34. How many police officers are you acquainted with? \_\_\_\_\_

35. How many city officials are you acquainted with? \_\_\_\_\_

36. Do you rent or own your home?

- a. Rent
- b. Own

37. Finally, with what ethnic group do you most identify yourself with? Would you say that you are:

- a. White
- b. Hispanic
- c. African American
- d. African American
- e. Asian
- f. Native American
- g. Other

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## APPENDIX C. SALINAS POLICE DEPARTMENT ATTITUDES SURVEY

### A. REGRESSION ANALYSIS

As discussed in Chapter VI, we analyzed the survey data to resolve the best questions to represent the dependent variable for our regression model. Q30, "I have freedom to act on gang related intelligence in a timely manner," and Q33, "City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang violence," were ultimately chosen to represent the dependent variable for our model of information processing. Regression analysis was completed with *Stata Statistical Software: Release 10*, and is presented in Figure 37.

Q34	Freq.	Percent	Cum.			
0	53	60.23	60.23			
1	35	39.77	100.00			
Total	88	100.00				
Source	SS	df	MS			
Model	14.9094027	7	2.12991468			
Residual	15.1950749	59	257543642			
Total	30.1044776	66	456128449			
				Number of obs = 67		
				F( 7, 59) = 8.27		
				Prob > F = 0.0000		
				R-squared = 0.4953		
				Adj R-squared = 0.4354		
				Root MSE = .50749		
infopro	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
legitpol	-.1970832	.0890185	-2.21	0.031	-.3752088	-.0189577
legitcity	.0355998	.0798414	0.45	0.657	-.1241625	.195362
security	-.0235114	.060514	-0.39	0.699	-.1445996	.0975768
perresp	-.269311	.0840546	-3.20	0.002	-.4375039	-.1011182
community	.8519703	.1337192	6.37	0.000	.5843987	1.119542
unity	-.0486216	.0875912	-0.56	0.581	-.2238912	.1266481
q34	-.093801	.1324822	-0.71	0.482	-.3588973	.1712952
cons	.8387057	.6699404	1.25	0.216	-.5018421	2.179253

Figure 33. Regression Results

## B. REGRESSION TESTS

We utilized mean variance inflation factor (VIF) and Ramsey retest to verify the validity of our model. We tested for collinearity using VIF, and for model specificity and omitted variables using the Ramsey retest. The results are presented in Figure 38.

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
-----+-----		
unity	1.45	0.688633
community	1.42	0.704397
legitcity	1.23	0.815449
legitpol	1.17	0.852431
q34	1.12	0.892132
security	1.08	0.923940
perresp	1.06	0.940801
-----+-----		
Mean VIF	1.22	
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of infopro		
Ho: model has no omitted variables		
F(3, 56) = 6.72		
Prob > F = 0.0006		

Figure 34. Regression Tests

## C. SALINAS POLICE DEPARTMENT ATTITUDES SURVEY RESULTS

The complete frequency of response data set for the Salinas Police Department attitudes survey is presented in Table 62.

Salinas Police Department Attitudes Survey									
Question	# of Respondents	Response Rate (%)	Frequency of Response (%)					Mean	Standard Deviation
			1. Completely Disagree	2.	3.	4.	5. Completely Agree		
1. Compared to last year, gang violence in Salinas has increased.	85	96.6%	9.4%	31.8%	43.5%	12.9%	2.4%	2.7	0.9
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	33	38.8%	2.4%	15.3%	16.5%	3.5%	1.2%	2.6	0.9
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	52	61.2%	7.1%	16.5%	27.1%	9.4%	1.2%	2.7	0.9
2. The gang violence problem in Salinas is very serious.	88	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.4%	96.6%	5.0	0.2
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	39.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	39.8%	5.0	0.0
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	53	60.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.4%	56.8%	4.9	0.2

Salinas Police Department Attitudes Survey									
Question	# of Respondents	Response Rate (%)	Frequency of Response (%)					Mean	Standard Deviation
			1. Completely Disagree	2.	3.	4.	5. Completely Agree		
25. The gang violence problem will resolve itself with time regardless of how the City responds to the situation.	83	94.3%	84.3%	10.8%	3.6%	0.0%	1.2%	1.2	0.6
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	34	41.0%	33.7%	6.0%	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2	0.5
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	49	59.0%	50.6%	4.8%	2.4%	0.0%	1.2%	1.2	0.7
3. The Salinas Police care about Salinas citizens.	88	100.0%	1.1%	3.4%	21.6%	33.0%	40.9%	4.1	0.9
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	39.8%	0.0%	1.1%	8.0%	14.8%	15.9%	4.1	0.8
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	53	60.2%	1.1%	2.3%	13.6%	18.2%	25.0%	4.1	1.0
4. The Salinas City Council cares about Salinas citizens.	88	100.0%	5.7%	22.7%	39.8%	23.9%	8.0%	3.1	1.0
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	39.8%	0.0%	13.6%	12.5%	11.4%	2.3%	3.1	0.9
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	53	60.2%	5.7%	9.1%	27.3%	12.5%	5.7%	3.1	1.1
5. The Salinas Police are very responsive to citizen complaints.	88	100.0%	0.0%	5.7%	18.2%	43.2%	33.0%	4.0	0.9
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	39.8%	0.0%	2.3%	5.7%	18.2%	13.6%	4.1	0.9
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	53	60.2%	0.0%	3.4%	12.5%	25.0%	19.3%	4.0	0.9
6. The Salinas City Council are very responsive to citizen complaints.	74	84.1%	5.4%	20.3%	37.8%	24.3%	12.2%	3.2	1.1
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	30	40.5%	0.0%	10.8%	17.6%	10.8%	1.4%	3.1	0.8
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	44	59.5%	5.4%	9.5%	20.3%	13.5%	10.8%	3.3	1.2
7. I am confident in Salinas's courts and legal system.	88	100.0%	9.1%	34.1%	33.0%	20.5%	3.4%	2.8	1.0
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	39.8%	2.3%	14.8%	14.8%	4.5%	3.4%	2.8	1.0
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	53	60.2%	6.8%	19.3%	18.2%	15.9%	0.0%	2.7	1.0
8. I am satisfied with the quality of education in Salinas	88	100.0%	44.3%	36.4%	17.0%	2.3%	0.0%	1.8	0.8
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	39.8%	14.8%	19.3%	5.7%	0.0%	0.0%	1.8	0.7
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	53	60.2%	29.5%	17.0%	11.4%	2.3%	0.0%	1.8	0.9
9. I receive most of my information about gang activity through official city communication channels (Press releases, billboards, community meetings)	88	100.0%	46.6%	27.3%	10.2%	10.2%	5.7%	2.0	1.2
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	39.8%	21.6%	6.8%	3.4%	4.5%	3.4%	2.0	1.4
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	53	60.2%	25.0%	20.5%	6.8%	5.7%	2.3%	2.0	1.1

Salinas Police Department Attitudes Survey									
Question	# of Respondents	Response Rate (%)	Frequency of Response (%)					Mean	Standard Deviation
			1. Completely Disagree	2.	3.	4.	5. Completely Agree		
10. I receive most of my information about gang activity through word of mouth or rumors.	88	100.0%	15.9%	22.7%	30.7%	20.5%	10.2%	2.9	1.2
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	39.8%	9.1%	9.1%	11.4%	8.0%	2.3%	2.6	1.2
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	53	60.2%	6.8%	13.6%	19.3%	12.5%	8.0%	3.0	1.2
11. I receive most of my information about gang activity through media outlets (TV, newspaper, radio).	88	100.0%	42.0%	31.8%	17.0%	8.0%	1.1%	1.9	1.0
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	39.8%	18.2%	13.6%	6.8%	1.1%	0.0%	1.8	0.8
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	53	60.2%	23.9%	18.2%	10.2%	6.8%	1.1%	2.1	1.1
12. The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk alone at night.	88	100.0%	1.1%	4.5%	11.4%	26.1%	56.8%	4.3	0.9
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	39.8%	0.0%	3.4%	9.1%	8.0%	19.3%	4.1	1.0
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	53	60.2%	1.1%	1.1%	2.3%	18.2%	37.5%	4.5	0.8
13. I feel safe and secure in my home.	84	95.5%	3.6%	9.5%	16.7%	29.8%	40.5%	3.9	1.1
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	41.7%	1.2%	6.0%	8.3%	16.7%	9.5%	3.7	1.1
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	49	58.3%	2.4%	3.6%	8.3%	13.1%	31.0%	4.1	1.1
14. I or a member of my family have been threatened by a gang member in Salinas.	86	97.7%	46.5%	2.3%	7.0%	12.8%	31.4%	2.8	1.8
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	33	38.4%	16.3%	1.2%	2.3%	5.8%	12.8%	2.9	1.8
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	53	61.6%	30.2%	1.2%	4.7%	7.0%	18.6%	2.7	1.8
15. As compared to a year ago, the Salinas police department has made the city a more secure and safe place to live.	86	97.7%	17.4%	20.9%	36.0%	20.9%	4.7%	2.7	1.1
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	40.7%	3.5%	10.5%	14.0%	9.3%	3.5%	3.0	1.1
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	51	59.3%	14.0%	10.5%	22.1%	11.6%	1.2%	2.6	1.1
16. Speaking English, as a common language, will unite all of Salinas's citizens.	85	96.6%	17.6%	12.9%	18.8%	15.3%	35.3%	3.4	1.5
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	41.2%	8.2%	5.9%	11.8%	7.1%	8.2%	3.0	1.4
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	50	58.8%	9.4%	7.1%	7.1%	8.2%	27.1%	3.6	1.6

Salinas Police Department Attitudes Survey									
Question	# of Respondents	Response Rate (%)	Frequency of Response (%)					Mean	Standard Deviation
			1. Completely Disagree	2.	3.	4.	5. Completely Agree		
17. Salinas's citizens are best represented by leaders from their own racial or ethnic background.	83	94.3%	42.0%	31.8%	17.0%	8.0%	1.1%	2.4	1.3
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	39.8%	18.2%	13.6%	6.8%	1.1%	0.0%	2.0	1.2
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	48	60.2%	23.9%	18.2%	10.2%	6.8%	1.1%	2.6	1.3
18. People should help others who are less fortunate.	86	97.7%	5.8%	5.8%	30.2%	26.7%	31.4%	3.7	1.1
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	40.7%	2.3%	3.5%	12.8%	11.6%	10.5%	3.6	1.1
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	51	59.3%	3.5%	2.3%	17.4%	15.1%	20.9%	3.8	1.1
19. Hispanic Americans face discrimination in getting a decent job.	84	95.5%	48.8%	28.6%	13.1%	3.6%	6.0%	1.9	1.1
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	34	40.5%	20.2%	13.1%	4.8%	2.4%	0.0%	1.7	0.9
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	50	59.5%	28.6%	15.5%	8.3%	1.2%	6.0%	2.0	1.3
20. My ethnic group membership is very important to my sense of who I am.	83	94.3%	26.5%	10.8%	20.5%	18.1%	24.1%	3.0	1.5
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	34	41.0%	13.3%	2.4%	4.8%	7.2%	13.3%	3.1	1.7
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	49	59.0%	13.3%	8.4%	15.7%	10.8%	10.8%	3.0	1.4
21. The needs of my ethnic group are met by the City of Salinas (police, city council, educational system, mayor).	79	89.8%	22.8%	20.3%	31.6%	16.5%	8.9%	2.7	1.2
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	33	41.8%	11.4%	5.1%	11.4%	10.1%	3.8%	2.8	1.3
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	46	58.2%	11.4%	15.2%	20.3%	6.3%	5.1%	2.6	1.2
22. People should form or participate in community organizations to solve community problems in Salinas.	85	96.6%	1.2%	2.4%	17.6%	29.4%	49.4%	4.2	0.9
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	41.2%	0.0%	0.0%	3.5%	14.1%	23.5%	4.5	0.7
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	50	58.8%	1.2%	2.4%	14.1%	15.3%	25.9%	4.1	1.0
23. The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting gang violence.	84	95.5%	20.2%	39.3%	14.3%	17.9%	8.3%	2.5	1.2
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	41.7%	6.0%	17.9%	6.0%	7.1%	4.8%	2.7	1.3
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	49	58.3%	14.3%	21.4%	8.3%	10.7%	3.6%	2.4	1.2
24. The police work with local community leaders to fight gang violence.	82	93.2%	2.4%	17.1%	30.5%	37.8%	12.2%	3.4	1.0
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	42.7%	0.0%	7.3%	12.2%	14.6%	8.5%	3.6	1.0
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	47	57.3%	2.4%	9.8%	18.3%	23.2%	3.7%	3.3	1.0



Salinas Police Department Attitudes Survey									
Question	# of Respondents	Response Rate (%)	Frequency of Response (%)					Mean	Standard Deviation
			1. Completely Disagree	2.	3.	4.	5. Completely Agree		
26. I have a role in implementing the city's counter-gang strategy.	84	95.5%	13.1%	14.3%	23.8%	15.5%	33.3%	3.4	1.4
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	41.7%	4.8%	8.3%	9.5%	7.1%	11.9%	3.3	1.4
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	49	58.3%	8.3%	6.0%	14.3%	8.3%	21.4%	3.5	1.4
27. Information related to gang activities should only be shared with other individuals or departments on a need to know basis.	84	95.5%	31.0%	20.2%	19.0%	16.7%	13.1%	2.6	1.4
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	33	39.3%	13.1%	10.7%	7.1%	4.8%	3.6%	2.4	1.3
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	51	60.7%	17.9%	9.5%	11.9%	11.9%	9.5%	2.8	1.5
28. The city of Salinas and the Salinas PD have a unified counter-gang strategy.	81	92.0%	27.2%	35.8%	19.8%	14.8%	2.5%	2.3	1.1
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	33	40.7%	7.4%	18.5%	7.4%	6.2%	1.2%	2.4	1.1
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	48	59.3%	19.8%	17.3%	12.3%	8.6%	1.2%	2.2	1.1
29. Existing Police Department policies suppress individual initiative and or hinder my ability to reduce gang activities.	86	97.7%	19.8%	14.0%	27.9%	20.9%	17.4%	3.0	1.4
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	34	39.5%	8.1%	7.0%	10.5%	10.5%	3.5%	2.9	1.3
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	52	60.5%	11.6%	7.0%	17.4%	10.5%	14.0%	3.1	1.4
30. I have freedom to act on gang related intelligence in a timely manner.	87	98.9%	10.3%	21.8%	31.0%	25.3%	11.5%	3.1	1.2
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	34	39.1%	3.4%	10.3%	10.3%	8.0%	6.9%	3.1	1.2
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	53	60.9%	6.9%	11.5%	20.7%	17.2%	4.6%	3.0	1.1
31. The gang violence problem is something that requires the combined efforts of the population of Salinas and the city government (police, city council, mayor, educational system) to resolve.	88	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.5%	10.2%	85.2%	4.8	0.5
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	39.8%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	3.4%	35.2%	4.9	0.4
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	53	60.2%	0.0%	0.0%	3.4%	6.8%	50.0%	4.8	0.5
32. The City of Salinas has been effective in soliciting local citizens' help in fighting the gang violence problem.	88	100.0%	21.6%	39.8%	28.4%	6.8%	3.4%	2.3	1.0
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	35	39.8%	9.1%	12.5%	10.2%	5.7%	2.3%	2.5	1.2
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	53	60.2%	12.5%	27.3%	18.2%	1.1%	1.1%	2.2	0.9

Salinas Police Department Attitudes Survey									
Question	# of Respondents	Response Rate (%)	Frequency of Response (%)					Mean	Standard Deviation
			1. Completely Disagree	2.	3.	4.	5. Completely Agree		
33. City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang violence.	79	89.8%	34.2%	29.1%	29.1%	6.3%	1.3%	2.1	1.0
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	32	40.5%	10.1%	12.7%	15.2%	2.5%	0.0%	2.3	0.9
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	47	59.5%	24.1%	16.5%	13.9%	3.8%	1.3%	2.0	1.1

Table 51. Salinas Police Department Attitudes Survey Results

#### D. ADDITIONAL MULTIPLE REGRESSION VARIABLES

The following variables were included in the final information processing model, but were deemed statistically insignificant contributors to the dependent variable.

Questions about Security ( <i>security</i> )			Mean	Standard Deviation
Q12. The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk alone at night.			4.3	0.9
Q14. I or a member of my family have been threatened by a gang member in Salinas.			2.8	1.8
Mean	Standard Deviation	Sample Size	Coefficient Alpha	
3.6	1.1	86	0.083	

Table 52. IV3 Security Component Questions

Questions about City Government Legitimacy ( <i>legitimacy</i> )			Mean	Standard Deviation
Q4. The Salinas City Council cares about Salinas citizens.			3.0	1.0
Q6. The Salinas City Council are very responsive to citizen complaints.			3.2	1.1
Mean	Standard Deviation	Sample Size	Coefficient Alpha	
3.1	0.8	74	-0.016	

Table 53. IV2 City Government Legitimacy Component Questions

Questions about Government Agency Unity of Effort ( <i>unity</i> )			Mean	Standard Deviation
Q23. The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting gang violence.			2.5	1.2
Q26. I have a role in implementing the city's counter-gang strategy.			3.4	1.4
Q28. The city of Salinas and the Salinas PD have a unified counter-gang strategy.			2.3	1.1
Mean	Standard Deviation	Sample Size	Coefficient Alpha	
3.3	0.7	77	1.153	

Table 54. IV6 Government Agency Unity of Effort Component Questions

## **E.      ADDITIONAL REGRESSION MODELS**

The following model best represented the variables of our initial theory, but ultimately proved insufficient to explain information processing ( $\text{Adj } R^2 = 0.11$ , OV Test p-value = 0.85, See Figure 39).

. gen system=(q9+q33)/2  
(9 missing values generated)

. gen unieff=(q23+q24+q28+q31+q32)/5  
(11 missing values generated)

. gen autonomy=(q5+q26+q29+q30)/4  
(7 missing values generated)

. reg q27 system unieff autonomy

Source	SS	df	MS	
Model	20.9173768	3	6.97245893	
Residual	118.829102	67	1.77356869	
Total	139.746479	70	1.99637827	

Number of obs = 71  
F( 3, 67) = 3.93  
Prob > F = 0.0120  
R-squared = 0.1497  
Adj R-squared = 0.1116  
Root MSE = 1.3318

q27	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
system	.6279292	.2090433	3.00	0.004	.2106771 1.045181
unieff	-.0011321	.264664	-0.00	0.997	-.5294036 .5271394
autonomy	.3965108	.286335	1.38	0.171	-.1750162 .9680378
_cons	-.1800224	1.192456	-0.15	0.880	-2.560174 2.20013

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
unieff	1.15	0.868118
system	1.13	0.883114
autonomy	1.03	0.972538
Mean VIF	1.10	

Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of q27  
Ho: model has no omitted variables  
F(3, 64) = 0.27  
Prob > F = 0.8489

. corr system unieff autonomy  
(obs=71)

	system	unieff	autonomy
system	1.0000		
unieff	0.3301	1.0000	
autonomy	-0.0427	0.1370	1.0000

Figure 35. Additional Regression Model Results

## F. SURVEY

The survey, in its entirety is presented in Table 66.

### Naval Postgraduate School Consent to Participate in Research

**Introduction.** You are invited to participate in a research study entitled *Small Town Insurgency: The Struggle for Information Dominance to Reduce Gang Violence*. This research will foster a greater understanding of the causes of gang-related violence.

**Procedures.** You will be participating in a brief survey consisting of 34 questions. The survey is expected to take no more than 15 minutes.

**Voluntary Nature of the Study.** Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. If you choose to participate you can change your mind at any time and withdraw from the study. You will not be penalized in any way or lose any benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled if you choose not to participate in this study or to withdraw.

**Potential Risks and Discomforts.** There are no identified potential risks associated with your participation in this survey.

**Anticipated Benefits.** Anticipated benefits from this study are: a better understanding of factors that contribute to gang-related violence and a potential for reduced gang violence within Salinas. You will not directly benefit from your participation in this research.

**Compensation for Participation.** No tangible compensation will be given. A copy of the research results will be available at the conclusion of the experiment through the Naval Postgraduate School, and will be available for review, online, at the Dudley K. Knox Library: <http://www.nps.edu/library>.

**Confidentiality & Privacy Act.** Any information that is obtained during this study will be kept confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All efforts, within reason, will be made to keep your personal information in your research record confidential but total confidentiality cannot be guaranteed. All records associated with your participation will be maintained and analyzed only by those directly involved with this research project, to include those conducting the survey. However, it is possible that the researcher may be required to divulge information obtained in the course of this research to the subject's chain of command or other legal body. No names will be used to identify participants in this research.

**Points of Contact.** If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you experience an injury or have questions about any discomforts that you experience while taking part in this study please contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Michael Freeman, (831) 656-3731, [mefreema@nps.edu](mailto:mefreema@nps.edu). Questions about your rights as a research subject or any other concerns may be addressed to the Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831-656-2473, [lgshattu@nps.edu](mailto:lgshattu@nps.edu).

**Statement of Consent.** I have read the information provided above. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I have

been provided a copy of this form for my records and I agree to participate in this study. I understand that by agreeing to participate in this research and signing this form, I do not waive any of my legal rights.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Participant's Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Researcher's Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

1. Compared to last year, gang violence in Salinas has increased.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
2. The gang violence problem in Salinas is very serious.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
3. The Salinas Police care about Salinas citizens.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
4. The Salinas City Council cares about Salinas citizens.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
5. The Salinas Police are very responsive to citizen complaints.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
6. The Salinas City Council are very responsive to citizen complaints.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
7. I am confident in Salinas's courts and legal system.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
8. I am satisfied with the quality of education in Salinas.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
9. I receive most of my information about gang activity through official city communication channels (Press releases, billboards, community meetings).	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
10. I receive most of my information about gang activity through word of mouth or rumors.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>

11. I receive most of my information about gang activity through media outlets (TV, newspaper, radio).	Completely Disagree					Completely Agree	
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>	
12. The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk alone at night.	Completely Disagree					Completely Agree	
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>	
13. I feel safe and secure in my home.	Completely Disagree					Completely Agree	
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>	
14. I or a member of my family have been threatened by a gang member in Salinas.	Completely Disagree					Completely Agree	
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>	
15. As compared to a year ago, the Salinas police department has made the city a more secure and safe place to live.	Completely Disagree					Completely Agree	
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>	
16. Speaking English, as a common language, will unite all of Salinas's citizens.	Completely Disagree					Completely Agree	
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>	
17. Salinas's citizens are best represented by leaders from their own racial or ethnic background.	Completely Disagree					Completely Agree	
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>	
18. People should help others who are less fortunate.	Completely Disagree					Completely Agree	
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>	
19. Hispanic Americans face discrimination in getting a decent job.	Completely Disagree					Completely Agree	
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>	
20. My ethnic group membership is very important to my sense of who I am.	Completely Disagree					Completely Agree	
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>	
21. The needs of my ethnic group are met by the City of Salinas (police, city council, educational system, mayor).	Completely Disagree					Completely Agree	
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>	
22. People should form or participate in community organizations to solve community problems in Salinas.	Completely Disagree					Completely Agree	
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>	
23. The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting gang violence.	Completely Disagree					Completely Agree	
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>	
24. The police work with local community leaders to fight gang violence.	Completely Disagree					Completely Agree	
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>	

25. The gang violence problem will resolve itself with time regardless of how the City responds to the situation	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
26. I have a role in implementing the city's counter-gang strategy.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
27. Information related to gang activities should only be shared with other individuals or departments on a need to know basis.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
28. The city of Salinas and the Salinas PD have a unified counter-gang strategy.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
29. Existing police department policies suppress individual initiative and or hinder my ability to reduce gang activities.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
30. I have freedom to act on gang related intelligence in a timely manner.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
31. The gang violence problem is something that requires the combined efforts of the population of Salinas and the city government (police, city council, mayor, educational system) to resolve.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
32. The City of Salinas has been effective in soliciting local citizens' help in fighting the gang violence problem.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
33. City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang violence.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
34. I live within the city limits of Salinas	<b>No</b> <b>Yes</b>					

Table 55. Salinas Police Department Survey



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## APPENDIX D. SALINAS CITY EMPLOYEE ATTITUDES SURVEY

### A. REGRESSION ANALYSIS

As discussed in Chapter VII, we analyzed the survey data to resolve the best questions to represent the dependent variable for our regression model. Q25, "It is important and effective to pass crime information to the Salinas Police Department," and Q32, "City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang violence," were ultimately chosen to represent the dependent variable for our model of information processing. Regression analysis was completed with *Stata Statistical Software: Release 10*, and is presented in Figure 40.

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	= 35	
				F(7, 27)	= 3.63	
Model	4.86878947	7	.695541353	Prob > F	= 0.0069	
Residual	5.17406767	27	.191632136	R-squared	= 0.4848	
				Adj R-squared	= 0.3512	
Total	10.0428571	34	.295378151	Root MSE	= .43776	
infopro	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
gangprob	.0753529	.0748298	1.01	0.323	-.0781851	.228891
legit	.1174803	.1118389	1.05	0.303	-.1119941	.3469547
security	-.199643	.0941257	-2.12	0.043	-.3927731	-.006513
perresp	.0313628	.136262	0.23	0.820	-.2482237	.3109494
community	.2580694	.1800793	1.43	0.163	-.1114229	.6275617
unity	.1004382	.1296514	0.77	0.445	-.1655846	.366461
q33	.0028773	.1863037	0.02	0.988	-.3793863	.385141
_cons	2.169782	.7970861	2.72	0.011	.5342966	3.805268

Figure 36. Regression Results

### B. REGRESSION TESTS

We utilized mean variance inflation factor (VIF) and Ramsey retest to verify the validity of our model. We tested for collinearity using VIF, and for model specificity and omitted variables using the Ramsey retest. The results are presented in Figure 41.

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
community	2.04	0.491147
unity	1.96	0.508939
legit	1.81	0.553885
gangprob	1.39	0.718007
security	1.33	0.754401
q33	1.29	0.772954
perresp	1.13	0.884290
Mean VIF	1.56	
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of infopro		
Ho: model has no omitted variables		
F(3, 24) = 0.65		
Prob > F = 0.5881		

Figure 37. Regression Tests

### C. SALINAS CITY EMPLOYEE ATTITUDES SURVEY RESULTS

The complete frequency of response data set for the Salinas City Employee attitudes survey is presented in Table 67.

Salinas City Employee Attitudes Survey									
Question	# of Respondents	Response Rate (%)	Frequency of Response (%)					Mean	Standard Deviation
			1. Completely Disagree	2.	3.	4.	5. Completely Agree		
1. Compared to last year, gang violence in Salinas has increased.	61	93.8%	3.3%	18.0%	32.8%	16.4%	29.5%	3.5	1.2
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	40	65.6%	0.0%	11.5%	18.0%	11.5%	24.6%	3.8	1.1
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	19	31.1%	3.3%	6.6%	13.1%	4.9%	3.3%	2.9	1.1
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	1.6%	4.0	1.4
2. The gang violence problem in Salinas is very serious.	65	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	15.4%	83.1%	4.8	0.4
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	42	64.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	10.8%	53.8%	4.8	0.4
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	21	32.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.6%	27.7%	4.9	0.4
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.1%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	0.0%	1.5%	4.0	1.4

Salinas City Employee Attitudes Survey									
Question	# of Respondents	Response Rate (%)	Frequency of Response (%)					Mean	Standard Deviation
			1. Completely Disagree	2.	3.	4.	5. Completely Agree		
3. The Salinas Police care about Salinas citizens.	62	95.4%	9.7%	16.1%	29.0%	22.6%	22.6%	3.3	1.3
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	41	66.1%	8.1%	12.9%	14.5%	14.5%	16.1%	3.3	1.4
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	20	32.3%	1.6%	3.2%	12.9%	8.1%	6.5%	3.5	1.1
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	1	1.6%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0	--
4. The Salinas City Council cares about Salinas citizens.	64	98.5%	4.7%	14.1%	34.4%	18.8%	28.1%	3.5	1.2
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	42	65.6%	4.7%	10.9%	18.8%	12.5%	18.8%	3.5	1.3
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	20	31.3%	0.0%	1.6%	14.1%	6.3%	9.4%	3.8	1.0
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.1%	0.0%	1.6%	1.6%	0.0%	0.0%	2.5	0.7
5. The Salinas Police are very responsive to citizen complaints.	60	92.3%	15.0%	25.0%	35.0%	23.3%	1.7%	2.7	1.0
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	40	66.7%	11.7%	15.0%	21.7%	16.7%	1.7%	2.7	1.1
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	18	30.0%	3.3%	8.3%	13.3%	5.0%	0.0%	2.7	0.9
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.3%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	3.0	1.4
6. The Salinas City Council are very responsive to citizen complaints.	62	95.4%	4.8%	12.9%	46.8%	24.2%	11.3%	3.2	1.0
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	41	66.1%	4.8%	8.1%	33.9%	11.3%	8.1%	3.1	1.0
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	19	30.6%	0.0%	3.2%	12.9%	11.3%	3.2%	3.5	0.8
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.2%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	3.0	1.4
7. I am confident in Salinas's courts and legal system.	61	93.8%	11.5%	24.6%	18.0%	29.5%	16.4%	3.1	1.3
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	40	65.6%	8.2%	13.1%	13.1%	18.0%	13.1%	3.2	1.3
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	19	31.1%	3.3%	9.8%	4.9%	9.8%	3.3%	3.0	1.2
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.3%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	3.0	1.4

Salinas City Employee Attitudes Survey									
Question	# of Respondents	Response Rate (%)	Frequency of Response (%)					Mean	Standard Deviation
			1. Completely Disagree	2.	3.	4.	5. Completely Agree		
8. I am satisfied with the quality of education in Salinas	63	96.9%	25.4%	39.7%	17.5%	12.7%	4.8%	2.3	1.1
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	42	66.7%	14.3%	27.0%	12.7%	7.9%	4.8%	2.4	1.2
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	19	30.2%	11.1%	11.1%	4.8%	3.2%	0.0%	2.0	1.0
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.2%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	3.0	1.4
9. I receive most of my information about gang activity through official city communication channels (Press releases, billboards, community meetings)	63	96.9%	12.7%	23.8%	28.6%	23.8%	11.1%	3.0	1.2
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	41	65.1%	7.9%	12.7%	20.6%	15.9%	7.9%	3.0	1.2
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	20	31.7%	4.8%	9.5%	7.9%	7.9%	1.6%	2.8	1.2
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.2%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	3.5	2.1
10. I receive most of my information about gang activity through word of mouth or rumors.	65	100.0%	12.3%	32.3%	33.8%	16.9%	4.6%	2.7	1.0
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	42	64.6%	7.7%	18.5%	24.6%	10.8%	3.1%	2.7	1.0
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	21	32.3%	3.1%	13.8%	9.2%	4.6%	1.5%	2.6	1.0
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.1%	1.5%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	0.0%	2.5	2.1
11. I receive most of my information about gang activity through media outlets (TV, newspaper, radio).	65	100.0%	4.6%	7.7%	15.4%	38.5%	33.8%	3.9	1.1
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	42	64.6%	1.5%	4.6%	13.8%	24.6%	20.0%	3.9	1.0
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	21	32.3%	3.1%	1.5%	1.5%	13.8%	12.3%	4.0	1.2
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.1%	0.0%	1.5%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	3.5	2.1

Salinas City Employee Attitudes Survey									
Question	# of Respondents	Response Rate (%)	Frequency of Response (%)					Mean	Standard Deviation
			1. Completely Disagree	2.	3.	4.	5. Completely Agree		
12. The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk alone at night.	65	100.0%	6.2%	7.7%	26.2%	24.6%	35.4%	3.8	1.2
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	42	64.6%	6.2%	3.1%	20.0%	12.3%	23.1%	3.7	1.3
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	21	32.3%	0.0%	3.1%	4.6%	12.3%	12.3%	4.0	1.0
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.1%	0.0%	1.5%	1.5%	0.0%	0.0%	2.5	0.7
13. I feel safe and secure in my home.	61	93.8%	11.5%	6.6%	19.7%	37.7%	24.6%	3.6	1.3
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	40	65.6%	4.9%	3.3%	13.1%	24.6%	19.7%	3.8	1.2
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	19	31.1%	6.6%	3.3%	6.6%	11.5%	3.3%	3.1	1.4
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	1.6%	4.5	0.7
14. I or a member of my family have been threatened by a gang member in Salinas.	63	96.9%	52.4%	17.5%	9.5%	14.3%	6.3%	2.0	1.3
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	41	65.1%	34.9%	11.1%	6.3%	9.5%	3.2%	2.0	1.3
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	20	31.7%	15.9%	4.8%	3.2%	4.8%	3.2%	2.2	1.5
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.2%	1.6%	1.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5	0.7
15. As compared to a year ago, the Salinas police department has made the city a more secure and safe place to live.	63	96.9%	25.4%	25.4%	30.2%	15.9%	3.2%	2.5	1.1
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	40	63.5%	19.0%	15.9%	17.5%	7.9%	3.2%	2.4	1.2
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	21	33.3%	6.3%	9.5%	11.1%	6.3%	0.0%	2.5	1.0
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	1.6%	0.0%	3.5	0.7

Salinas City Employee Attitudes Survey									
Question	# of Respondents	Response Rate (%)	Frequency of Response (%)					Mean	Standard Deviation
			1. Completely Disagree	2.	3.	4.	5. Completely Agree		
16. Speaking English, as a common language, will unite all of Salinas's citizens.	64	98.5%	21.9%	17.2%	21.9%	17.2%	21.9%	3.0	1.5
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	42	65.6%	12.5%	12.5%	20.3%	7.8%	12.5%	2.9	1.4
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	20	31.3%	9.4%	4.7%	1.6%	6.3%	9.4%	3.1	1.7
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.1%	0.0%	4.0	0.0
17. Salinas's citizens are best represented by leaders from their own racial or ethnic background.	63	96.9%	12.7%	22.2%	38.1%	23.8%	3.2%	2.8	1.0
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	40	63.5%	7.9%	14.3%	23.8%	15.9%	1.6%	2.8	1.0
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	21	33.3%	3.2%	7.9%	14.3%	6.3%	1.6%	2.9	1.0
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.2%	1.6%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	2.5	2.1
18. People should help others who are less fortunate.	64	98.5%	0.0%	0.0%	15.6%	32.8%	51.6%	4.4	0.7
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	41	64.1%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	20.3%	31.3%	4.3	0.8
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	21	32.8%	0.0%	0.0%	3.1%	12.5%	17.2%	4.4	0.7
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.1%	5.0	0.0
19. Hispanic Americans face discrimination in getting a decent job.	64	98.5%	20.3%	28.1%	25.0%	17.2%	9.4%	2.7	1.2
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	41	64.1%	14.1%	15.6%	18.8%	10.9%	4.7%	2.6	1.2
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	21	32.8%	4.7%	12.5%	6.3%	4.7%	4.7%	2.8	1.3
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.1%	1.6%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	2.5	2.1
20. My ethnic group membership is very important to my sense of who I am.	65	100.0%	15.4%	12.3%	27.7%	29.2%	15.4%	3.2	1.3
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	42	64.6%	12.3%	4.6%	16.9%	20.0%	10.8%	3.2	1.3
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	21	32.3%	3.1%	7.7%	10.8%	9.2%	1.5%	3.0	1.1
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.1%	5.0	0.0

Salinas City Employee Attitudes Survey									
Question	# of Respondents	Response Rate (%)	Frequency of Response (%)					Mean	Standard Deviation
			1. Completely Disagree	2.	3.	4.	5. Completely Agree		
21. The needs of my ethnic group are met by the City of Salinas (police, city council, educational system, mayor).	59	90.8%	8.5%	20.3%	37.3%	22.0%	11.9%	3.1	1.1
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	40	67.8%	5.1%	11.9%	27.1%	13.6%	10.2%	3.2	1.1
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	17	28.8%	3.4%	6.8%	10.2%	6.8%	1.7%	2.9	1.1
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.4%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	3.0	1.4
22. People should form or participate in community organizations to solve community problems in Salinas.	64	98.5%	0.0%	3.1%	12.5%	29.7%	54.7%	4.4	0.8
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	41	64.1%	0.0%	3.1%	7.8%	12.5%	40.6%	4.4	0.9
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	21	32.8%	0.0%	0.0%	3.1%	17.2%	12.5%	4.3	0.6
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.1%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	1.6%	4.0	1.4
23. The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting gang violence.	57	87.7%	7.0%	10.5%	38.6%	29.8%	14.0%	3.3	1.1
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	36	63.2%	7.0%	8.8%	21.1%	17.5%	8.8%	3.2	1.2
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	20	35.1%	0.0%	1.8%	15.8%	12.3%	5.3%	3.6	0.8
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	1	1.8%	0.0%	0.0%	1.8%	0.0%	0.0%	3.0	--
24. The police work with local community leaders to fight gang violence.	58	89.2%	6.9%	13.8%	29.3%	39.7%	10.3%	3.3	1.1
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	40	69.0%	6.9%	8.6%	19.0%	25.9%	8.6%	3.3	1.2
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	16	27.6%	0.0%	3.4%	10.3%	12.1%	1.7%	3.4	0.8
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.4%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	3.0	1.4



Salinas City Employee Attitudes Survey									
Question	# of Respondents	Response Rate (%)	Frequency of Response (%)					Mean	Standard Deviation
			1. Completely Disagree	2.	3.	4.	5. Completely Agree		
25. It is important and effective to pass crime information to the Salinas Police Department.	64	98.5%	0.0%	3.1%	4.7%	20.3%	71.9%	4.6	0.7
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	41	64.1%	0.0%	3.1%	3.1%	10.9%	46.9%	4.6	0.8
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	21	32.8%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	7.8%	23.4%	4.7	0.6
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	1.6%	4.5	0.7
26. The gang violence problem will resolve itself with time regardless of how the City responds to the situation	64	98.5%	78.1%	10.9%	3.1%	6.3%	1.6%	1.4	0.9
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	41	64.1%	50.0%	7.8%	3.1%	3.1%	0.0%	1.4	0.8
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	21	32.8%	26.6%	3.1%	0.0%	3.1%	0.0%	1.4	0.9
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.1%	1.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	3.0	2.8
27. I have a role in implementing the city's counter-gang strategy.	59	90.8%	25.4%	5.1%	25.4%	28.8%	15.3%	3.0	1.4
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	39	66.1%	22.0%	1.7%	16.9%	16.9%	8.5%	2.8	1.5
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	18	30.5%	3.4%	1.7%	8.5%	10.2%	6.8%	3.5	1.2
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.4%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	3.0	1.4
28. Information related to gang activities should only be shared with other individuals or departments on a need to know basis.	62	95.4%	43.5%	21.0%	16.1%	8.1%	11.3%	2.2	1.4
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	41	66.1%	32.3%	12.9%	8.1%	6.5%	6.5%	2.1	1.4
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	19	30.6%	11.3%	8.1%	8.1%	1.6%	1.6%	2.2	1.2
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	5.0	0.0

Salinas City Employee Attitudes Survey									
Question	# of Respondents	Response Rate (%)	Frequency of Response (%)					Mean	Standard Deviation
			1. Completely Disagree	2.	3.	4.	5. Completely Agree		
29. The city of Salinas and the Salinas PD have a unified counter-gang strategy.	51	78.5%	15.7%	27.5%	27.5%	23.5%	5.9%	2.8	1.2
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	34	66.7%	13.7%	17.6%	15.7%	15.7%	3.9%	2.7	1.2
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	15	29.4%	2.0%	9.8%	9.8%	5.9%	2.0%	2.9	1.1
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.9%	0.0%	0.0%	2.0%	2.0%	0.0%	3.5	0.7
30. The gang violence problem is something that requires the combined efforts of the population of Salinas and the city government (police, city council, mayor, educational system) to resolve.	65	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.2%	7.7%	86.2%	4.8	0.5
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	42	64.6%	0.0%	0.0%	6.2%	3.1%	55.4%	4.8	0.6
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	21	32.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.6%	27.7%	4.9	0.4
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.1%	5.0	0.0
31. The City of Salinas has been effective in soliciting local citizens' help in fighting the gang violence problem.	59	90.8%	8.5%	33.9%	35.6%	15.3%	6.8%	2.8	1.0
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	37	62.7%	6.8%	20.3%	18.6%	13.6%	3.4%	2.8	1.1
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	20	33.9%	0.0%	13.6%	16.9%	1.7%	1.7%	2.8	0.8
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.4%	1.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.7%	3.0	2.8

Salinas City Employee Attitudes Survey									
Question	# of Respondents	Response Rate (%)	Frequency of Response (%)					Mean	Standard Deviation
			1. Completely Disagree	2.	3.	4.	5. Completely Agree		
32. City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang violence.	51	78.5%	17.6%	31.4%	35.3%	13.7%	2.0%	2.5	1.0
R Resides Inside Salinas City Limits	33	64.7%	11.8%	23.5%	17.6%	11.8%	0.0%	2.5	1.0
R Resides Outside Salinas City Limits	16	31.4%	3.9%	7.8%	15.7%	2.0%	2.0%	2.7	1.0
R Did Not Indicate Where They Reside	2	3.9%	2.0%	0.0%	2.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.0	1.4

Table 56. Salinas City Employee Attitudes Survey Results

#### D. ADDITIONAL MULTIPLE REGRESSION VARIABLES

The following variables were included in the final information processing model, but were deemed statistically insignificant contributors to the dependent variable.

Questions about Perception of Gang Problem ( <i>gangprob</i> )			Mean	Standard Deviation
Q1. Compared to last year, gang violence in Salinas has increased.			3.5	1.2
Q2. The gang violence problem in Salinas is very serious			4.8	0.4
Mean	Standard Deviation	Sample Size	Coefficient Alpha	
4.2	0.7	61	0.08	

Table 57. IV1 Perception of Gang Problem Component Questions

Questions about Legitimacy ( <i>legit</i> )			Mean	Standard Deviation
Q3. The Salinas Police care about Salinas citizens.			3.3	1.3
Q4. The Salinas City Council cares about Salinas citizens.			0.0	1.2
Q5. The Salinas Police are very responsive to citizen complaints.			2.7	1.0
Q6. The Salinas City Council are very responsive to citizen complaints.			3.2	1.0
Mean	Standard Deviation	Sample Size	Coefficient Alpha	
3.1	0.9	58	0.12	

Table 58. IV2 Legitimacy Component Questions

Questions about Personal Responsibility ( <i>perresp</i> )			Mean	Standard Deviation
Q18. People should help others who are less fortunate.			4.4	0.7
Q22. People should form or participate in community organizations to solve community problems in Salinas.			4.4	0.8
Mean	Standard Deviation	Sample Size	Coefficient Alpha	
4.4	0.6	63	0.03	

Table 59. IV4 Personal Responsibility Component Questions

Questions about Government Agency Unity of Effort ( <i>unity</i> )			Mean	Standard Deviation
Q23. The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting gang violence.			3.3	1.1
Q29. The city of Salinas and the Salinas PD have a unified counter-gang strategy.			2.8	1.2
Mean	Standard Deviation	Sample Size	Coefficient Alpha	
3.0	0.9	47	0.10	

Table 60. IV6 Government Agency Unity of Effort Component Questions

## E. ADDITIONAL REGRESSION MODELS

The following model in Figure 42 best represented the variables of our initial theory, but ultimately proved insufficient to explain information processing ( $\text{Adj } R^2 = 0.04$ ).

```
. gen system=(q9+q32)/2
(15 missing values generated)
```

```
. gen unieff=(q23+q29+q30+q31)/4
(20 missing values generated)
```

```
. gen autonomy=(q6+q27)/2
(9 missing values generated)
```

```
. reg q25 system unieff autonomy
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 40		
-----+-----				F( 3, 36) = 1.49		
Model	2.87155974	3	.957186581	Prob > F = 0.2333		
Residual	23.1034403	36	.641762229	R-squared = 0.1106		
-----+-----				Adj R-squared = 0.0364		
Total	25.975	39	.666025641	Root MSE = .8011		
-----						
q25	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
-----+-----						
system	-.18468	.1636548	-1.13	0.267	-.5165872	.1472273
<b>unieff  </b>	<b>.3707268</b>	.2322883	<b>1.60</b>	0.119	-.1003757	.8418294
autonomy	.1738479	.1558826	1.12	0.272	-.1422966	.4899924
_cons	3.227863	.8522675	3.79	0.001	1.499384	4.956341

```
. vif
```

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
-----+-----		
unieff	1.18	0.849650
system	1.16	0.858841
autonomy	1.01	0.987545
-----+-----		
Mean VIF	1.12	

```
. ovtest
```

Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of q25

Ho: model has no omitted variables

F(3, 33) = 0.75

Prob > F = 0.5328

```
. corr system unieff autonomy
(obs=41)
```

	system	unieff	autonomy
-----+-----			
system	1.0000		
unieff	0.3996	1.0000	
autonomy	0.0206	0.0930	1.0000

Figure 38. Additional Regression Model Results

## F. SURVEY

The survey, in its entirety is presented in Figure 43.

### Naval Postgraduate School Consent to Participate in Research

**Introduction.** You are invited to participate in a research study entitled *Small Town Insurgency: The Struggle for Information Dominance to Reduce Gang Violence*. This research will foster a greater understanding of the causes of gang-related violence.

**Procedures.** You will be participating in a brief survey consisting of 33 questions. The survey is expected to take no more than 15 minutes.

**Voluntary Nature of the Study.** Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. If you choose to participate you can change your mind at any time and withdraw from the study. You will not be penalized in any way or lose any benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled if you choose not to participate in this study or to withdraw.

**Potential Risks and Discomforts.** There are no identified potential risks associated with your participation in this survey.

**Anticipated Benefits.** Anticipated benefits from this study are: a better understanding of factors that contribute to gang-related violence and a potential for reduced gang violence within Salinas. You will not directly benefit from your participation in this research.

**Compensation for Participation.** No tangible compensation will be given. A copy of the research results will be available at the conclusion of the experiment through the Naval Postgraduate School, and will be available for review, online, at the Dudley K. Knox Library: <http://www.nps.edu/library>.

**Confidentiality & Privacy Act.** Any information that is obtained during this study will be kept confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All efforts, within reason, will be made to keep your personal information in your research record confidential but total confidentiality cannot be guaranteed. All records associated with your participation will be maintained and analyzed only by those directly involved with this research project, to include those conducting the survey. However, it is possible that the researcher may be required to divulge information obtained in the course of this research to the subject's chain of command or other legal body. No names will be used to identify participants in this research.

**Points of Contact.** If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you experience an injury or have questions about any discomforts that you experience while taking part in this study please contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Michael Freeman, (831) 656-3731, [mefreema@nps.edu](mailto:mefreema@nps.edu). Questions about your rights as a research subject or any other concerns may be addressed to the Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831-656-2473, [lgshattu@nps.edu](mailto:lgshattu@nps.edu).

**Statement of Consent.** I have read the information provided above. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I have

been provided a copy of this form for my records and I agree to participate in this study. I understand that by agreeing to participate in this research and signing this form, I do not waive any of my legal rights.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Participant's Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Researcher's Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

1. Compared to last year, gang violence in Salinas has increased.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
2. The gang violence problem in Salinas is very serious.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
3. The Salinas Police care about Salinas citizens.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
4. The Salinas City Council cares about Salinas citizens.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
5. The Salinas Police are very responsive to citizen complaints.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
6. The Salinas City Council are very responsive to citizen complaints.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
7. I am confident in Salinas's courts and legal system.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>
8. I am satisfied with the quality of education in Salinas	Completely Disagree <b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b>	<b>Don't Know</b>

9. I receive most of my information about gang activity through official city communication channels (Press releases, billboards, community meetings).	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b> <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
10. I receive most of my information about gang activity through word of mouth or rumors.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b> <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
11. I receive most of my information about gang activity through media outlets (TV, newspaper, radio).	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b> <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
12. The city of Salinas is a dangerous place to walk alone at night.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b> <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
13. I feel safe and secure in my home.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b> <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
14. I or a member of my family have been threatened by a gang member in Salinas.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b> <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
15. As compared to a year ago, the Salinas police department has made the city a more secure and safe place to live.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b> <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
16. Speaking English, as a common language, will unite all of Salinas's citizens.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b> <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
17. Salinas's citizens are best represented by leaders from their own racial or ethnic background.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b> <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
18. People should help others who are less fortunate.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b> <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
19. Hispanic Americans face discrimination in getting a decent job.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b> <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
20. My ethnic group membership is very important to my sense of who I am.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b> <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
21. The needs of my ethnic group are met by the City of Salinas (police, city council, educational system, mayor).	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b> <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
22. People should form or participate in community organizations to solve community problems in Salinas.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b> <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>



23. The City of Salinas is taking a unified approach to confronting gang violence.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
24. The police work with local community leaders to fight gang violence.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
25. It is important and effective to pass crime information to the Salinas Police Department.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
26. The gang violence problem will resolve itself with time regardless of how the City responds to the situation	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
27. I have a role in implementing the city's counter-gang strategy.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
28. Information related to gang activities should only be shared with other individuals or departments on a need to know basis.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
29. The city of Salinas and the Salinas PD have a unified counter-gang strategy.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
30. The gang violence problem is something that requires the combined efforts of the population of Salinas and the city government (police, city council, mayor, educational system) to resolve.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
31. The City of Salinas has been effective in soliciting local citizens' help in fighting the gang violence problem.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
32. City agencies communicate effectively among each other on issues related to gang violence.	Completely Disagree <b>1</b> <b>2</b> <b>3</b> <b>4</b>	Completely Agree <b>5</b> <b>Don't Know</b>
33. I live within the city limits of Salinas	<b>No</b> <b>Yes</b>	

Figure 39. Salinas City Employee Survey

## **APPENDIX E. NETWORK SURVEY AND EMPIRICAL INFORMATION**

### **A. DESCRIPTION**

Participants received an electronic excel spreadsheet survey through the SPD email system. These potential participants were asked four comprehensive questions, in order to analyze the operations of the informal network. This survey took approximately 30 minutes to complete. The survey questions were designed to measure, understand, and visualize the contact network, the advice network, the intelligence network, and the assistance or trust network that exist in the SPD. Specifically, each officer rated his or her survey responses using a scale of 0 (Rarely or never), 1 (Every few months), 2 (Every few weeks), 3 (Every week), and 4 (Everyday) in relation to other officers and outside organizations and agencies that work with SPD on gang related issues. The survey was returned to the research team electronically. Survey results were compiled and analyzed using UCINET and NETDRAW social networking analysis programs.<sup>188</sup> In accordance with IRB guidelines, all names were removed from survey responses during the analysis of the results.

### **B. METHOD OF RECRUITMENT**

On recommendations for the Salinas City Manager and the SPD Chief of Police, the entire SPD was recruited to conduct the survey, provided they had an option to opt-out if they so desired. The survey was sent to the Assistant Chief of Police via email, who electronically distributed the surveys to potential recruits through official SPD email distribution lists. The SPD leadership encouraged participation in the survey, but did not make participation mandatory. All information gathered during this survey is unclassified.

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<sup>188</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis* and Brogatti, *Netdraw Network Visualization*.

## C. SURVEY

### 1. Social Network Survey

Figure 44 is an example of the Network Survey distributed to the Salinas Police Department from 15 September 2010 thru 27 September 2010, which was used in conjunction with the social network analysis portion of this thesis.<sup>189</sup>

**Organizational Network Survey**

The Defense Analysis Department of the Naval Post Graduate School is conducting a network study of the Salinas Police Department to better understand how information and intelligence is shared within the department, as well as with other government and civic agencies. The following survey is an important part of this study. With the results of this survey, we will gain a better understanding of how information flows between agencies and departments. This will aid us in the development of recommendations for further improvements in this important aspect of law enforcement.

In order for this survey to be effective, we need participation from as many people as possible by no later than **27 September 2010**.

The primary result of this survey will be a network map of who communicates with whom within the Salinas Police Department. Therefore, to participate in this survey, you must identify yourself with your response. Your answers to this survey will be shared only with research personnel who will keep the data strictly confidential.

Even if you do not respond to the survey, you may still appear in the network map based on others' reported communication with you. If you wish to opt out of the survey altogether, you must respond to the survey and answer "No" to the question about participation, below.

Thank you for helping in this research, it is our intent for the Salinas PD to continue to grow and improve its effectiveness in securing the city.

**When survey is complete, please click on red button to submit your survey.**

Select your name from the drop-down list:

Would you like to participate in this survey? (Yes or No)

If you answered "No" above, please return this survey as-is so that we can ensure you do not appear in the network map. Otherwise, please complete the rest of the survey:

Select your rank from the drop-down list:

What division of the Salinas PD do you work in?

What unit of the Salinas PD do you work in?

How many years have you been with the Salinas PD?  Whole Years Only

Select the name of your immediate supervisor:

The staff of the Salinas Police Department as well as other significant agencies and organizations are listed below. For each person, and or organization please answer the following questions:

**Contact:** On average, how often do you have contact with the following individuals or organizations? Contact can be meetings, phone calls, or emails.

**Advice:** On average, how often do you go to the following individuals or organizations for help or advice concerning work-related matters?

**Intel Sharing:** On average, how often do you share gang related intelligence with the following individuals or organizations?

**Assistance:** On average, how often did the following individuals and or organizations provide assistance and or expertise to your gang prevention activities over the last year?

Answer each question on a scale from 0 to 4:  
(0) Rarely or never; (1) Every few months; (2) Every few weeks; (3) Every week; (4) Every day

	Contact	Advice	Intel Sharing	Assistance
Officer 1	1	4	0	4
Officer 2	0	0	1	0
Officer 3	3	2	0	0
Officer 4	2	0	2	3

Figure 40. Social Network Analysis Survey Example used to analyze the Salinas Police Department

<sup>189</sup> The survey used for this research was developed using the David Krackhardt informal network model, and was adapted by Bruce Hoppe, Ph.D. from Boston University. Used with permission, from Hoppe, *Organizational Network Survey Spreadsheet Utility*.

## 2. Social Network Participation Results

The following table shows participation numbers, demonstrating the limitations of the social analysis conducted with the SPD. Total numbers were derived from historical SPD data, dated 19 August 2010. It is entirely possible that current numbers have changed slightly; however, at the time of the survey's execution, these are the numbers that the research team used.

	Admin Division										Investigations Division										Field Ops Division				
Rank	Leadership		Internal Affairs		Training		Community Services		PAL		MC Joint Gang Task Force		BNE Task Force		VSU		NARC/Vics		Investigations		Patrol		Traffic		
	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	Total	Survey	
Officer							3	1	1	1	3	1	4	4	1	5			14	4	84	27	1		
Sergeant			1	1	1	1	2				1	1			2		1		2	1	14	4	1	1	
Criminalist																					1	1			
Commander											1								1	1	4	2			
Deputy Chief of Police	3	2																							
Chief of Police	1	1																							
% Complete by Unit	78%		100%		100%		20%		100%		40%		100%		36%		0%		36%		33%		60%		

% Complete by Rank	Totals (Total)	Totals (Survey)	%
Officer	121	43	36%
Sergeant	25	8	36%
Criminalist	1	1	100%
Commander	8	3	60%
Deputy Chief of Police	3	2	87%
Chief of Police	1	1	100%
Totals	167	68	36%

Table 61. Salinas Police Department Network Analysis Survey Participation Results

### 3. Contact Network Working Data and Analysis

#### a. Weekly Contact Network Density, Average Degree, Centralization, Clustering, Path Length, and Cohesion Data

DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE <sup>190</sup>		
	Density	No. of Ties
	-----	-----
Salinas NetworkGE3	0.2200	753.0000

Table 62. Weekly Contact Network Density Results

FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES <sup>191</sup>				
-----				
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS				
	1	2	3	4
	OutDegree	InDegree	NrmOutDeg	NrmInDeg
	-----	-----	-----	-----
1 Mean	12.763	12.763	22.005	22.005
2 Std Dev	11.522	4.014	19.866	6.921
3 Sum	753.000	753.000	1298.276	1298.276
4 Variance	132.757	16.113	394.641	47.899
5 SSQ	17443.000	10561.000	51851.961	31394.174
6 MCSSQ	7832.678	950.678	23283.822	2826.034
7 Euc Norm	132.072	102.767	227.710	177.184
8 Minimum	0.000	2.000	0.000	3.448
9 Maximum	54.000	24.000	93.103	41.379
10 N of Obs	59.000	59.000	59.000	59.000
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 72.325%				
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 19.709%				

Table 63. Weekly Contact Network Average Degree Centrality and Centralization Results

<sup>190</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>191</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

CLUSTERING COEFFICIENT <sup>192</sup>
-----
Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.444
Weighted Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.353

Table 64. Weekly Contact Network Clustering Coefficient

GEODESIC DISTANCE <sup>193</sup>
-----
Average distance (among reachable pairs) = 1.943
Distance-based cohesion ("Compactness") = 0.532
(range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness)
Distance-weighted fragmentation ("Breadth") = 0.468

Table 65. Weekly Contact Network Average Path Length and Cohesion

***b. Daily Contact Network Density, Average Degree, Centralization, Clustering, Path Length, and Cohesion Data***

DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE <sup>194</sup>		
-----		
	Density	No. of Observations
	-----	-----
Salinas NetworkEQ4	0.050	171.000

Table 66. Daily Contact Network Density Results

<sup>192</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>193</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>194</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES <sup>195</sup>				
-----				
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS				
	1	2	3	4
	OutDegree	InDegree	NrmOutDeg	NrmInDeg
	-----	-----	-----	-----
1 Mean	2.898	2.898	4.997	4.997
2 Std Dev	3.074	2.023	5.299	3.487
3 Sum	171.000	171.000	294.828	294.828
4 Variance	9.447	4.091	28.083	12.162
5 SSQ	1053.000	737.000	3130.202	2190.844
6 MCSSQ	557.390	241.390	1656.926	717.568
7 Euc Norm	32.450	27.148	55.948	46.806
8 Minimum	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
9 Maximum	17.000	7.000	29.310	12.069
10 N of Obs	59.000	59.000	59.000	59.000
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 24.732%				
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 7.194%				

Table 67. Daily Contact Network Average Degree Centrality and Centralization Results

CLUSTERING COEFFICIENT <sup>196</sup>
-----
Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.379
Weighted Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.283

Table 68. Daily Contact Network Clustering Coefficient

GEODESIC DISTANCE <sup>197</sup>
-----
Average distance (among reachable pairs) = 4.382
Distance-based cohesion ("Compactness") = 0.176
(range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness)
Distance-weighted fragmentation ("Breadth") = 0.824

Table 69. Daily Contact Network Average Path Length and Cohesion

<sup>195</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>196</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>197</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

**c. Weekly Contact-Agency Network Density**

DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE <sup>198</sup>		
	Density	No. of Ties
Salinas Agency NetworkGE3	0.0405	43.0000

Table 70. Weekly Contact-Agency Network Density Results

**d. Daily Contact-Agency Network Density**

DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE <sup>199</sup>		
	Density	No. of Ties
Salinas Agency NetworkEQ4	0.0122	13.0000

Table 71. Daily Contact-Agency Network Density Results

**4. Advice Network Working Data**

**a. Weekly Advice Network Density, Average Degree, Centralization, Clustering, Path Length, and Cohesion Data**

DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE <sup>200</sup>		
	Density	No. of Ties
Advice NetworkGE3	0.0710	243.0000

Table 72. Weekly Advice Network Density Results

<sup>198</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>199</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>200</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.



FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES <sup>201</sup>				
-----				
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS				
	1	2	3	4
	OutDegree	InDegree	NrmOutDeg	NrmInDeg
	-----	-----	-----	-----
1 Mean	4.119	4.119	7.101	7.101
2 Std Dev	5.308	2.585	9.151	4.456
3 Sum	243.000	243.000	418.966	418.966
4 Variance	28.172	6.681	83.747	19.860
5 SSQ	2663.000	1395.000	7916.171	4146.849
6 MCSSQ	1662.169	394.169	4941.051	1171.729
7 Euc Norm	51.604	37.350	88.973	64.396
8 Minimum	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.724
9 Maximum	22.000	13.000	37.931	22.414
10 N of Obs	59.000	59.000	59.000	59.000
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 31.361%				
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 15.577%				

Table 73. Weekly Advice Network Average Degree Centrality and Centralization Results

CLUSTERING COEFFICIENT <sup>202</sup>
-----
Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.244
Weighted Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.

Table 74. Weekly Advise Network Clustering Coefficient

GEODESIC DISTANCE <sup>203</sup>
-----
Average distance (among reachable pairs) = 3.383
Distance-based cohesion ("Compactness") = 0.281
(range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness)
Distance-weighted fragmentation ("Breadth") = 0.719

Table 75. Weekly Advice Network Average Path Length and Cohesion

<sup>201</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>202</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>203</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

**b. Daily Advice Network Density, Average Degree, Centralization, Clustering, Path Length, and Cohesion Data**

DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE <sup>204</sup>		
	Density	No. of Ties
Advice NetworkEQ4	0.0231	79.0000

Table 76. Daily Advice Network Density Results

FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES <sup>205</sup>				
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS				
	1 OutDegree	2 InDegree	3 NrmOutDeg	4 NrmInDeg
1 Mean	1.339	1.339	2.309	2.309
2 Std Dev	2.535	1.323	4.371	2.280
3 Sum	79.000	79.000	136.207	136.207
4 Variance	6.427	1.749	19.107	5.201
5 SSQ	485.000	209.000	1441.736	621.284
6 MCSSQ	379.220	103.220	1127.290	306.838
7 Euc Norm	22.023	14.457	37.970	24.926
8 Minimum	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
9 Maximum	15.000	5.000	25.862	8.621
10 N of Obs	59.000	59.000	59.000	59.000
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 23.960%				
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 6.421%				

Table 77. Daily Advice Network Average Degree Centrality and Centralization Results

<sup>204</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>205</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

#### CLUSTERING COEFFICIENT<sup>206</sup>

Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.425  
Weighted Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.

Table 78. Daily Advise Network Clustering Coefficient

#### GEODESIC DISTANCE<sup>207</sup>

Average distance (among reachable pairs) = 2.931  
Distance-based cohesion ("Compactness") = 0.048  
(range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness)  
Distance-weighted fragmentation ("Breadth") = 0.952

Table 79. Daily Advice Network Average Path Length and Cohesion

#### c. *Weekly Advice-Agency Network Density*

##### DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE<sup>208</sup>

	Density	No. of Ties
	-----	-----
Advice Agency NetworkGE3	0.0160	16.0000

Table 80. Weekly Advice-Agency Network Density Results

#### d. *Daily Advice-Agency Network Density*

##### DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE<sup>209</sup>

	Density	No. of Ties
	-----	-----
Advice Agency NetworkEQ4	0.0070	7.0000

Table 81. Daily Advice-Agency Network Density Results

<sup>206</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>207</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>208</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>209</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

## 5. Intelligence Network Working Data

### a. Weekly Intelligence Network Density, Average Degree, Centralization, Clustering, Path Length, and Cohesion Data

DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE <sup>210</sup>		
	Density	No. of Ties
Intel NetworkGE3	0.0731	250.0000

Table 82. Weekly Intelligence Network Density Results

FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES <sup>211</sup>				
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS				
	1 OutDegree	2 InDegree	3 NrmOutDeg	4 NrmInDeg
1 Mean	4.237	4.237	7.306	7.306
2 Std Dev	5.700	2.242	9.827	3.866
3 Sum	250.000	250.000	431.034	431.034
4 Variance	32.486	5.028	96.570	14.948
5 SSQ	2976.000	1356.000	8846.611	4030.916
6 MCSSQ	1916.678	296.678	5697.616	881.920
7 Euc Norm	54.553	36.824	94.056	63.489
8 Minimum	0.000	1.000	0.000	1.724
9 Maximum	22.000	10.000	37.931	17.241
10 N of Obs	59.000	59.000	59.000	59.000
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 31.153%				
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 10.107%				

Table 83. Weekly Intelligence Network Average Degree Centrality and Centralization Results

<sup>210</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>211</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.324  
Weighted Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.193

Average distance (among reachable pairs) = 3.090  
 Distance-based cohesion ("Compactness") = 0.235  
 (range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness)  
 Distance-weighted fragmentation ("Breadth") = 0.765

	Density	No. of Ties
Intel NetworkEQ4	0.0234	80.0000

FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES <sup>215</sup>				
-----				
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS				
	1	2	3	4
	OutDegree	InDegree	NrmOutDeg	NrmInDeg
	-----	-----	-----	-----
1 Mean	1.356	1.356	2.338	2.338
2 Std Dev	2.184	1.423	3.766	2.454
3 Sum	80.000	80.000	137.931	137.931
4 Variance	4.772	2.026	14.184	6.022
5 SSQ	390.000	228.000	1159.334	677.765
6 MCSSQ	281.525	119.525	836.877	355.307
7 Euc Norm	19.748	15.100	34.049	26.034
8 Minimum	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
9 Maximum	9.000	5.000	15.517	8.621
10 N of Obs	59.000	59.000	59.000	59.000
Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 13.407%				
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 6.391%				

Table 87. Daily Intelligence Network Average Degree Centrality and Centralization Results

CLUSTERING COEFFICIENT <sup>216</sup>
-----
Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.475
Weighted Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.298

Table 88. Daily Intelligence Network Clustering Coefficient

GEODESIC DISTANCE <sup>217</sup>
-----
Average distance (among reachable pairs) = 2.753
Distance-based cohesion ("Compactness") = 0.049
(range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness)
Distance-weighted fragmentation ("Breadth") = 0.951

Table 89. Daily Intelligence Network Average Path Length and Cohesion

<sup>215</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>216</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>217</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

**c. Weekly Intelligence-Agency Network Density**

DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE <sup>218</sup>		
	Density	No. of Ties
	-----	-----
Intel Agency NetworkGE3	0.0160	16.0000

Table 90. Weekly Intelligence-Agency Network Density Results

**d. Daily Intelligence-Agency Network Density**

DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE <sup>219</sup>		
	Density	No. of Ties
	-----	-----
Intel Agency NetworkEQ4	0.0060	6.0000

Table 91. Daily Intelligence-Agency Network Density Results

**6. Assistance Network Working Data**

**a. Weekly Assistance Network Density, Average Degree, Centralization, Clustering, Path Length, and Cohesion Data**

DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE <sup>220</sup>		
	Density	No. of Ties
	-----	-----
Assistance NetworkGE3	0.0751	257.0000

Table 92. Weekly Assistance Network Density Results

<sup>218</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>219</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>220</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES<sup>221</sup>

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	1	2	3	4
	OutDegree	InDegree	NrmOutDeg	NrmInDeg
1 Mean	4.356	4.356	7.510	7.510
2 Std Dev	6.011	2.334	10.363	4.025
3 Sum	257.000	257.000	443.103	443.103
4 Variance	36.128	5.450	107.395	16.200
5 SSQ	3251.000	1441.000	9664.090	4283.591
6 MCSSQ	2131.525	321.525	6336.282	955.783
7 Euc Norm	57.018	37.961	98.306	65.449
8 Minimum	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
9 Maximum	27.000	11.000	46.552	18.966
10 N of Obs	59.000	59.000	59.000	59.000

Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 39.715%

Network Centralization (Indegree) = 11.653%

Table 93. Weekly Assistance Network Average Degree Centrality and Centralization Results

CLUSTERING COEFFICIENT<sup>222</sup>

Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.376

Weighted Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.204

Table 94. Weekly Assistance Network Clustering Coefficient

<sup>221</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>222</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.



GEODESIC DISTANCE <sup>223</sup>		
-----		
Average distance (among reachable pairs)	=	2.959
Distance-based cohesion ("Compactness")	=	0.250
(range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness)		
Distance-weighted fragmentation ("Breadth")	=	0.750

Table 95. Weekly Assistance Network Average Path Length and Cohesion

***b. Daily Assistance Network Density, Average Degree, Centralization, Clustering, Path Length, and Cohesion Data***

DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE <sup>224</sup>		
-----		
	Density	No. of
Ties		
	-----	-----
--		
Assistance NetworkEQ4	0.0248	85.0000

Table 96. Daily Assistance Network Density Results

<sup>223</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>224</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

FREEMAN'S DEGREE CENTRALITY MEASURES<sup>225</sup>

-----  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	1 OutDegree	2 InDegree	3 NrmOutDeg	4 NrmInDeg
	-----	-----	-----	-----
1 Mean	1.441	1.441	2.484	2.484
2 Std Dev	2.520	1.292	4.344	2.228
3 Sum	85.000	85.000	146.552	146.552
4 Variance	6.348	1.670	18.871	4.965
5 SSQ	497.000	221.000	1477.408	656.956
6 MCSSQ	374.542	98.542	1113.384	292.932
7 Euc Norm	22.293	14.866	38.437	25.631
8 Minimum	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
9 Maximum	13.000	5.000	22.414	8.621
10 N of Obs	59.000	59.000	59.000	59.000

Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 20.273%

Network Centralization (Indegree) = 6.243%

Table 97. Daily Assistance Network Average Degree Centrality and Centralization Results

CLUSTERING COEFFICIENT<sup>226</sup>

-----  
Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.471

Weighted Overall graph clustering coefficient: 0.236

Table 98. Daily Assistance Network Clustering Coefficient

<sup>225</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>226</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

GEODESIC DISTANCE <sup>227</sup>	
-----	
Average distance (among reachable pairs)	= 3.081
Distance-based cohesion ("Compactness")	= 0.055
(range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness)	
Distance-weighted fragmentation ("Breadth")	= 0.945

Table 99. Daily Assistance Network Average Path Length and Cohesion

*c. Weekly Assistance-Agency Network Density*

DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE <sup>228</sup>		
-----		
	Density	No. of Ties
	-----	-----
Assistance Agency NetworkGE3	0.0199	20.0000

Table 100. Weekly Assistance-Agency Network Density Results

*d. Daily Assistance-Agency Network Density*

DENSITY / AVERAGE MATRIX VALUE <sup>229</sup>		
-----		
	Density	No. of Ties
	-----	-----
Assistance Agency NetworkEQ4	0.0080	8.0000

Table 101. Daily Assistance-Agency Network Density Results

<sup>227</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>228</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

<sup>229</sup> Brogatti, Everett and Freeman, *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*.

## **APPENDIX F. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

### **A. DESCRIPTION**

The interviews conducted in conjunction with this study used questions developed from our condition variables. The questions ranged from baseline assessments of the gang situation, to perceptions of city government. Topics identified for discussion included: legitimacy, city security, population's trust in government, levels of intelligence sharing, and media engagement. Not all questions developed for this research were applicable to every person interviewed. Thus, we developed tailored interview questions for each interviewee based on their role in countering the gang problem in Salinas, whether they were involved in suppression, intervention, or prevention; or some combination of all of these. All interview questions were developed in advance, and were approved by the Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board.

To elicit thoughtful and candid responses from the interviewees, we attempted to be as transparent as possible by providing the questions identified for discussion prior to the interview. All interviews were conducted in person with at least two researchers present during the interview. At all times, interviewees were made aware that we were taking notes of the interview, and all respondents agreed to be quoted; however, some of the respondents did not want to be referred to by name in the final publication of this paper. Interviews ranged between 45 to 90 minutes in length. The feedback during the interviews reflected an array of substantive responses, from additional discussion topics beyond the scope of this research, to responses that directly addressed our key variables.

## **B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

The following list of questions, organized by each of our significant variables, represents the questions used to conduct the interviews necessary to support our research:

### **1. General Questions**

1. Do you think gangs are a problem within the city of Salinas?
2. Do you think the gang problem in Salinas is more of a problem now than it was 1–10 yrs ago?

### **2. Unity of Effort**

1. In your opinion, is the city of Salinas taking a unified approach to confronting gang violence?
  - a. Could you give some examples?
  - b. Does this unified approach include non-governmental entities?
  - c. How has this changed over the last 10 yrs?
2. Does the city encourage initiatives that include citizen involvement to counter gang violence?
  - a. Could you give some examples?
3. In your opinion is intelligence on gang activity freely shared among all departments within the city government?
4. Who makes strategic decisions regarding the city's counter gang strategy?
5. Does the chief of police and or Mayor publish guidance on counter-gang activity?
  - a. If so, how is this guidance distributed and to what level within the organization is this guidance disseminated?
6. Are there published critical intelligence requirements established for gang-activity?
  - a. Are these intelligence requirements known by all officers within the police department?
7. What are the agencies that most collaborate with your organization to counter gang violence?

8. What civil protection programs does the city of Salinas employ, such as neighborhood watch etc.?
  - a. Are any of these programs effective at harnessing population involvement in countering gang violence?
    - i. If not, what would make them more effective?
  - b. Do these programs enable the population to participate in its own security?

**3. Integration**

1. What are some existing barriers that hinder cooperation between government and nongovernment entities in countering gang violence?
2. Is the communication within the city government effective with respect to gang violence?
  - a. Within the police department?
  - b. With other law enforcement agencies?
  - c. With the city officials?
  - d. With the public?
3. What is the primary means of communication the police department uses to communicate with the local population on gang related issues?
4. What mechanisms does the city employ to gather feedback on the population's attitudes and perceptions in regards to gang violence?
5. How much would you say the work of the police department's gang activity is characterized by deliberate (planned) operations versus reactionary?
6. How is information / intelligence disseminated within your organization? Outside your organization?
  - a. Is intelligence on gang activity handled in a unique fashion?
  - b. To what extent are information / intelligence compartmentalized and or controlled strictly by the originator of the information?
    - i. What kind of information is compartmentalized within the police department?
  - c. To what extent does the police department share intelligence across interagency boundaries?

7. What are some collaborative tools the city uses to integrate its efforts to counter gang activity? Examples: Share point web site.

**4. Autonomy**

1. Would you consider the decision making process for counter-gang initiatives to be fast and efficient or slow and delaying?
  - a. What about decisions for tactical operations?

**5. Legitimacy**

1. In your opinion how important is legitimacy for a governing body?
2. What do you feel are some components of city government legitimacy?
3. What strengthens legitimacy; weakens legitimacy in city governments?
4. In your opinion is Salinas' government seen as legitimate?
5. In your opinion what are some of the indicators of legitimacy?
6. What are some steps the city government is taking to improve its legitimacy within the population?
7. In your opinion how has the legitimacy of the Salinas city government changed over the last 10 yrs. (Increased / Decreased)

**6. Security**

1. In your opinion how important is security for a city?
2. In your opinion is Salinas a secure city? How has this changed over the last 10 yrs?
3. What strengthens security; weakens security of a city?
4. In your opinion what are some indicators of a secure city?
5. What are some steps the city government is taking to improve the security of Salinas?

**7. Trust**

1. In your opinion do the citizens of Salinas trust the city government? Why or why not?
2. Does this trust or lack of trust follow racial, ethnic, cultural, or some other lines?
3. In your opinion what does the rejection of measure "k" indicate, if anything?

4. In your opinion does the population tell everything it knows about the gangs to local law enforcement?
  - a. Why or why not? What are some barriers preventing this?
5. In your opinion how has the population's trust in the city government changed over the last 10 years?

**8. Embeddedness**

1. In your opinion what percent of the police force lives within the city of Salinas?
2. Does your organization encourage community involvement outside of work related matters? How is this done?
3. Does your organization put an emphasis on cultural awareness? (Language training)

**9. Information Operations**

1. Does your organization issue press releases regarding gang activity?
2. What is the criterion your organization uses when issuing press releases related to gang activity? (per incident, periodically, pro-actively)
3. Does the Salinas city government have a coordinated message to influence target audiences within the population in regards to gang violence?
4. What is the central theme of the city's counter gang message?
  - a. What are the different target audiences the city focuses on?
  - b. What would you say is the most effective tool the gangs use to convey their messages to the population?
    - i. Do you believe the gangs have an IO theme?
    - ii. Would you consider the gangs IO campaign effective?
    - iii. Does the city have a similar tool you use to counter this?
5. Do you have a PIO to handle media engagements?
6. What mediums does the city use to put out its message to the population regarding gang violence?
7. How often does the city put out information messages to the population concerning its counter-gang strategy?
8. How has the city's media engagement changed over the last few years?



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